CVE-2019-20175

An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert.

An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert.

An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert.

** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert."

An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert.

An issue was discovered in ide_dma_cb() in hw/ide/core.c in QEMU 2.4.0 through 4.2.0. The guest system can crash the QEMU process in the host system via a special SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND. It hits an assertion that implies that the size of successful DMA transfers there must be a multiple of 512 (the size of a sector). NOTE: a member of the QEMU security team disputes the significance of this issue because a "privileged guest user has many ways to cause similar DoS effect, without triggering this assert.