{"id":"CVE-2026-82438","aliases":["EUVD-2026-77514","GHSA-xf44-6rjp-v8cm"],"status":"published","title":"Apache Storm Webapp: Authenticated API Responses Exposed to Arbitrary Web Origins","description":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP\ncomponents served to an authenticated user.\n\nThe Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also\nsending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to\nhonour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.\n\nThe shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name\nwhere an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own\ndefaults, which allow credentials.\n\nFinally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET\nrequest. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy\nentirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.\n\nIn each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and\nlog data on their behalf.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the\nCORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to\nfalse.\n\nNote that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such\ntooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse\nproxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and\nrejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.0021,"percentile":0.11349,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-346","CWE-942"],"published":"2026-09-14T14:02:07Z","modified":"2026-09-14T21:31:41Z","products":[{"vendor":"apache software foundation","product":"apache storm webapp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/2o7tl3hcdd865njxsn4d9cxp1frkctz3","tags":["vendor-advisory"]},{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/17"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82438"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xf44-6rjp-v8cm"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82438","title":"Apache Storm Webapp: Authenticated API Responses Exposed to Arbitrary Web Origins","description":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP\ncomponents served to an authenticated user.\n\nThe Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also\nsending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to\nhonour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.\n\nThe shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name\nwhere an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own\ndefaults, which allow credentials.\n\nFinally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET\nrequest. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy\nentirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.\n\nIn each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and\nlog data on their behalf.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the\nCORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to\nfalse.\n\nNote that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such\ntooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse\nproxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and\nrejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T14:02:07.213Z","modified":"2026-09-14T19:52:48.724Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-346","CWE-942"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:35.004553Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-77514","description":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP\ncomponents served to an authenticated user.\n\nThe Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also\nsending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to\nhonour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.\n\nThe shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name\nwhere an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own\ndefaults, which allow credentials.\n\nFinally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET\nrequest. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy\nentirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.\n\nIn each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and\nlog data on their behalf.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the\nCORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to\nfalse.\n\nNote that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such\ntooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse\nproxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and\nrejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T14:02:07Z","modified":"2026-09-14T19:52:48Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:19.383429Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-xf44-6rjp-v8cm","title":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read...","description":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP\ncomponents served to an authenticated user.\n\nThe Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also\nsending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to\nhonour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.\n\nThe shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name\nwhere an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own\ndefaults, which allow credentials.\n\nFinally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET\nrequest. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy\nentirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.\n\nIn each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and\nlog data on their behalf.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the\nCORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to\nfalse.\n\nNote that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such\ntooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse\nproxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and\nrejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T15:32:49Z","modified":"2026-09-14T21:31:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:52.325814Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82438","description":"Description\n\nThree separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP\ncomponents served to an authenticated user.\n\nThe Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also\nsending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to\nhonour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.\n\nThe shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name\nwhere an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own\ndefaults, which allow credentials.\n\nFinally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET\nrequest. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy\nentirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.\n\nIn each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and\nlog data on their behalf.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the\nCORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to\nfalse.\n\nNote that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such\ntooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse\nproxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and\nrejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T15:17:10.9Z","modified":"2026-09-14T20:58:48.43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-346","CWE-942"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:46.980627Z"}]}}