{"id":"GHSA-xg7c-246g-6qpv","aliases":["RUSTSEC-2026-0219"],"status":"published","title":"Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-04 IV","description":"The `nostr` crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector\ndecoded from the `?iv=` portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message.\n\nThe decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type\nusing a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose\ndecoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext\ndecryption. For example, `?iv=AAAA` decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the\npanic.\n\nApplications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is\nalso reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and\nnotification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed\nto NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate\nthe application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service.\n\nThe issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity.\n\nThe flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to `[u8; 16]` using a\nchecked conversion. Invalid IV lengths now return a `Malformed` error instead of\npanicking.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and responsibly disclosed by **Muhammed Shekho** ([mhd-shekho.com](https://mhd-shekho.com)).","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","from":"osv"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"published":"2026-07-26T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-08-01T11:45:04Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nostr","fixed_in":["0.44.6","0.45.0-alpha.6"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nostr","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.0-0"},{"fixed":"0.44.6"},{"introduced":"0.45.0-alpha.1"},{"fixed":"0.45.0-alpha.6"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://crates.io/crates/nostr","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0219.html","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nostrdevkit/nostr/commit/b24619346f666d08ef7fefe27f033b8bc871697f","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"osv":[{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0219","title":"Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-04 IV","description":"The `nostr` crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector\ndecoded from the `?iv=` portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message.\n\nThe decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type\nusing a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose\ndecoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext\ndecryption. For example, `?iv=AAAA` decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the\npanic.\n\nApplications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is\nalso reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and\nnotification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed\nto NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate\nthe application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service.\n\nThe issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity.\n\nThe flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to `[u8; 16]` using a\nchecked conversion. Invalid IV lengths now return a `Malformed` error instead of\npanicking.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and responsibly disclosed by **Muhammed Shekho** ([mhd-shekho.com](https://mhd-shekho.com)).","status":"published","published":"2026-07-26T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-08-01T11:45:04.785279192Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:40.430679Z"}]}}