{"id":"CVE-2026-89426","aliases":["EUVD-2026-86579","GHSA-mhvq-rh33-27cf"],"status":"published","title":"Knit Pay \u003c= 9.6.1.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation via Gravity Forms Role Field","description":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00462,"percentile":0.40327,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-09-25T07:40:30Z","modified":"2026-09-25T14:17:21Z","products":[{"vendor":"knitpay","product":"knit pay – cashfree, instamojo, razorpay, paypal and more"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ee5df686-7bf8-42cc-9356-92570bd02355?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.6.1.0/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L384"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.6.1.0/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L381"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.6.1.0/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L989"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.6.1.0/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Processor.php#L493"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.4.0.1/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L384"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.4.0.1/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L381"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.4.0.1/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Extension.php#L989"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/knit-pay/tags/9.4.0.1/packages/wp-pay-extensions/gravityforms/src/Processor.php#L493"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3706862%40knit-pay\u0026new=3706862%40knit-pay"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89426"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mhvq-rh33-27cf"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-89426","title":"Knit Pay \u003c= 9.6.1.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation via Gravity Forms Role Field","description":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T07:40:30.779Z","modified":"2026-09-25T13:00:13.78Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:55.526923Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-86579","description":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T07:40:30Z","modified":"2026-09-25T13:00:13Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:55.846756Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mhvq-rh33-27cf","title":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable...","description":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T09:31:08Z","modified":"2026-09-25T09:31:16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:24.75064Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-89426","description":"The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's `user_role_field_id` — and passing it to `WP_User::set_role()` without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to `$lead['created_by']` — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T08:16:40.94Z","modified":"2026-09-25T14:17:21.75Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:51.388161Z"}]}}