{"id":"GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments","description":"## Summary\nThis advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.\n\n## Deployment Context\nOpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.\n\n## What Changed\n- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.\n- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.\n- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.\n\n## Impact\nRisk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`\n- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`\n\nThanks @NucleiAv for reporting.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","level":"medium","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1021","CWE-79"],"published":"2026-03-03T23:17:06Z","modified":"2026-03-04T15:14:04Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.21"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.21"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.21"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx"},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx","title":"OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments","description":"## Summary\nThis advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.\n\n## Deployment Context\nOpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.\n\n## What Changed\n- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.\n- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.\n- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.\n\n## Impact\nRisk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`\n- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`\n\nThanks @NucleiAv for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-03T23:17:06Z","modified":"2026-03-03T23:17:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79","CWE-1021"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:30.031684Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx","title":"OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments","description":"## Summary\nThis advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.\n\n## Deployment Context\nOpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.\n\n## What Changed\n- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.\n- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.\n- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.\n\n## Impact\nRisk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`\n- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`\n\nThanks @NucleiAv for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-03T23:17:06Z","modified":"2026-03-04T15:14:04.950421Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1021","CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:45.28161Z"}]}}