{"id":"GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping","description":"### Summary\n`/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.\n\nBecause default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account.\n\nThis is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version checked: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Fixed on `main`: March 7, 2026 in `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73`\n- Patched release: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nThe affected path was:\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393` resolved `accountId` and read store state with it\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702` and `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733` wrote store state without passing `accountId`\n- `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234` and `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554` still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the `default` account\n\nThe fix scopes `/allowlist ... --store` writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization\n- Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run `/allowlist` edits\n- Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into `default`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` — scope `/allowlist ... --store` writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-03-09T19:54:08Z","modified":"2026-03-09T20:01:25Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.3.7"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2026.3.2"},{"fixed":"2026.3.7"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.3.7"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg"},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg","title":"OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping","description":"### Summary\n`/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.\n\nBecause default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account.\n\nThis is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version checked: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Fixed on `main`: March 7, 2026 in `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73`\n- Patched release: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nThe affected path was:\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393` resolved `accountId` and read store state with it\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702` and `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733` wrote store state without passing `accountId`\n- `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234` and `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554` still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the `default` account\n\nThe fix scopes `/allowlist ... --store` writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization\n- Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run `/allowlist` edits\n- Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into `default`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` — scope `/allowlist ... --store` writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T19:54:08Z","modified":"2026-03-09T19:54:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:33.538417Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg","title":"OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping","description":"### Summary\n`/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.\n\nBecause default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account.\n\nThis is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version checked: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Fixed on `main`: March 7, 2026 in `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73`\n- Patched release: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nThe affected path was:\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393` resolved `accountId` and read store state with it\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702` and `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733` wrote store state without passing `accountId`\n- `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234` and `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554` still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the `default` account\n\nThe fix scopes `/allowlist ... --store` writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization\n- Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run `/allowlist` edits\n- Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into `default`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` — scope `/allowlist ... --store` writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T19:54:08Z","modified":"2026-03-09T20:01:25.895783Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:53.244788Z"}]}}