{"id":"CVE-2026-81728","aliases":["EUVD-2026-67233","GHSA-j8xc-7c27-7wj4"],"status":"published","title":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 SQL Injection via the CSV and XLSX Import Update Keys","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00441,"percentile":0.38765,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-89"],"published":"2026-08-27T20:07:33Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23Z","products":[{"vendor":"dolibarr","product":"dolibarr"},{"vendor":"dolibarr","product":"dolibarr_erp\\/crm"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/24b1b99c89c79a3fe2d1e83b22dc1810cf0fa6e1","tags":["patch","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr","tags":["product","Product","package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php#L925","tags":["technical-description","Product","article"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-before-24.0.0-sql-injection-via-the-csv-and-xlsx-import-update-keys","tags":["third-party-advisory","Patch","Product","Third Party Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81728","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8xc-7c27-7wj4"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81728.json","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81728","title":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 SQL Injection via the CSV and XLSX Import Update Keys","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:07:33.503Z","modified":"2026-09-24T14:19:48.1Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:29.327819Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-67233","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:07:33Z","modified":"2026-09-24T14:19:48Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:57.839356Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-j8xc-7c27-7wj4","title":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard...","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T21:31:53Z","modified":"2026-08-27T21:31:57Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:05.645531Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81728","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:18:55.183Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:05:29.76Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.035353Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-81728","title":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 SQL Injection via the CSV and XLSX Import Update Keys","description":"Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*\\./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:07:33.503Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23.351812405Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.131258Z"}]}}