{"id":"CVE-2026-83805","aliases":["EUVD-2026-84815","GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","PYSEC-2026-4111"],"status":"published","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00294,"percentile":0.2228,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"published":"2026-09-22T19:47:42Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"nautobot","fixed_in":["3.1.8"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"nautobot","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.0.0"},{"fixed":"3.1.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"nautobot","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.0.0"},{"fixed":"3.1.8"}]}],"versions":["3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.10","3.0.11","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.0a1","3.1.0a2","3.1.0a3","3.1.0a4","3.1.0a5","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"nautobot","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.0.0"},{"fixed":"3.1.8"}]}],"versions":["3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.10","3.0.11","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.0a1","3.1.0a2","3.1.0a3","3.1.0a4","3.1.0a5","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nautobot","product":"nautobot"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/83xxx/CVE-2026-83805.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83805","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/nautobot","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-83805","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T19:47:42.826Z","modified":"2026-09-26T00:09:18.288Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:45:14.072357Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-84815","description":"Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T19:47:42Z","modified":"2026-09-26T00:09:18Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:54.622662Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T20:37:33Z","modified":"2026-09-22T20:37:37Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:20.575159Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-83805","description":"Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T20:17:09.487Z","modified":"2026-09-26T01:17:02.7Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.703874Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-83805","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T19:47:42.826Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30.600913185Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.482949Z"},{"id":"GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T20:37:33Z","modified":"2026-10-01T17:56:10.652773917Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:54.055966Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-4111","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","description":"### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T16:38:37.079884Z","modified":"2026-10-01T17:45:10.084187323Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:57.255153Z"}]}}