{"id":"CVE-2026-91982","aliases":["EUVD-2026-78653","GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774","GHSA-jmr8-r558-3jhx","GO-2026-6722"],"status":"published","title":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 TOTP Secret Disclosure via API","description":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00346,"percentile":0.28358,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-312","CWE-522"],"published":"2026-09-15T15:18:26Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:43Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"code.vikunja.io/api","fixed_in":["2.6.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"code.vikunja.io/api","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.5.0"},{"fixed":"2.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"code.vikunja.io/api","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"code.vikunja.io/api","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"go-vikunja","product":"vikunja"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-totp-secret-disclosure-via-api","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91982","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jmr8-r558-3jhx"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/91xxx/CVE-2026-91982.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-91982","title":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 TOTP Secret Disclosure via API","description":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:26.212Z","modified":"2026-09-17T15:14:33.105Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:52.773089Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-78653","description":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:26Z","modified":"2026-09-17T15:14:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:11.615612Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774","title":"Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth","description":"### Summary\nOnce a user has TOTP enabled, the API still hands back the raw shared secret to anyone holding that account's access token. Reading it doesn't ask for the password, even though disabling TOTP does. So a stolen token, an XSS, or a browser left open is enough to copy the second factor into your own authenticator and keep generating valid codes indefinitely.\n\n### Details\n`GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp` returns the full TOTP object, including the secret field and the otpauth:// provisioning URL. `GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode` renders the same secret as a QR image. Neither requires re-authentication, the access token alone is enough.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the rest of the flow: `POST /api/v1/user/settings/totp/disable` calls CheckUserPassword before it will turn TOTP off. So the destructive action is gated behind the password, but reading out the secret that backs the second factor isn't. There's also no reason for the secret to be readable at all once enrollment is finished, the client only needs it during setup.\n\nThe fix is to stop returning secret/url/the QR code once enabled is true (only expose them during the enrollment window). Requiring the password on the read, like disable already does, would also be reasonable.\n\n### PoC\nThe attacker needs the victim's access token, from an XSS, a leaked/stolen token, or an unlocked session. TOTP must already be enabled on the account.\n\n1. With the victim's bearer token, call:\n```\nGET /api/v1/user/settings/totp\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cvictim_token\u003e\n```\nThe response contains the shared secret and the otpauth:// URL:\n```\n{\"secret\": \"\u003cbase32 secret\u003e\", \"enabled\": true, \"url\": \"otpauth://totp/...\"}\n```\n2. Paste that secret (or scan `/api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode`) into any authenticator app.\n3. It now produces the same 6-digit codes as the victim's device. Nothing is logged and the victim gets no notification.\n\n### Impact\nThis defeats the purpose of the second factor. 2FA is supposed to survive exactly this situation, a compromised password or a hijacked session, but a single read of the account's own settings hands over the shared secret with no step-up check and no trace. Combined with a known or later-recovered password, it's a durable account takeover that TOTP was meant to prevent.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-09T20:51:17Z","modified":"2026-10-09T20:51:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-312","CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:31.175024Z"},{"id":"GHSA-jmr8-r558-3jhx","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth","description":"### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nVikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-15T18:32:30Z","modified":"2026-10-09T20:51:11Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:31.175024Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-91982","description":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T16:17:55.227Z","modified":"2026-09-17T16:18:32.237Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:47.668237Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-91982","title":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 TOTP Secret Disclosure via API","description":"Vikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:26.212Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:43.446805676Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:20.269367Z"},{"id":"GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774","title":"Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth","description":"### Summary\nOnce a user has TOTP enabled, the API still hands back the raw shared secret to anyone holding that account's access token. Reading it doesn't ask for the password, even though disabling TOTP does. So a stolen token, an XSS, or a browser left open is enough to copy the second factor into your own authenticator and keep generating valid codes indefinitely.\n\n### Details\n`GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp` returns the full TOTP object, including the secret field and the otpauth:// provisioning URL. `GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode` renders the same secret as a QR image. Neither requires re-authentication, the access token alone is enough.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the rest of the flow: `POST /api/v1/user/settings/totp/disable` calls CheckUserPassword before it will turn TOTP off. So the destructive action is gated behind the password, but reading out the secret that backs the second factor isn't. There's also no reason for the secret to be readable at all once enrollment is finished, the client only needs it during setup.\n\nThe fix is to stop returning secret/url/the QR code once enabled is true (only expose them during the enrollment window). Requiring the password on the read, like disable already does, would also be reasonable.\n\n### PoC\nThe attacker needs the victim's access token, from an XSS, a leaked/stolen token, or an unlocked session. TOTP must already be enabled on the account.\n\n1. With the victim's bearer token, call:\n```\nGET /api/v1/user/settings/totp\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cvictim_token\u003e\n```\nThe response contains the shared secret and the otpauth:// URL:\n```\n{\"secret\": \"\u003cbase32 secret\u003e\", \"enabled\": true, \"url\": \"otpauth://totp/...\"}\n```\n2. Paste that secret (or scan `/api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode`) into any authenticator app.\n3. It now produces the same 6-digit codes as the victim's device. Nothing is logged and the victim gets no notification.\n\n### Impact\nThis defeats the purpose of the second factor. 2FA is supposed to survive exactly this situation, a compromised password or a hijacked session, but a single read of the account's own settings hands over the shared secret with no step-up check and no trace. Combined with a known or later-recovered password, it's a durable account takeover that TOTP was meant to prevent.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-09T20:51:17Z","modified":"2026-10-19T21:41:10.522955718Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-312","CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.077781Z"},{"id":"GHSA-jmr8-r558-3jhx","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth","description":"### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nVikunja before 2.6.0 continues to expose the raw TOTP shared secret after enrollment through the GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp and /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode endpoints without re-authentication. Attackers with a valid access token can read the secret, import it into their own authenticator, and generate valid codes indefinitely to defeat the second factor and enable account takeover.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-15T18:32:30Z","modified":"2026-10-09T21:00:06.431838779Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:50.687609Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6722","title":"Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth in code.vikunja.io/api","description":"Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth in code.vikunja.io/api.\n\nNOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.\n\n(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)\n\nThe additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api before v2.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-19T21:08:26Z","modified":"2026-10-19T21:31:52.830377661Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:03.11707Z"}]}}