{"id":"GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"GeoLens's authorization and cache-scope flaws disclose private dataset data and metadata to unauthorized users (fixed in 1.2.4)","description":"GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Private record metadata disclosure.** Record contact, keyword, and distribution sub-resource endpoints did not re-authorize the backing dataset, so any authenticated user could read a private record's contact details (PII), keywords, and distributions. (Runtime-proven.)\n- **Private tile data via shared caches.** Private raster and vector tiles were served with shared-cache (`Cache-Control: public`) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews.\n- **Private dataset title enumeration.** The map visibility-check endpoint did not authorize read access to the map, allowing any editor to enumerate the titles of non-public datasets in any map by ID — including private maps owned by other users.\n- **SSRF via DNS rebinding.** URL validation for user-supplied service URLs (probes, STAC/OGC API sources, manifest downloads) resolved DNS once and then let the HTTP client re-resolve at connect time, allowing a low-TTL domain to pass validation as a public address and connect to an internal/metadata address.\n- **Token leak + header injection in service preview.** The remote-service preview path passed the authorization token to GDAL via the process environment without sanitization, leaking it through `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/environ` and allowing CRLF header injection.\n- **Unauthenticated STAC search DoS.** `POST /search` did not cap the size of GeoJSON `intersects` geometries (the `GET` sibling did).\n- **API key written to access logs.** The bundled reverse proxy logged the `api_key` query-string credential in cleartext.\n- **Security posture coupled to a logging flag.** API documentation exposure and the Secure flag on the OAuth session cookie were keyed off the `LOG_JSON` logging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose `/docs` and emit a non-Secure session cookie.\n- **Missing Content-Security-Policy (defense-in-depth).** The web application shipped no `script-src`/`default-src` CSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.\n- **Weak default install credentials.** The installer kept the published default database password and could silently retain the default admin password on a headless install.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to **GeoLens 1.2.4**. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set `ENVIRONMENT=production` to make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on `POST /search`), but the code fix is the durable remedy.\n\n### References\n\n- Release: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/releases/tag/v1.2.4\n- Pull request: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/pull/243\n- Prior related advisory: GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j","facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1021","CWE-1392","CWE-200","CWE-285","CWE-400","CWE-524","CWE-532","CWE-918","CWE-93"],"published":"2026-08-19T19:22:59Z","modified":"2026-08-19T19:30:06Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"geolens","fixed_in":["1.2.4"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"geolens","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.2.4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"geolens","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.2.4"}]}],"versions":["0.0.0","1.0.0","1.2.0","1.2.3"]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/pull/243","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/releases/tag/v1.2.4","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw"},{"url":"https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw","title":"GeoLens's authorization and cache-scope flaws disclose private dataset data and metadata to unauthorized users (fixed in 1.2.4)","description":"GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Private record metadata disclosure.** Record contact, keyword, and distribution sub-resource endpoints did not re-authorize the backing dataset, so any authenticated user could read a private record's contact details (PII), keywords, and distributions. (Runtime-proven.)\n- **Private tile data via shared caches.** Private raster and vector tiles were served with shared-cache (`Cache-Control: public`) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews.\n- **Private dataset title enumeration.** The map visibility-check endpoint did not authorize read access to the map, allowing any editor to enumerate the titles of non-public datasets in any map by ID — including private maps owned by other users.\n- **SSRF via DNS rebinding.** URL validation for user-supplied service URLs (probes, STAC/OGC API sources, manifest downloads) resolved DNS once and then let the HTTP client re-resolve at connect time, allowing a low-TTL domain to pass validation as a public address and connect to an internal/metadata address.\n- **Token leak + header injection in service preview.** The remote-service preview path passed the authorization token to GDAL via the process environment without sanitization, leaking it through `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/environ` and allowing CRLF header injection.\n- **Unauthenticated STAC search DoS.** `POST /search` did not cap the size of GeoJSON `intersects` geometries (the `GET` sibling did).\n- **API key written to access logs.** The bundled reverse proxy logged the `api_key` query-string credential in cleartext.\n- **Security posture coupled to a logging flag.** API documentation exposure and the Secure flag on the OAuth session cookie were keyed off the `LOG_JSON` logging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose `/docs` and emit a non-Secure session cookie.\n- **Missing Content-Security-Policy (defense-in-depth).** The web application shipped no `script-src`/`default-src` CSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.\n- **Weak default install credentials.** The installer kept the published default database password and could silently retain the default admin password on a headless install.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to **GeoLens 1.2.4**. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set `ENVIRONMENT=production` to make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on `POST /search`), but the code fix is the durable remedy.\n\n### References\n\n- Release: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/releases/tag/v1.2.4\n- Pull request: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/pull/243\n- Prior related advisory: GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T19:22:59Z","modified":"2026-08-19T19:23:01Z","cwes":["CWE-93","CWE-200","CWE-285","CWE-400","CWE-524","CWE-532","CWE-918","CWE-1021","CWE-1392"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:03.602876Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw","title":"GeoLens's authorization and cache-scope flaws disclose private dataset data and metadata to unauthorized users (fixed in 1.2.4)","description":"GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Private record metadata disclosure.** Record contact, keyword, and distribution sub-resource endpoints did not re-authorize the backing dataset, so any authenticated user could read a private record's contact details (PII), keywords, and distributions. (Runtime-proven.)\n- **Private tile data via shared caches.** Private raster and vector tiles were served with shared-cache (`Cache-Control: public`) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews.\n- **Private dataset title enumeration.** The map visibility-check endpoint did not authorize read access to the map, allowing any editor to enumerate the titles of non-public datasets in any map by ID — including private maps owned by other users.\n- **SSRF via DNS rebinding.** URL validation for user-supplied service URLs (probes, STAC/OGC API sources, manifest downloads) resolved DNS once and then let the HTTP client re-resolve at connect time, allowing a low-TTL domain to pass validation as a public address and connect to an internal/metadata address.\n- **Token leak + header injection in service preview.** The remote-service preview path passed the authorization token to GDAL via the process environment without sanitization, leaking it through `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/environ` and allowing CRLF header injection.\n- **Unauthenticated STAC search DoS.** `POST /search` did not cap the size of GeoJSON `intersects` geometries (the `GET` sibling did).\n- **API key written to access logs.** The bundled reverse proxy logged the `api_key` query-string credential in cleartext.\n- **Security posture coupled to a logging flag.** API documentation exposure and the Secure flag on the OAuth session cookie were keyed off the `LOG_JSON` logging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose `/docs` and emit a non-Secure session cookie.\n- **Missing Content-Security-Policy (defense-in-depth).** The web application shipped no `script-src`/`default-src` CSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.\n- **Weak default install credentials.** The installer kept the published default database password and could silently retain the default admin password on a headless install.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to **GeoLens 1.2.4**. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set `ENVIRONMENT=production` to make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on `POST /search`), but the code fix is the durable remedy.\n\n### References\n\n- Release: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/releases/tag/v1.2.4\n- Pull request: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/pull/243\n- Prior related advisory: GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T19:22:59Z","modified":"2026-08-19T19:30:06.739322528Z","cwes":["CWE-1021","CWE-1392","CWE-200","CWE-285","CWE-400","CWE-524","CWE-532","CWE-918","CWE-93"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:52.891208Z"}]}}