{"id":"CVE-2026-86304","aliases":["EUVD-2026-72177","GHSA-34pg-3x4x-4vf5"],"status":"published","title":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor","description":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00311,"percentile":0.24288,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-347"],"published":"2026-09-06T22:24:19Z","modified":"2026-09-08T21:34:07Z","references":[{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes","tags":["release-notes"]},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089","tags":["related"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86304"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-34pg-3x4x-4vf5"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-86304","title":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor","description":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-06T22:24:19.368Z","modified":"2026-09-08T18:41:46.209Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-347"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:49:31.546614Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-72177","description":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-06T22:24:19Z","modified":"2026-09-08T18:41:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:28.557436Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-34pg-3x4x-4vf5","title":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because...","description":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-07T00:30:20Z","modified":"2026-09-08T21:34:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-347"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:35.275364Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-86304","description":"MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST-\u003enew with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion-\u003enew_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-06T23:17:39.483Z","modified":"2026-09-08T19:20:13.933Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-347"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:44.082631Z"}]}}