{"id":"GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc","aliases":[],"status":"published","title":"ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `pullArtifact` methods in `Registry` and `OCILayout` use the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo call sites are affected.\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java`, `pullLayer` (reached from `Registry.pullArtifact`):\n\n```java\nPath targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));\n...\nFiles.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);\n```\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java`, `OCILayout.pullArtifact`:\n\n```java\nFiles.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));\n```\n\nThe annotation comes from the remote manifest. `Path.resolve` treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows `..` segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. `REPLACE_EXISTING` overwrites files that exist at that destination.\n\nThe unpack branch of `pullLayer` (taken when the layer carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`) is not affected, because it dispatches through `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `unzip`, which apply `outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget)` after normalization. The non unpack branch and `OCILayout.pullArtifact` lack the equivalent check.\n\n`fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path)` is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","from":"ghsa"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-05-19T15:47:36Z","modified":"2026-05-19T16:00:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"land.oras:oras-java-sdk","fixed_in":["0.6.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"land.oras:oras-java-sdk","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.6.1"},{"fixed":"0.6.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"land.oras:oras-java-sdk","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.6.2"}]}],"versions":["0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.10","0.2.11","0.2.12","0.2.13","0.2.14","0.2.15","0.2.16","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.2.6","0.2.7","0.2.8","0.2.9","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.5.0","0.5.1","0.5.2","0.6.0","0.6.1"]}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java/security/advisories/GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc"},{"url":"https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc","title":"ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `pullArtifact` methods in `Registry` and `OCILayout` use the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo call sites are affected.\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java`, `pullLayer` (reached from `Registry.pullArtifact`):\n\n```java\nPath targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));\n...\nFiles.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);\n```\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java`, `OCILayout.pullArtifact`:\n\n```java\nFiles.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));\n```\n\nThe annotation comes from the remote manifest. `Path.resolve` treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows `..` segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. `REPLACE_EXISTING` overwrites files that exist at that destination.\n\nThe unpack branch of `pullLayer` (taken when the layer carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`) is not affected, because it dispatches through `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `unzip`, which apply `outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget)` after normalization. The non unpack branch and `OCILayout.pullArtifact` lack the equivalent check.\n\n`fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path)` is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-19T15:47:36Z","modified":"2026-05-19T15:47:37Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:12.430932Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc","title":"ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `pullArtifact` methods in `Registry` and `OCILayout` use the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo call sites are affected.\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java`, `pullLayer` (reached from `Registry.pullArtifact`):\n\n```java\nPath targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));\n...\nFiles.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);\n```\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java`, `OCILayout.pullArtifact`:\n\n```java\nFiles.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));\n```\n\nThe annotation comes from the remote manifest. `Path.resolve` treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows `..` segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. `REPLACE_EXISTING` overwrites files that exist at that destination.\n\nThe unpack branch of `pullLayer` (taken when the layer carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`) is not affected, because it dispatches through `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `unzip`, which apply `outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget)` after normalization. The non unpack branch and `OCILayout.pullArtifact` lack the equivalent check.\n\n`fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path)` is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-19T15:47:36Z","modified":"2026-05-19T16:00:12.159350459Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:00.198893Z"}]}}