{"id":"GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes","description":"### Summary\nA gateway client authenticated with `operator.write` could route `/config set` or `/config unset` through `chat.send` and reach persistent config mutation even though direct config RPC methods are admin-scoped.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched in: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nBefore the fix, `chat.send` ran slash commands in an internal gateway-chat context with `CommandAuthorized: true`, and `/config` write paths only checked command authorization plus `commands.config` / `channels.\u003cprovider\u003e.configWrites` gates. That allowed an authenticated `operator.write` gateway client to bridge into persistent config writes even though direct `config.*` RPC methods remain `operator.admin` scoped.\n\nThe fix keeps command functionality intact while restoring the intended scope boundary:\n- persistent `/config set|unset` writes routed through gateway `chat.send` now require `operator.admin`\n- read-only `/config show` remains available to normal write-scoped gateway clients\n- normal messaging-channel `/config` behavior remains unchanged\n\n### Impact\nThis is a real authorization mismatch, but exploitability requires an already authenticated gateway client with `operator.write`, `chat.send` access, and `/config` command support enabled. Maintainer severity is set to medium because the bug is a scoped control-plane privilege mismatch rather than a broad unauthenticated or generic remote compromise. The main consequence is unintended persistent config mutation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e`\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-863"],"published":"2026-03-09T19:54:41Z","modified":"2026-03-09T20:02:42Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.3.7"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2026.3.2"},{"fixed":"2026.3.7"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.3.7"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm"},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm","title":"OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes","description":"### Summary\nA gateway client authenticated with `operator.write` could route `/config set` or `/config unset` through `chat.send` and reach persistent config mutation even though direct config RPC methods are admin-scoped.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched in: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nBefore the fix, `chat.send` ran slash commands in an internal gateway-chat context with `CommandAuthorized: true`, and `/config` write paths only checked command authorization plus `commands.config` / `channels.\u003cprovider\u003e.configWrites` gates. That allowed an authenticated `operator.write` gateway client to bridge into persistent config writes even though direct `config.*` RPC methods remain `operator.admin` scoped.\n\nThe fix keeps command functionality intact while restoring the intended scope boundary:\n- persistent `/config set|unset` writes routed through gateway `chat.send` now require `operator.admin`\n- read-only `/config show` remains available to normal write-scoped gateway clients\n- normal messaging-channel `/config` behavior remains unchanged\n\n### Impact\nThis is a real authorization mismatch, but exploitability requires an already authenticated gateway client with `operator.write`, `chat.send` access, and `/config` command support enabled. Maintainer severity is set to medium because the bug is a scoped control-plane privilege mismatch rather than a broad unauthenticated or generic remote compromise. The main consequence is unintended persistent config mutation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e`\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T19:54:41Z","modified":"2026-03-09T19:54:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:33.538417Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rm","title":"OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes","description":"### Summary\nA gateway client authenticated with `operator.write` could route `/config set` or `/config unset` through `chat.send` and reach persistent config mutation even though direct config RPC methods are admin-scoped.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched in: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nBefore the fix, `chat.send` ran slash commands in an internal gateway-chat context with `CommandAuthorized: true`, and `/config` write paths only checked command authorization plus `commands.config` / `channels.\u003cprovider\u003e.configWrites` gates. That allowed an authenticated `operator.write` gateway client to bridge into persistent config writes even though direct `config.*` RPC methods remain `operator.admin` scoped.\n\nThe fix keeps command functionality intact while restoring the intended scope boundary:\n- persistent `/config set|unset` writes routed through gateway `chat.send` now require `operator.admin`\n- read-only `/config show` remains available to normal write-scoped gateway clients\n- normal messaging-channel `/config` behavior remains unchanged\n\n### Impact\nThis is a real authorization mismatch, but exploitability requires an already authenticated gateway client with `operator.write`, `chat.send` access, and `/config` command support enabled. Maintainer severity is set to medium because the bug is a scoped control-plane privilege mismatch rather than a broad unauthenticated or generic remote compromise. The main consequence is unintended persistent config mutation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `5f8f58ae25e2a78f31b06edcf26532d634ca554e`\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T19:54:41Z","modified":"2026-03-09T20:02:42.630466Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:48.920784Z"}]}}