CVE-2021-29512

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor(https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/sparse/SparseTensor), then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow. This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/8b677d79167799f71c42fd3fa074476e0295413a/tensorflow/core/kernels/bincount_op.cc#L430-L433). Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor(https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/sparse/SparseTensor), then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow. This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/8b677d79167799f71c42fd3fa074476e0295413a/tensorflow/core/kernels/bincount_op.cc#L430-L433). Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

Impact

If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor, then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow:

import tensorflow as tf
tf.raw_ops.RaggedBincount(splits=[0], values=[1,1,1,1,1], size=5, weights=[1,2,3,4], binary_output=False)

This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op:

    for (int idx = 0; idx < num_values; ++idx) {
      while (idx >= splits(batch_idx)) {
        batch_idx++;
      }
      ...
    }

Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit eebb96c2830d48597d055d247c0e9aebaea94cd5.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported by members of the Aivul Team from Qihoo 360.

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor(https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/sparse/SparseTensor), then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow. This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/8b677d79167799f71c42fd3fa074476e0295413a/tensorflow/core/kernels/bincount_op.cc#L430-L433). Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor(https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/sparse/SparseTensor), then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow. This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/8b677d79167799f71c42fd3fa074476e0295413a/tensorflow/core/kernels/bincount_op.cc#L430-L433). Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

Impact

If the splits argument of RaggedBincount does not specify a valid SparseTensor, then an attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow:

import tensorflow as tf
tf.raw_ops.RaggedBincount(splits=[0], values=[1,1,1,1,1], size=5, weights=[1,2,3,4], binary_output=False)

This will cause a read from outside the bounds of the splits tensor buffer in the implementation of the RaggedBincount op:

    for (int idx = 0; idx < num_values; ++idx) {
      while (idx >= splits(batch_idx)) {
        batch_idx++;
      }
      ...
    }

Before the for loop, batch_idx is set to 0. The user controls the splits array, making it contain only one element, 0. Thus, the code in the while loop would increment batch_idx and then try to read splits(1), which is outside of bounds.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit eebb96c2830d48597d055d247c0e9aebaea94cd5.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2 and TensorFlow 2.3.3, as these are also affected.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported by members of the Aivul Team from Qihoo 360.