{"id":"CVE-2026-84363","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1790413170","EUVD-2026-69610","GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx","GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf"],"status":"published","title":"Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials","description":"Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00448,"percentile":0.39441,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-444"],"published":"2026-09-01T20:22:59Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:11Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"hono","fixed_in":["4.13.5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"hono","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.13.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"hono","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.12.12-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.12.12-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["3.12.12"],"bundled":14},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"hono","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.13.5"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"honojs","product":"hono"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/9c28d724c5a7fb086ebaa812fdc1ad6e957c63bc","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.13.5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84363","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/84xxx/CVE-2026-84363.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/honojs/hono","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84363","title":"Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials","description":"Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T20:22:59.164Z","modified":"2026-09-02T12:19:50.946Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-444"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:08.734143Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-69610","description":"Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T20:22:59Z","modified":"2026-09-02T12:19:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:16.020579Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx","title":"Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials","description":"### Summary\n\nHono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a `?` appearing after a `#` is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.\n\n### Details\n\nA fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, `new URL()`, reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first `#` onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.\n\nFor one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:\n\n- A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.\n- The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.\n\nThe same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.\n\nThis requires a request target containing a literal `#` to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.\n\nThis may lead to:\n\n- filtering rules, allow/deny lists, and audit logging being blind to parameters the application still processes\n- a cached response being stored under a key that does not reflect the parameters used to produce it, and served to other users\n- stored cross-site scripting, where such a parameter is reflected into a cached HTML response without escaping\n\nThis issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal `#` through to the request URL.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T21:22:50Z","modified":"2026-09-08T21:22:51Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-444"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:14.764963Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84363","description":"Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T21:18:47.173Z","modified":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.08Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-444"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:43.04945Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-84363","title":"Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials","description":"Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.5, Hono's query helpers treat a question mark after a literal hash fragment as the start of a query string, so the application can read request parameters that browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies, filtering rules, parameter allow and deny lists, access logging, request validation, and other middleware do not observe. The Cache Middleware removes the fragment when building its cache key, allowing a response influenced by parameters inside the fragment to be stored under a key that omits those parameters and later served to other users. This can bypass filtering and auditing, poison cached responses, and enable stored cross-site scripting when an affected parameter is reflected into cached HTML without escaping. Exploitation requires a runtime and intermediary path that passes a literal hash character through to the request URL; Cloudflare Workers and intermediaries that strip fragments are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-01T20:22:59.164Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:11.845324522Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-444"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.482949Z"},{"id":"GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx","title":"Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials","description":"### Summary\n\nHono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a `?` appearing after a `#` is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.\n\n### Details\n\nA fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, `new URL()`, reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first `#` onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.\n\nFor one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:\n\n- A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.\n- The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.\n\nThe same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.\n\nThis requires a request target containing a literal `#` to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.\n\nThis may lead to:\n\n- filtering rules, allow/deny lists, and audit logging being blind to parameters the application still processes\n- a cached response being stored under a key that does not reflect the parameters used to produce it, and served to other users\n- stored cross-site scripting, where such a parameter is reflected into a cached HTML response without escaping\n\nThis issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal `#` through to the request URL.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T21:22:50Z","modified":"2026-09-08T21:30:04.756349206Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-444"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:45.639885Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1790413170","title":"TuxCare security update for hono (15 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt hono to address 15 CVEs. Fixed in 3.12.12-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T08:59:30Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:56.5204861Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:48.65893Z"}]}}