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CVE-2021-32724

check-spelling workflow vulnerable to GITHUB_TOKEN leakage via symlink attack

9.9 CriticalPublic exploitFix available

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

2.33%Up 1.7 points since Sep 10, 2021
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used9.9

check-spelling workflow vulnerable to GITHUB_TOKEN leakage via symlink attack

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.

Record
CVE-2021-32724
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-532
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2022-63389.9

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.

Record
EUVD-2022-6338
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p9.6

check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack

Impact

For a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed.

With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository.

Workarounds

You can either:

or

  • Set repository to Allow specific actions. You can check:
    • [x] Allow actions created by GitHub
    • [x] Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators

check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses.

or

Solution

Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main were fixed automatically with the release of v0.0.19.

Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version.

The simple case

In the simple case, you have few enough open branches that you can do the following on all branches.

  • Edit the workflow to use check-spelling/check-spelling@main, or
  • Edit the workflow to use check-spelling/check-spelling@v0.0.19, or
  • Delete the workflow file, or
  • Change the workflow to only use on: push
    • this will result in PRs losing status checks (commits will still have statuses)

The complex case

If you have too many open branches to feasibly fix all of them as per the above, you can instead do the following:

  1. Perform the above solution on all open branches for which you need check-spelling to be active.
  2. On all open branches on which you need check-spelling to be active, rename the workflow file (e.g. to spelling2.yml)
  3. On the default branch, create a dummy workflow file with the old name (this is usually spelling.yml).
  4. Use the GitHub Actions UI to disable the workflow with the old name (this is usually spelling.yml).

This should prevent the vulnerable workflow from executing on any branches that you have not applied the proper solution to.

The reason for creating the dummy file (Step 3) before disabling the workflow (Step 4) is that, in our testing, GitHub may un-disable a workflow if it does not exist on your default branch.

Example dummy workflow file (For step 3):

# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
name: Workflow should not run!
on:
  push:
    branches: ''

jobs:
  placeholder:
    name: Should be disabled
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: false
    steps:
    - name: Task
      run: |
        echo 'Running this task would be bad'
        exit 1

You should also include a comment in the new workflow to remind people not to resurrect the old name, for example:

# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p

Finally, you should consider sending a Pull Request to an open branch in which you have not performed the proper solution to verify that the old version of…

Record
GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
CVSS 3.1
9.6 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weakness
CWE-532
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD9.9

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.

Record
CVE-2021-32724
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 2.0
6.8 MediumAV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Weakness
CWE-532
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV9.9

check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.

Record
CVE-2021-32724
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p9.6

check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack

Impact

For a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed.

With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository.

Workarounds

You can either:

or

  • Set repository to Allow specific actions. You can check:
    • [x] Allow actions created by GitHub
    • [x] Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators

check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses.

or

Solution

Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main were fixed automatically with the release of v0.0.19.

Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version.

The simple case

In the simple case, you have few enough open branches that you can do the following on all branches.

  • Edit the workflow to use check-spelling/check-spelling@main, or
  • Edit the workflow to use check-spelling/check-spelling@v0.0.19, or
  • Delete the workflow file, or
  • Change the workflow to only use on: push
    • this will result in PRs losing status checks (commits will still have statuses)

The complex case

If you have too many open branches to feasibly fix all of them as per the above, you can instead do the following:

  1. Perform the above solution on all open branches for which you need check-spelling to be active.
  2. On all open branches on which you need check-spelling to be active, rename the workflow file (e.g. to spelling2.yml)
  3. On the default branch, create a dummy workflow file with the old name (this is usually spelling.yml).
  4. Use the GitHub Actions UI to disable the workflow with the old name (this is usually spelling.yml).

This should prevent the vulnerable workflow from executing on any branches that you have not applied the proper solution to.

The reason for creating the dummy file (Step 3) before disabling the workflow (Step 4) is that, in our testing, GitHub may un-disable a workflow if it does not exist on your default branch.

Example dummy workflow file (For step 3):

# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
name: Workflow should not run!
on:
  push:
    branches: ''

jobs:
  placeholder:
    name: Should be disabled
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: false
    steps:
    - name: Task
      run: |
        echo 'Running this task would be bad'
        exit 1

You should also include a comment in the new workflow to remind people not to resurrect the old name, for example:

# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p

Finally, you should consider sending a Pull Request to an open branch in which you have not performed the proper solution to verify that the old version of…

Record
GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
CVSS 3.1
9.6 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weakness
CWE-532
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
check-spelling/check-spelling
GitHub Actions
before 0.0.19
0.0.19

Public exploits

Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.

Public exploits
SourceLinkDate
PoC in GitHubMaximeSchlegel/CVE-2021-32724-Target2021-12-03

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
aliasesEUVD
first indexedCVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV, PoC in GitHub

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2021-32724 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.9) in Check-spelling, published September 9, 2021. Public exploit code exists. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 2.33%, the 83rd percentile. Fixed in check-spelling/check-spelling 0.0.19.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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