{"id":"GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP","description":"## Summary\nOpenClaw's SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (`...:5efe:w.x.y.z`). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.\n\n## Severity Assessment\nRated **medium**: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003e=2026.1.20 \u003c=2026.2.17`\n- Latest published at patch time: `2026.2.17`\n- Patched release: `2026.2.19`\n\n## Security Policy Context\nPer `SECURITY.md`, OpenClaw's web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.\n\n## Impact\nThis can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.\n\n## Fix\n- Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.\n- Centralized hostname/IP blocking through `isBlockedHostnameOrIp` and routed relevant validators to that shared path.\n- Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aa`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-03-04T18:55:48Z","modified":"2026-03-04T19:04:48Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.19"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2026.1.20"},{"fixed":"2026.2.19"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2026.1.20"},{"fixed":"2026.2.19"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aa","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77"},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77","title":"OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP","description":"## Summary\nOpenClaw's SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (`...:5efe:w.x.y.z`). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.\n\n## Severity Assessment\nRated **medium**: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003e=2026.1.20 \u003c=2026.2.17`\n- Latest published at patch time: `2026.2.17`\n- Patched release: `2026.2.19`\n\n## Security Policy Context\nPer `SECURITY.md`, OpenClaw's web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.\n\n## Impact\nThis can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.\n\n## Fix\n- Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.\n- Centralized hostname/IP blocking through `isBlockedHostnameOrIp` and routed relevant validators to that shared path.\n- Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aa`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T18:55:48Z","modified":"2026-03-04T18:55:49Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:31.060223Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77","title":"OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP","description":"## Summary\nOpenClaw's SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (`...:5efe:w.x.y.z`). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.\n\n## Severity Assessment\nRated **medium**: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003e=2026.1.20 \u003c=2026.2.17`\n- Latest published at patch time: `2026.2.17`\n- Patched release: `2026.2.19`\n\n## Security Policy Context\nPer `SECURITY.md`, OpenClaw's web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.\n\n## Impact\nThis can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.\n\n## Fix\n- Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.\n- Centralized hostname/IP blocking through `isBlockedHostnameOrIp` and routed relevant validators to that shared path.\n- Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aa`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T18:55:48Z","modified":"2026-03-04T19:04:48.938954Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.077781Z"}]}}