{"id":"CVE-2026-94379","aliases":["EUVD-2026-83905","GHSA-3q8c-466v-vgx3"],"status":"published","title":"MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00578,"percentile":0.4805,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-285"],"published":"2026-09-21T12:35:26Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07Z","products":[{"vendor":"misp","product":"misp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94379","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3q8c-466v-vgx3"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/94xxx/CVE-2026-94379.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-94379","title":"MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T12:35:26.533Z","modified":"2026-09-21T15:21:01.092Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:53.786088Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-83905","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T12:35:26Z","modified":"2026-09-21T15:21:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:05.36994Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3q8c-466v-vgx3","title":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation...","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T15:32:00Z","modified":"2026-09-21T15:32:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:15.376121Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-94379","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T13:17:13.2Z","modified":"2026-09-21T16:17:30.397Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.043898Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-94379","title":"MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)","description":"The login() function in MISP's UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically: \n\n - the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n -  the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n - login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T12:35:26.533Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07.015058586Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:20.931171Z"}]}}