{"id":"GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm","aliases":["RUSTSEC-2026-0122"],"status":"published","title":"rkyv: Panic safety bugs in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear` enable arbitrary code execution","description":"`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.\n\nA subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:\n\n- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped.\n- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the  user closure returns.\n\n\n## Technical Impact\n\n- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box\u003cT\u003e`  \n- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop`\n\nBoth vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-415","CWE-416"],"published":"2026-04-23T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:47Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"rkyv","fixed_in":["0.8.16"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"rkyv","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.0"},{"fixed":"0.8.16"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"rkyv","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.0"},{"fixed":"0.8.16"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"rkyv","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.0"},{"fixed":"0.8.16"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/rkyv/rkyv/commit/5828cf5c27b664eb4432c4a93d4769e12e5e42fb","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0122.html","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm"},{"url":"https://github.com/rkyv/rkyv","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://crates.io/crates/rkyv","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm","title":"rkyv: Panic safety bugs in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear` enable arbitrary code execution","description":"`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.\n\nA subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:\n\n- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped.\n- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the  user closure returns.\n\n\n## Technical Impact\n\n- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box\u003cT\u003e`  \n- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop`\n\nBoth vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T18:09:10Z","modified":"2026-05-15T18:09:11Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-415","CWE-416"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:10.269075Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm","title":"rkyv: Panic safety bugs in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear` enable arbitrary code execution","description":"`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.\n\nA subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:\n\n- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped.\n- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the  user closure returns.\n\n\n## Technical Impact\n\n- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box\u003cT\u003e`  \n- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop`\n\nBoth vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T18:09:10Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.714144241Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-415","CWE-416"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:57.348035Z"},{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0122","title":"Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear`","description":"`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe.\nBoth functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each,\nupdating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element's `Drop` implementation\npanics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.\n\nA subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the\nalready-freed elements:\n\n- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`'s own `Drop`\n  implementation when the value is later dropped.\n- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the\n  user closure returns.\n\n## Impact\n- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** heap corruption when the element type is one that\n  owns memory, such as `Box\u003cT\u003e` or `Vec\u003cT\u003e`\n- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when an element is accessed\n  following a caught panic\n\nBoth types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if\nunwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-23T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-05-16T07:08:02Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:40.430679Z"}]}}