{"id":"GHSA-647h-p824-99w7","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.\n\nThis is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)\n\n**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.\n\n### Design Note\n\nCross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:\n- Workspace-level \"share knowledge with\" settings\n- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens\n- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:\n```typescript\nconst resolvedWorkspaceId =\n  authContext?.type === \"scoped\"\n    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? \"\"\n    : workspaceId ?? \"\";\n```\n\nWhen cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.\n\n### References\n\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-284"],"published":"2026-03-25T17:23:11Z","modified":"2026-03-25T17:32:56Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@grackle-ai/mcp","fixed_in":["0.70.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@grackle-ai/mcp","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.70.1"},{"fixed":"0.70.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@grackle-ai/mcp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.70.2"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-647h-p824-99w7","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-647h-p824-99w7"},{"url":"https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-647h-p824-99w7","title":"@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.\n\nThis is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)\n\n**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.\n\n### Design Note\n\nCross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:\n- Workspace-level \"share knowledge with\" settings\n- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens\n- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:\n```typescript\nconst resolvedWorkspaceId =\n  authContext?.type === \"scoped\"\n    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? \"\"\n    : workspaceId ?? \"\";\n```\n\nWhen cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.\n\n### References\n\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`","status":"published","published":"2026-03-25T17:23:11Z","modified":"2026-03-25T17:23:12Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:41.724707Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-647h-p824-99w7","title":"@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.\n\nThis is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)\n\n**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.\n\n### Design Note\n\nCross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:\n- Workspace-level \"share knowledge with\" settings\n- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens\n- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:\n```typescript\nconst resolvedWorkspaceId =\n  authContext?.type === \"scoped\"\n    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? \"\"\n    : workspaceId ?? \"\";\n```\n\nWhen cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.\n\n### References\n\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`","status":"published","published":"2026-03-25T17:23:11Z","modified":"2026-03-25T17:32:56.686228Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:39.266402Z"}]}}