{"id":"GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"Actions expression injection in `filter-test-configs` (`GHSL-2023-181`)","description":"The `pytorch/pytorch` `filter-test-configs` workflow is vulnerable to an expression injection in Actions, allowing an attacker to potentially leak secrets and alter the repository using the workflow.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`filter-test-configs`](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/ec26947c586dd323d741da80008403664c533f65/.github/actions/filter-test-configs/action.yml) workflow is using the raw `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch` value inside the `filter` step:\n\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\"\n```\n\nIn the event of a repository using `filter-test-configs` in a `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow, an attacker could use a malicious branch name to gain command execution in the step and potentially leak secrets.\n\n```yml\nname: Example\n\non: pull_request_target\n\njobs:\n  example:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Filter\n        uses: pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs@v2\n```\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to stealing workflow secrets.\n\n#### Remediation\n\n1. Use an intermediate environment variable for potentially attacker-controlled values such as `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch`:\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n    HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"$HEAD_BRANCH\"\n```\n\n#### Resources\n\n* [CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/javascript/js-actions-command-injection/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)","facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"published":"2023-08-30T20:47:13Z","modified":"2023-08-30T20:47:26Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs","fixed_in":["2.0.1"],"sources":["ghsa"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.0.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/security/advisories/GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987"},{"url":"https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987","title":"Actions expression injection in `filter-test-configs` (`GHSL-2023-181`)","description":"The `pytorch/pytorch` `filter-test-configs` workflow is vulnerable to an expression injection in Actions, allowing an attacker to potentially leak secrets and alter the repository using the workflow.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`filter-test-configs`](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/ec26947c586dd323d741da80008403664c533f65/.github/actions/filter-test-configs/action.yml) workflow is using the raw `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch` value inside the `filter` step:\n\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\"\n```\n\nIn the event of a repository using `filter-test-configs` in a `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow, an attacker could use a malicious branch name to gain command execution in the step and potentially leak secrets.\n\n```yml\nname: Example\n\non: pull_request_target\n\njobs:\n  example:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Filter\n        uses: pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs@v2\n```\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to stealing workflow secrets.\n\n#### Remediation\n\n1. Use an intermediate environment variable for potentially attacker-controlled values such as `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch`:\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n    HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"$HEAD_BRANCH\"\n```\n\n#### Resources\n\n* [CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/javascript/js-actions-command-injection/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)\n","status":"published","published":"2023-08-30T20:47:13Z","modified":"2023-08-30T20:47:26Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:37:02.095916Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987","title":"Actions expression injection in `filter-test-configs` (`GHSL-2023-181`)","description":"The `pytorch/pytorch` `filter-test-configs` workflow is vulnerable to an expression injection in Actions, allowing an attacker to potentially leak secrets and alter the repository using the workflow.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`filter-test-configs`](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/ec26947c586dd323d741da80008403664c533f65/.github/actions/filter-test-configs/action.yml) workflow is using the raw `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch` value inside the `filter` step:\n\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\"\n```\n\nIn the event of a repository using `filter-test-configs` in a `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow, an attacker could use a malicious branch name to gain command execution in the step and potentially leak secrets.\n\n```yml\nname: Example\n\non: pull_request_target\n\njobs:\n  example:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Filter\n        uses: pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs@v2\n```\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to stealing workflow secrets.\n\n#### Remediation\n\n1. Use an intermediate environment variable for potentially attacker-controlled values such as `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch`:\n```yaml\n- name: Select all requested test configurations\n  shell: bash\n  env:\n    GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}\n    JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }}\n    HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n  id: filter\n  run: |\n    ...\n    python3 \"${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py\" \\\n      ...\n      --branch \"$HEAD_BRANCH\"\n```\n\n#### Resources\n\n* [CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/javascript/js-actions-command-injection/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)\n","status":"published","published":"2023-08-30T20:47:13Z","modified":"2023-08-30T20:47:13Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:49.621585Z"}]}}