{"id":"CVE-2026-92953","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1791279062","CLSA-2026-1791282796","EUVD-2026-81602","GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr","GHSA-5v7w-95g5-pj6q","ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-92953"],"status":"published","title":"vm2 3.11.0 through 3.11.7 Prototype Pollution via TypedArray","description":"vm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00501,"percentile":0.43251,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1321","CWE-913"],"published":"2026-09-17T13:46:12Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.8"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.6-aikido.1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.6-root.io.1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.0"},{"last_affected":"3.11.7"},{"fixed":"3.11.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.7-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.11.7-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["3.11.7"],"bundled":8},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.5-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.11.5-tuxcare.5"}]}],"versions":["3.11.5","3.11.5-tuxcare.1","3.11.5-tuxcare.2","3.11.5-tuxcare.3","3.11.5-tuxcare.4"],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"3.11.0"},{"fixed":"3.11.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.6-aikido.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.6-root.io.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"patriksimek","product":"vm2"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.11.0-through-3.11.7-prototype-pollution-via-typedarray","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92953","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/92a10fca7b3ca63bb1574b6795540264f6805b30","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5v7w-95g5-pj6q"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/92xxx/CVE-2026-92953.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92953","title":"vm2 3.11.0 through 3.11.7 Prototype Pollution via TypedArray","description":"vm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:12.146Z","modified":"2026-09-18T19:49:31.925Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:48:35.749498Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-81602","description":"vm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:12Z","modified":"2026-09-18T19:49:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:07.574446Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr","title":"vm2: Default VM can mutate host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer intrinsics after the host-prototype pollution fix","description":"## Summary\n\nvm2's current host-intrinsic prototype protection is incomplete. The fix for `GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq` blocks sandbox writes into classic host intrinsics such as `Object.prototype`, `Array.prototype`, and `Function.prototype`, but current head still lets sandbox code in a default `VM` reach and mutate host `Uint8Array.prototype`, `%TypedArray%.prototype`, and `ArrayBuffer.prototype`.\n\nAfter `VM.run()` returns, normal host typed-array and ArrayBuffer objects observe attacker-controlled properties and methods installed by the sandbox.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe existing mitigation relies on `protectedHostObjects` in `lib/bridge.js`. That set is populated from `otherGlobalPrototypes`, which is built from a fixed inventory of classic globals:\n\n```js\nconst globalsList = [\n  'Number', 'String', 'Boolean', 'Date', 'RegExp', 'Map', 'WeakMap',\n  'Set', 'WeakSet', 'Promise', 'Function'\n];\n```\n\nThe inventory omits typed-array and ArrayBuffer intrinsics. Sandbox code can still reuse the host-prototype walking primitive from the prior public advisory:\n\n```js\nconst lookupGetter = ({}).__lookupGetter__;\nconst apply = Buffer.apply;\nconst protoGetter = apply.apply(lookupGetter, [Buffer, ['__proto__']]);\nconst hostBuffer = Buffer.from([1]);\n\nconst hostBufferPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBuffer);\nconst hostUint8ArrayPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBufferPrototype);\nconst hostTypedArrayPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostUint8ArrayPrototype);\nconst hostArrayBufferPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBuffer.buffer);\n```\n\nThose objects are not sandbox-local. Inside the sandbox, `hostUint8ArrayPrototype === Uint8Array.prototype`, `hostTypedArrayPrototype === Object.getPrototypeOf(Uint8Array.prototype)`, and `hostArrayBufferPrototype === ArrayBuffer.prototype` are all false. Because the objects are not in `protectedHostObjects`, bridge `defineProperty` writes are forwarded into the real host objects.\n\nThis is the same guard-coverage boundary as the previous host-intrinsic prototype pollution fix, but with a missing intrinsic family. The bridge already has the correct enforcement shape; the protected inventory is too narrow.\n\n## PoC\n\nPoV: `poc/pov-host-typedarray-arraybuffer-prototype-pollution.js`\n\nCurrent-head output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"completed\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true,\n  \"node\": \"v25.8.0\",\n  \"v8\": \"14.1.146.11-node.20\",\n  \"control\": {\n    \"defineResult\": true,\n    \"sandboxReadsBack\": \"sandbox-only\",\n    \"hostControlAfter\": null\n  },\n  \"exploit\": {\n    \"hostUint8IsSandboxUint8\": false,\n    \"hostTypedArrayIsSandboxTypedArray\": false,\n    \"hostArrayBufferIsSandboxArrayBuffer\": false,\n    \"defineUint8\": true,\n    \"defineTypedArray\": true,\n    \"defineArrayBuffer\": true,\n    \"defineMethod\": true\n  },\n  \"hostEffect\": {\n    \"uint8Marker\": \"polluted-host-uint8array-prototype\",\n    \"typedArrayMarker\": \"polluted-host-typedarray-prototype\",\n    \"arrayBufferMarker\": \"polluted-host-arraybuffer-prototype\",\n    \"methodReturn\": \"sandbox-method-reached-host-uint8array\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe control proves sandbox-local `Uint8Array.prototype` writes remain sandbox-local. The exploit path reaches host prototypes through the bridge and causes host-created objects to observe sandbox-installed properties after `VM.run()` returns.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a sandbox boundary violation and host intrinsic prototype pollution. An attacker who can run JavaScript in a default vm2 `VM` can mutate shared host typed-array and ArrayBuffer behavior without `NodeVM`, `require`, wildcard builtins, `nesting: true`, or any host-provided typed-array object.\n\nThe supplied PoV demonstrates integrity and availability impact by installing markers and a method on host prototypes:\n\n- `Uint8Array.prototype`\n- `%TypedArray%.prototype`, which affects typed-array families through the shared typed-array prototype chain\n- `ArrayBuffer.prototype`\n\nThe PoV does not claim direct host command execution or direct confidentiality impact. It is local-only and restores touched descriptors before exit.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nExtend the protected host-object inventory and identity/prototype mappings to typed-array and binary-data intrinsics, including at least:\n\n- `%TypedArray%.prototype`\n- `ArrayBuffer.prototype`\n- `SharedArrayBuffer.prototype` when present\n- `DataView.prototype`\n- all concrete typed-array prototypes present in the runtime, including `Uint8Array.prototype`, `Uint8ClampedArray.prototype`, `Int8Array.prototype`, `Uint16Array.prototype`, `Int16Array.prototype`, `Uint32Array.prototype`, `Int32Array.prototype`, `Float16Array.prototype` when present, `Float32Array.prototype`, `Float64Array.prototype`, `BigInt64Array.prototype`, and `BigUint64Array.prototype`\n\nA temporary patched-control that added this intrinsic family to `thisGlobalPrototypes` caused the same PoV's `Reflect.defineProperty()` calls to throw `VMError: Operation not allowed on contextified object`, and no host markers were installed.\n\nThe fix should cover the same host mutation traps used by the existing host-intrinsic protection: `set`, `defineProperty`, `deleteProperty`, and `preventExtensions`. It should not special-case `Buffer`; `Buffer` is only one way to reach the omitted host prototypes.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed on current head `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92` / `v3.11.5` with Node `v25.8.0` / V8 `14.1.146.11-node.20`.\n\nConfirmed affected after the prior patch: `npm:vm2 \u003e= 3.11.0, \u003c= 3.11.5`.\n\nLocal sweep also reproduces on `v3.10.0` through `v3.10.5`, but that range overlaps the already-published `GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq` range. `v3.9.0` through `v3.9.2` did not produce host-visible pollution in the same local test.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nvm2 documents `VM` as a sandbox for untrusted code without `require`, with only JavaScript built-ins and Node's `Buffer` available by default. The known escape hatches do not explain this issue:\n\n- `require.builtin: ['*']` is a `NodeVM` configuration; this PoV uses default `VM`.\n- `nesting: true` is not enabled or used.\n- The README timeout caveat covers host code operating on objects returned from the sandbox; this PoV mutates host intrinsics and later affects ordinary host-created typed arrays and ArrayBuffers.\n\nThe project's own attack notes state that host-realm intrinsic prototypes should be protected from sandbox writes, while non-intrinsic host objects may remain mutable when intentionally exposed. Typed-array and ArrayBuffer prototypes are host intrinsics, not embedder-owned application objects.\n\n`Buffer` availability explains how the PoV reaches the host prototype chain, but it does not authorize mutation of unrelated host-realm intrinsics. The host effects are observed on new host-created typed arrays and ArrayBuffers after `VM.run()` returns; the host is not invoking an object returned from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-05T22:45:22Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:45:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913","CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:25.889593Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5v7w-95g5-pj6q","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Default VM can mutate host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer intrinsics after the host-prototype pollution fix","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nvm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-17T15:32:16Z","modified":"2026-10-05T22:45:04Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:25.889593Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92953","description":"vm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T14:18:01.16Z","modified":"2026-09-18T20:17:31.113Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:49.013904Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-92953","title":"vm2 3.11.0 through 3.11.7 Prototype Pollution via TypedArray","description":"vm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-17T13:46:12.146Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12.543617707Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:20.588039Z"},{"id":"GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr","title":"vm2: Default VM can mutate host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer intrinsics after the host-prototype pollution fix","description":"## Summary\n\nvm2's current host-intrinsic prototype protection is incomplete. The fix for `GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq` blocks sandbox writes into classic host intrinsics such as `Object.prototype`, `Array.prototype`, and `Function.prototype`, but current head still lets sandbox code in a default `VM` reach and mutate host `Uint8Array.prototype`, `%TypedArray%.prototype`, and `ArrayBuffer.prototype`.\n\nAfter `VM.run()` returns, normal host typed-array and ArrayBuffer objects observe attacker-controlled properties and methods installed by the sandbox.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe existing mitigation relies on `protectedHostObjects` in `lib/bridge.js`. That set is populated from `otherGlobalPrototypes`, which is built from a fixed inventory of classic globals:\n\n```js\nconst globalsList = [\n  'Number', 'String', 'Boolean', 'Date', 'RegExp', 'Map', 'WeakMap',\n  'Set', 'WeakSet', 'Promise', 'Function'\n];\n```\n\nThe inventory omits typed-array and ArrayBuffer intrinsics. Sandbox code can still reuse the host-prototype walking primitive from the prior public advisory:\n\n```js\nconst lookupGetter = ({}).__lookupGetter__;\nconst apply = Buffer.apply;\nconst protoGetter = apply.apply(lookupGetter, [Buffer, ['__proto__']]);\nconst hostBuffer = Buffer.from([1]);\n\nconst hostBufferPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBuffer);\nconst hostUint8ArrayPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBufferPrototype);\nconst hostTypedArrayPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostUint8ArrayPrototype);\nconst hostArrayBufferPrototype = protoGetter.call(hostBuffer.buffer);\n```\n\nThose objects are not sandbox-local. Inside the sandbox, `hostUint8ArrayPrototype === Uint8Array.prototype`, `hostTypedArrayPrototype === Object.getPrototypeOf(Uint8Array.prototype)`, and `hostArrayBufferPrototype === ArrayBuffer.prototype` are all false. Because the objects are not in `protectedHostObjects`, bridge `defineProperty` writes are forwarded into the real host objects.\n\nThis is the same guard-coverage boundary as the previous host-intrinsic prototype pollution fix, but with a missing intrinsic family. The bridge already has the correct enforcement shape; the protected inventory is too narrow.\n\n## PoC\n\nPoV: `poc/pov-host-typedarray-arraybuffer-prototype-pollution.js`\n\nCurrent-head output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"completed\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true,\n  \"node\": \"v25.8.0\",\n  \"v8\": \"14.1.146.11-node.20\",\n  \"control\": {\n    \"defineResult\": true,\n    \"sandboxReadsBack\": \"sandbox-only\",\n    \"hostControlAfter\": null\n  },\n  \"exploit\": {\n    \"hostUint8IsSandboxUint8\": false,\n    \"hostTypedArrayIsSandboxTypedArray\": false,\n    \"hostArrayBufferIsSandboxArrayBuffer\": false,\n    \"defineUint8\": true,\n    \"defineTypedArray\": true,\n    \"defineArrayBuffer\": true,\n    \"defineMethod\": true\n  },\n  \"hostEffect\": {\n    \"uint8Marker\": \"polluted-host-uint8array-prototype\",\n    \"typedArrayMarker\": \"polluted-host-typedarray-prototype\",\n    \"arrayBufferMarker\": \"polluted-host-arraybuffer-prototype\",\n    \"methodReturn\": \"sandbox-method-reached-host-uint8array\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe control proves sandbox-local `Uint8Array.prototype` writes remain sandbox-local. The exploit path reaches host prototypes through the bridge and causes host-created objects to observe sandbox-installed properties after `VM.run()` returns.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a sandbox boundary violation and host intrinsic prototype pollution. An attacker who can run JavaScript in a default vm2 `VM` can mutate shared host typed-array and ArrayBuffer behavior without `NodeVM`, `require`, wildcard builtins, `nesting: true`, or any host-provided typed-array object.\n\nThe supplied PoV demonstrates integrity and availability impact by installing markers and a method on host prototypes:\n\n- `Uint8Array.prototype`\n- `%TypedArray%.prototype`, which affects typed-array families through the shared typed-array prototype chain\n- `ArrayBuffer.prototype`\n\nThe PoV does not claim direct host command execution or direct confidentiality impact. It is local-only and restores touched descriptors before exit.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nExtend the protected host-object inventory and identity/prototype mappings to typed-array and binary-data intrinsics, including at least:\n\n- `%TypedArray%.prototype`\n- `ArrayBuffer.prototype`\n- `SharedArrayBuffer.prototype` when present\n- `DataView.prototype`\n- all concrete typed-array prototypes present in the runtime, including `Uint8Array.prototype`, `Uint8ClampedArray.prototype`, `Int8Array.prototype`, `Uint16Array.prototype`, `Int16Array.prototype`, `Uint32Array.prototype`, `Int32Array.prototype`, `Float16Array.prototype` when present, `Float32Array.prototype`, `Float64Array.prototype`, `BigInt64Array.prototype`, and `BigUint64Array.prototype`\n\nA temporary patched-control that added this intrinsic family to `thisGlobalPrototypes` caused the same PoV's `Reflect.defineProperty()` calls to throw `VMError: Operation not allowed on contextified object`, and no host markers were installed.\n\nThe fix should cover the same host mutation traps used by the existing host-intrinsic protection: `set`, `defineProperty`, `deleteProperty`, and `preventExtensions`. It should not special-case `Buffer`; `Buffer` is only one way to reach the omitted host prototypes.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed on current head `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92` / `v3.11.5` with Node `v25.8.0` / V8 `14.1.146.11-node.20`.\n\nConfirmed affected after the prior patch: `npm:vm2 \u003e= 3.11.0, \u003c= 3.11.5`.\n\nLocal sweep also reproduces on `v3.10.0` through `v3.10.5`, but that range overlaps the already-published `GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq` range. `v3.9.0` through `v3.9.2` did not produce host-visible pollution in the same local test.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nvm2 documents `VM` as a sandbox for untrusted code without `require`, with only JavaScript built-ins and Node's `Buffer` available by default. The known escape hatches do not explain this issue:\n\n- `require.builtin: ['*']` is a `NodeVM` configuration; this PoV uses default `VM`.\n- `nesting: true` is not enabled or used.\n- The README timeout caveat covers host code operating on objects returned from the sandbox; this PoV mutates host intrinsics and later affects ordinary host-created typed arrays and ArrayBuffers.\n\nThe project's own attack notes state that host-realm intrinsic prototypes should be protected from sandbox writes, while non-intrinsic host objects may remain mutable when intentionally exposed. Typed-array and ArrayBuffer prototypes are host intrinsics, not embedder-owned application objects.\n\n`Buffer` availability explains how the PoV reaches the host prototype chain, but it does not authorize mutation of unrelated host-realm intrinsics. The host effects are observed on new host-created typed arrays and ArrayBuffers after `VM.run()` returns; the host is not invoking an object returned from the sandbox.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-05T22:45:22Z","modified":"2026-10-05T23:00:06.309865725Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321","CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:36.092962Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5v7w-95g5-pj6q","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Default VM can mutate host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer intrinsics after the host-prototype pollution fix","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3vgf-8m4q-q4qr. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nvm2 versions from 3.11.0 before 3.11.8 fail to protect host TypedArray and ArrayBuffer prototypes from sandbox mutation. Attackers can use prototype-walking primitives to reach and modify host Uint8Array.prototype, %TypedArray%.prototype, and ArrayBuffer.prototype, causing host-created typed arrays to observe attacker-controlled properties after VM.run() returns.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-09-17T15:32:16Z","modified":"2026-10-05T23:00:04.247984162Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:38.911014Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791279062","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (8 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.11.7-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T09:31:02Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:35.533296933Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791282796","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (3 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 3.11.5-tuxcare.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T10:33:16Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:35.550710283Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-92953","title":"CVE-2026-92953 in vm2 - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-92953 in the vm2 package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-19T07:16:29Z","modified":"2026-10-19T08:15:05.420737906Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.649662Z"}]}}