{"id":"CVE-2026-81505","aliases":["EUVD-2026-83051","GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4","GO-2026-6523"],"status":"published","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials","description":"Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00465,"percentile":0.40707,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-639"],"published":"2026-09-18T16:21:17Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/frain-dev/convoy","fixed_in":["0.9.3-0.20260724092134-1cc67cd16fb1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/frain-dev/convoy","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.3-0.20260724092134-1cc67cd16fb1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/frain-dev/convoy","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.3-0.20260724092134-1cc67cd16fb1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/frain-dev/convoy","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.3-0.20260724092134-1cc67cd16fb1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"frain-dev","product":"convoy"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/security/advisories/GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/pull/2755","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/commit/1cc67cd16fb1f8890cc83a3998d3f92dceb7fd06","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/releases/tag/v26.6.8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81505.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81505","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81505","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials","description":"Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T16:21:17.278Z","modified":"2026-09-18T17:15:48.985Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:18.075535Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-83051","description":"Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T16:21:17Z","modified":"2026-09-18T17:15:48Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:08.412343Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials","description":"## Summary\nfrain-dev/convoy (all versions up to and including v26.6.2, no patch\navailable) lets any authenticated caller who is authorized on at least one\nproject read ANY OTHER project's \"Source\" record by ID via\nGET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} -- regardless of whether\nthat Source actually belongs to the project named in the URL. The response\nincludes the Source's full PubSub broker configuration in plaintext\n(AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google credentials), with no redaction.\n\n## Details\n`Handler.GetSource` (api/handlers/source.go) resolves the caller's\nauthorization against the {projectID} in the URL via retrieveProject(), then\ncalls `sources.Service.FindSourceByID(ctx, project.UID, sourceID)`\n(internal/sources/impl.go). That function accepts a projectID parameter but\nnever uses it:\n\n    func (s *Service) FindSourceByID(ctx context.Context, projectID, id string) (*datastore.Source, error) {\n        row, err := s.repo.FetchSourceByID(ctx, common.StringToPgText(id))\n        ...\n    }\n\nThe underlying SQL query (internal/sources/repo/queries.sql,\n`fetchSourceByID`) has no project_id predicate at all:\n\n    SELECT ... FROM convoy.sources AS s\n    LEFT JOIN convoy.source_verifiers sv ON s.source_verifier_id = sv.id\n    WHERE s.id = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL\n\nSo the {projectID} in the URL only gates \"is the caller authorized to view\n*a* project\" -- it never re-validates that the fetched Source actually\nbelongs to that project. `LoadSourcesPaged` (the list endpoint) does\ncorrectly scope by project; only the single-item GetSource lookup is\naffected. `SourceResponse{*datastore.Source}` embeds the full database\nrecord with no redaction, so if the leaked Source is an AMQP/Kafka type, its\n`pub_sub.*.auth.password` field (a live, plaintext broker credential) is\nreturned verbatim.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n1. As a test account, create \"Victim Project\" and an AMQP Source in it\n   with a known broker password (verified against a real RabbitMQ broker,\n   not just stored -- Convoy performs a live connectivity check before\n   persisting an AMQP source).\n2. As the same or a different authenticated caller, create a completely\n   separate \"Attacker Project\".\n3. Call GET /api/v1/projects/{attacker_project_id}/sources/{victim_source_id}\n   -- i.e. a request whose URL and authorization check only ever resolve\n   the Attacker project.\n4. Verified in a Docker lab (convoy v26.6.2): the request returns 200 with\n   the Victim project's full Source object, including\n   pub_sub.amqp.auth.password matching the secret set in step 1 exactly.\n   The response's own `project_id` field is the Victim project's id, never\n   the Attacker project id used in the URL/authorization check.\n5. Negative control: an otherwise-identical request for a made-up source id\n   under the same Attacker project returns 404, confirming this is a real,\n   ID-specific hit and not a blanket-200 endpoint.\n\n(Community Edition license-gates org_limit=1/user_limit=1, so this PoC used\none account with two projects rather than two separate companies -- the\nvulnerable query performs no project-ownership check regardless of license\ntier, so a licensed multi-org deployment has the identical exposure between\ngenuinely different tenants.)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1100\" height=\"830\" alt=\"1_live_poc_evidence\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2d18d3f-8e70-40ec-ad7f-7f0ac1fdebe0\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\nAny authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder who has legitimate\naccess to at least one project on a Convoy instance can read any other\nproject's Source configuration by ID, including plaintext third-party\nmessage-broker credentials (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google PubSub). In a\nmulti-tenant deployment this is a direct cross-customer credential leak.\n\n## Fix\nAdd a project_id predicate to the fetchSourceByID query (and audit other\nsingle-item repository lookups reachable via a {projectID} route for the\nsame pattern), or re-check `source.ProjectID == project.UID` in the handler\nbefore returning the record.\n\n## Affected / Patched\nAffected: \u003c= v26.6.2 (latest release at time of report). No patched version\navailable.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T17:17:45Z","modified":"2026-09-18T17:17:48Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:19.455935Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81505","description":"Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T17:17:02.103Z","modified":"2026-09-24T21:25:27.05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.043898Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81505","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials","description":"Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T16:21:17.278Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23.956712855Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.131258Z"},{"id":"GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials","description":"## Summary\nfrain-dev/convoy (all versions up to and including v26.6.2, no patch\navailable) lets any authenticated caller who is authorized on at least one\nproject read ANY OTHER project's \"Source\" record by ID via\nGET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} -- regardless of whether\nthat Source actually belongs to the project named in the URL. The response\nincludes the Source's full PubSub broker configuration in plaintext\n(AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google credentials), with no redaction.\n\n## Details\n`Handler.GetSource` (api/handlers/source.go) resolves the caller's\nauthorization against the {projectID} in the URL via retrieveProject(), then\ncalls `sources.Service.FindSourceByID(ctx, project.UID, sourceID)`\n(internal/sources/impl.go). That function accepts a projectID parameter but\nnever uses it:\n\n    func (s *Service) FindSourceByID(ctx context.Context, projectID, id string) (*datastore.Source, error) {\n        row, err := s.repo.FetchSourceByID(ctx, common.StringToPgText(id))\n        ...\n    }\n\nThe underlying SQL query (internal/sources/repo/queries.sql,\n`fetchSourceByID`) has no project_id predicate at all:\n\n    SELECT ... FROM convoy.sources AS s\n    LEFT JOIN convoy.source_verifiers sv ON s.source_verifier_id = sv.id\n    WHERE s.id = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL\n\nSo the {projectID} in the URL only gates \"is the caller authorized to view\n*a* project\" -- it never re-validates that the fetched Source actually\nbelongs to that project. `LoadSourcesPaged` (the list endpoint) does\ncorrectly scope by project; only the single-item GetSource lookup is\naffected. `SourceResponse{*datastore.Source}` embeds the full database\nrecord with no redaction, so if the leaked Source is an AMQP/Kafka type, its\n`pub_sub.*.auth.password` field (a live, plaintext broker credential) is\nreturned verbatim.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n1. As a test account, create \"Victim Project\" and an AMQP Source in it\n   with a known broker password (verified against a real RabbitMQ broker,\n   not just stored -- Convoy performs a live connectivity check before\n   persisting an AMQP source).\n2. As the same or a different authenticated caller, create a completely\n   separate \"Attacker Project\".\n3. Call GET /api/v1/projects/{attacker_project_id}/sources/{victim_source_id}\n   -- i.e. a request whose URL and authorization check only ever resolve\n   the Attacker project.\n4. Verified in a Docker lab (convoy v26.6.2): the request returns 200 with\n   the Victim project's full Source object, including\n   pub_sub.amqp.auth.password matching the secret set in step 1 exactly.\n   The response's own `project_id` field is the Victim project's id, never\n   the Attacker project id used in the URL/authorization check.\n5. Negative control: an otherwise-identical request for a made-up source id\n   under the same Attacker project returns 404, confirming this is a real,\n   ID-specific hit and not a blanket-200 endpoint.\n\n(Community Edition license-gates org_limit=1/user_limit=1, so this PoC used\none account with two projects rather than two separate companies -- the\nvulnerable query performs no project-ownership check regardless of license\ntier, so a licensed multi-org deployment has the identical exposure between\ngenuinely different tenants.)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1100\" height=\"830\" alt=\"1_live_poc_evidence\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2d18d3f-8e70-40ec-ad7f-7f0ac1fdebe0\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\nAny authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder who has legitimate\naccess to at least one project on a Convoy instance can read any other\nproject's Source configuration by ID, including plaintext third-party\nmessage-broker credentials (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google PubSub). In a\nmulti-tenant deployment this is a direct cross-customer credential leak.\n\n## Fix\nAdd a project_id predicate to the fetchSourceByID query (and audit other\nsingle-item repository lookups reachable via a {projectID} route for the\nsame pattern), or re-check `source.ProjectID == project.UID` in the handler\nbefore returning the record.\n\n## Affected / Patched\nAffected: \u003c= v26.6.2 (latest release at time of report). No patched version\navailable.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T17:17:45Z","modified":"2026-09-28T17:10:51.160702463Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:52.534897Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6523","title":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials in github.com/frain-dev/convoy","description":"Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials in github.com/frain-dev/convoy","status":"published","published":"2026-09-28T16:43:40Z","modified":"2026-09-28T17:00:17.495324138Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:03.11707Z"}]}}