{"id":"CVE-2026-82725","aliases":["EEF-CVE-2026-82725","EUVD-2026-68337","GHSA-7xhg-xphm-f458"],"status":"published","title":"AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data","description":"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00449,"percentile":0.39493,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-639"],"published":"2026-08-31T03:09:25Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"ash_phoenix","fixed_in":["2.3.25"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"ash_phoenix","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.6.0-rc.1"},{"fixed":"2.3.25"}]}],"versions":["0.6.0-rc.1","0.6.0-rc.2","0.6.0-rc.3","0.6.0-rc.4","0.6.0-rc.5","0.6.0-rc.6","0.6.0-rc.7","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2-rc.0","0.7.2-rc.1","0.7.2-rc.2","0.7.3","0.7.4","0.7.5","0.7.6-rc.0","0.7.7","1.0.0-pre.0","1.0.0-pre.1","1.0.0-pre.2","1.0.0-rc.0","1.0.0-rc.1","1.1.0","1.1.0-rc.0","1.1.0-rc.1","1.1.0-rc.2","1.1.0-rc.3","1.1.1","1.1.2","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.10","1.2.11","1.2.12","1.2.13","1.2.14","1.2.15","1.2.16","1.2.17","1.2.18","1.2.19","1.2.2","1.2.20","1.2.21","1.2.22","1.2.23","1.2.24","1.2.25","1.2.26","1.2.3","1.2.4","1.2.5","1.2.6","1.2.7","1.2.8","1.2.9","1.3.0","1.3.1","1.3.2","1.3.3","1.3.4","1.3.5","1.3.6","1.3.7","2.0.0","2.0.0-rc.0","2.0.0-rc.1","2.0.0-rc.2","2.0.0-rc.3","2.0.0-rc.4","2.0.0-rc.5","2.0.0-rc.6","2.0.0-rc.7","2.0.0-rc.8","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.10","2.1.11","2.1.12","2.1.13","2.1.14","2.1.15","2.1.16","2.1.17","2.1.18","2.1.19","2.1.2","2.1.20","2.1.21","2.1.22","2.1.23","2.1.24","2.1.25","2.1.26","2.1.3","2.1.4","2.1.5","2.1.6","2.1.7","2.1.8","2.1.9","2.2.0","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.10","2.3.11","2.3.12","2.3.13","2.3.14","2.3.15","2.3.16","2.3.17","2.3.18","2.3.19","2.3.2","2.3.20","2.3.21","2.3.22","2.3.23","2.3.24","2.3.3","2.3.4","2.3.5","2.3.6","2.3.7","2.3.8","2.3.9"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"ash-project","product":"ash_phoenix"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-7xhg-xphm-f458","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82725.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82725","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit/a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15b","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/82xxx/CVE-2026-82725.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82725","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/ash_phoenix","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82725","title":"AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data","description":"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T03:09:25.85Z","modified":"2026-08-31T15:49:46.161Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:46.161838Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-68337","description":"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T03:09:25Z","modified":"2026-08-31T15:49:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"low"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:20.704822Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82725","description":"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T04:17:29.167Z","modified":"2026-09-01T21:15:00.147Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.691315Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82725","title":"AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data","description":"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T03:09:25.85Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45.422425199Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.482949Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-82725","title":"AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data","description":"## Summary\n\nAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\n`AshPhoenix.FilterForm` resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied `path` with `Ash.Resource.Info.related/2`, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. `parse_path_and_field/2` also rewrote a `field` naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so `field=some_private_rel` was accepted too. Both `path` and `field` come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to `Ash.Query.do_filter/2` without the public-only enforcement of `Ash.Filter.parse_input/2`. The fix resolves each hop with `Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2`, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe resource exposes an `AshPhoenix.FilterForm` whose params the attacker controls, and has a non-public relationship to data that should not be filterable.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T03:09:25.85Z","modified":"2026-09-08T03:30:11.84374647Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"}]}}