{"id":"CVE-2026-92537","aliases":["EUVD-2026-90455","GHSA-r57r-xx5c-pcg3"],"status":"published","title":"Newsletter \u003c= 9.3.9 - Unauthenticated Insufficiently Protected Credentials via '/tnp/l/' Click-Tracking REST Endpoint (Raw Subscriber Token Cookie Disclosure)","description":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=\u003cid\u003e-\u003craw_token\u003e` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy set — can replay it indefinitely to obtain the victim's credential.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00322,"percentile":0.25394,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-522"],"published":"2026-10-01T02:27:46Z","modified":"2026-10-01T15:17:35Z","products":[{"vendor":"satollo","product":"newsletter – send awesome emails from wordpress"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ed68a4ff-a2aa-4df7-96b1-f094bce4b9b7?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/statistics/statistics.php#L174"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/includes/module.php#L403"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/includes/module-base.php#L441"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/statistics/statistics.php#L107"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/statistics/statistics.php#L335"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/newsletter/tags/9.3.9/includes/module-base.php#L1209"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3709894%40newsletter%2Ftags%2F9.4.0\u0026old=3695457%40newsletter%2Ftags%2F9.3.9"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92537"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r57r-xx5c-pcg3"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92537","title":"Newsletter \u003c= 9.3.9 - Unauthenticated Insufficiently Protected Credentials via '/tnp/l/' Click-Tracking REST Endpoint (Raw Subscriber Token Cookie Disclosure)","description":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=\u003cid\u003e-\u003craw_token\u003e` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy set — can replay it indefinitely to obtain the victim's credential.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T02:27:46.143Z","modified":"2026-10-01T14:21:14.764Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:48:24.536396Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-90455","description":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=\u003cid\u003e-\u003craw_token\u003e` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy set — can replay it indefinitely to obtain the victim's credential.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T02:27:46Z","modified":"2026-10-01T14:21:14Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:46.15359Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-r57r-xx5c-pcg3","title":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to...","description":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=\u003cid\u003e-\u003craw_token\u003e` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy set — can replay it indefinitely to obtain the victim's credential.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T03:31:13Z","modified":"2026-10-01T03:31:22Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:39.341866Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92537","description":"The Newsletter – Send awesome emails from WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials in all versions up to, and including, 9.3.9 The plugin's public click-tracking REST route `/tnp/l/` is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e '__return_true'` and, upon receiving a valid keyed-MD5 signature, calls `set_user_cookie()`, which emits a `Set-Cookie: newsletter=\u003cid\u003e-\u003craw_token\u003e` response header to the requester because the subscriber object loaded via `get_user()` lacks the `_trusted` property, causing `get_user_key()` to return the raw token column value instead of its MD5-masked variant. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who obtain any signed click-tracking URL for a target subscriber to receive that subscriber's permanent raw authentication cookie, which they can then use to export the subscriber's full PII record via the JSON profile-export endpoint (`?na=px`), rewrite the subscriber's stored profile (`?na=ps`), and silently unsubscribe the subscriber via the RFC-8058 one-click endpoint (`?na=ocu`), none of which require a nonce, password, or email challenge. Signed tracking URLs are embedded in every external link of every newsletter delivered to a subscriber, carry no timestamp, and never expire until the site's relink key rotates, meaning that any party who observes such a URL — through a forwarded email, a shared inbox, a mail-gateway log, or Referer headers on the redirect target, which has no Referrer-Policy set — can replay it indefinitely to obtain the victim's credential.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T03:16:59.667Z","modified":"2026-10-01T15:17:35.69Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-522"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:53.097633Z"}]}}