{"id":"CVE-2026-86249","aliases":["EUVD-2026-107228","GHSA-9hx3-v45m-g57x"],"status":"published","title":"Apache bRPC: Authentication bypass when a server sets ServerOptions.internal_port and ServerOptions.auth","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00561,"percentile":0.46987,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-287"],"published":"2026-10-21T12:17:42Z","modified":"2026-11-01T02:30:33Z","products":[{"vendor":"apache software foundation","product":"apache brpc"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/apache/brpc/pulls/3525","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86249","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9hx3-v45m-g57x"},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/86xxx/CVE-2026-86249.json","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-86249","title":"Apache bRPC: Authentication bypass when a server sets ServerOptions.internal_port and ServerOptions.auth","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T12:17:42.903Z","modified":"2026-10-30T17:05:52.803Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:49:42.666099Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-107228","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T12:17:42Z","modified":"2026-10-30T17:05:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:05.567782Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-9hx3-v45m-g57x","title":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP...","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T15:42:30Z","modified":"2026-10-30T18:33:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:52.01816Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-86249","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T13:20:04.47Z","modified":"2026-10-30T17:17:30.24Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:02.371082Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-86249","title":"Apache bRPC: Authentication bypass when a server sets ServerOptions.internal_port and ServerOptions.auth","description":"On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403. \n\n\n\nMitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 . \n\n\n\nUsers who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T12:17:42.903Z","modified":"2026-11-01T02:30:33.827115888Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:18.825071Z"}]}}