{"id":"GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing","description":"## Summary\nThe issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n- `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing.\n- Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:\u003cpeerId\u003e`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.\n- Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values.\n- Target session keys can be derived or guessed.\n\nWithout those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.\n\n## Impact\n- Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.\n- Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.\n- Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2.0.0-beta3` and `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n\n## Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing:\n- `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`.\n- Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing.\n- Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys.\n- Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.\n\n## Recommended Configuration\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"enabled\": true,\n    \"token\": \"${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}\",\n    \"defaultSessionKey\": \"hook:ingress\",\n    \"allowRequestSessionKey\": false,\n    \"allowedSessionKeyPrefixes\": [\"hook:\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\nThanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-330","CWE-639"],"published":"2026-02-17T16:43:34Z","modified":"2026-02-17T17:02:26Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.12"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.0.0-beta3"},{"fixed":"2026.2.12"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2.0.0-beta3"},{"fixed":"2026.2.12"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f"},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f","title":"OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing","description":"## Summary\nThe issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n- `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing.\n- Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:\u003cpeerId\u003e`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.\n- Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values.\n- Target session keys can be derived or guessed.\n\nWithout those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.\n\n## Impact\n- Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.\n- Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.\n- Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2.0.0-beta3` and `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n\n## Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing:\n- `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`.\n- Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing.\n- Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys.\n- Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.\n\n## Recommended Configuration\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"enabled\": true,\n    \"token\": \"${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}\",\n    \"defaultSessionKey\": \"hook:ingress\",\n    \"allowRequestSessionKey\": false,\n    \"allowedSessionKeyPrefixes\": [\"hook:\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\nThanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-17T16:43:34Z","modified":"2026-02-17T16:43:35Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-330","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:25.82905Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f","title":"OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing","description":"## Summary\nThe issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n- `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing.\n- Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:\u003cpeerId\u003e`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.\n- Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values.\n- Target session keys can be derived or guessed.\n\nWithout those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.\n\n## Impact\n- Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.\n- Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.\n- Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2.0.0-beta3` and `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n\n## Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing:\n- `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`.\n- Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing.\n- Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys.\n- Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.\n\n## Recommended Configuration\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"enabled\": true,\n    \"token\": \"${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}\",\n    \"defaultSessionKey\": \"hook:ingress\",\n    \"allowRequestSessionKey\": false,\n    \"allowedSessionKeyPrefixes\": [\"hook:\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\nThanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-17T16:43:34Z","modified":"2026-02-17T17:02:26.396494Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-330","CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:49.621585Z"}]}}