{"id":"CVE-2026-92799","aliases":["EUVD-2026-86543","GHSA-jv6x-x2jh-jfmr"],"status":"published","title":"Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System \u003c= 28.2 - Unauthenticated Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling via 'verification_code' Parameter Type Juggling via json_data","description":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00367,"percentile":0.30838,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-285"],"published":"2026-09-25T06:39:55Z","modified":"2026-09-25T13:08:26Z","products":[{"vendor":"ladela","product":"online scheduling and appointment booking system – bookly"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d24fa600-7698-4081-92f5-e11606928886?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/Validator.php#L276"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/base/Component.php#L182"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L785"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L903"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/UserBookingData.php#L638"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L1447"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L15"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3707284%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool\u0026new=3707284%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92799"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jv6x-x2jh-jfmr"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92799","title":"Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System \u003c= 28.2 - Unauthenticated Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling via 'verification_code' Parameter Type Juggling via json_data","description":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T06:39:55.585Z","modified":"2026-09-25T10:37:28.171Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:48:24.536396Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-86543","description":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T06:39:55Z","modified":"2026-09-25T10:37:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:55.846756Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-jv6x-x2jh-jfmr","title":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable...","description":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T09:31:06Z","modified":"2026-09-25T09:31:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:24.174061Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92799","description":"The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T07:16:55.607Z","modified":"2026-09-25T13:08:26.93Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:51.388161Z"}]}}