{"id":"CVE-2026-97644","aliases":["EUVD-2026-91893","GHSA-9c9v-5p57-4qfm"],"status":"published","title":"Groundhogg \u003c= 4.9 - Authenticated (Sales Person+) Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding leading to Administrator Account Takeover to 'user_id' Parameter (v3 /contacts) chained with v4 /emails/test","description":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00482,"percentile":0.41834,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-10-03T03:25:44Z","modified":"2026-10-06T15:04:52Z","products":[{"vendor":"trainingbusinesspros","product":"groundhogg — crm, newsletters, and marketing automation"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/557306b7-7b66-465e-8d4d-ebae5b1577c9?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v3/contacts-api.php#L373"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/db/contacts.php#L205"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v4/emails-api.php#L571"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/replacements.php#L2280"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/rewrites.php#L460"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/main-roles.php#L532"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3724910%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9.1\u0026old=3724058%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3724910/groundhogg/trunk/api/v3/contacts-api.php"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97644"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9c9v-5p57-4qfm"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-97644","title":"Groundhogg \u003c= 4.9 - Authenticated (Sales Person+) Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding leading to Administrator Account Takeover to 'user_id' Parameter (v3 /contacts) chained with v4 /emails/test","description":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-03T03:25:44.527Z","modified":"2026-10-03T15:42:46.419Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:44:18.366073Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-91893","description":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-03T03:25:44Z","modified":"2026-10-03T15:42:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:40.984355Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-9c9v-5p57-4qfm","title":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to...","description":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-03T06:31:12Z","modified":"2026-10-03T06:31:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:44.258575Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-97644","description":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-03T04:18:04.917Z","modified":"2026-10-06T15:04:52.637Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:53.75133Z"}]}}