{"id":"CVE-2026-93757","aliases":["EUVD-2026-112591","GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74"],"status":"published","title":"Wild Apricot Login \u003c= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite","description":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00425,"percentile":0.37188,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-287"],"published":"2026-10-29T03:39:15Z","modified":"2026-10-29T14:56:26Z","products":[{"vendor":"wild-apricot","product":"wild apricot login"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9adbe55e-f1a1-4fa8-b28d-539d90d81c68?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Authorization/WaLogin/Controller.php#L347"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/WaApi/Client.php#L22"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L159"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Synchronization/UserSynchronizer.php#L36"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L112"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93757"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-93757","title":"Wild Apricot Login \u003c= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite","description":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-29T03:39:15.801Z","modified":"2026-10-29T10:45:42.405Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:54.122945Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-112591","description":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-29T03:39:15Z","modified":"2026-10-29T10:45:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:17.71975Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74","title":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email...","description":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-29T06:30:36Z","modified":"2026-10-29T06:30:37Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:37.567324Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-93757","description":"The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-29T04:18:43.763Z","modified":"2026-10-29T14:56:26.107Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:04.6346Z"}]}}