CVE-2021-32724
check-spelling workflow vulnerable to GITHUB_TOKEN leakage via symlink attack
check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used 9.9
check-spelling workflow vulnerable to GITHUB_TOKEN leakage via symlink attack
check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.
- Record
CVE-2021-32724- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2022-6338 9.9
check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.
- Record
EUVD-2022-6338- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p 9.6
check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack
Impact
For a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed.
With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository.
Workarounds
You can either:
- Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches.
or
- Set repository to Allow specific actions. You can check:
- [x]
Allow actions created by GitHub - [x]
Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators
- [x]
check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses.
or
- Set repository Workflow permissions to
Read repository contents permission.
Solution
Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main were fixed automatically with the release of v0.0.19.
Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version.
The simple case
In the simple case, you have few enough open branches that you can do the following on all branches.
- Edit the workflow to use
check-spelling/check-spelling@main, or - Edit the workflow to use
check-spelling/check-spelling@v0.0.19, or - Delete the workflow file, or
- Change the workflow to only use
on: push- this will result in PRs losing status checks (commits will still have statuses)
The complex case
If you have too many open branches to feasibly fix all of them as per the above, you can instead do the following:
- Perform the above solution on all open branches for which you need
check-spellingto be active. - On all open branches on which you need
check-spellingto be active, rename the workflow file (e.g. tospelling2.yml) - On the default branch, create a dummy workflow file with the old name (this is usually
spelling.yml). - Use the GitHub Actions UI to disable the workflow with the old name (this is usually
spelling.yml).
This should prevent the vulnerable workflow from executing on any branches that you have not applied the proper solution to.
The reason for creating the dummy file (Step 3) before disabling the workflow (Step 4) is that, in our testing, GitHub may un-disable a workflow if it does not exist on your default branch.
Example dummy workflow file (For step 3):
# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
name: Workflow should not run!
on:
push:
branches: ''
jobs:
placeholder:
name: Should be disabled
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: false
steps:
- name: Task
run: |
echo 'Running this task would be bad'
exit 1
You should also include a comment in the new workflow to remind people not to resurrect the old name, for example:
# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
Finally, you should consider sending a Pull Request to an open branch in which you have not performed the proper solution to verify that the old version of…
- Record
GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD 9.9
check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.
- Record
CVE-2021-32724- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS 2.0
- 6.8 Medium
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P - Weakness
- CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 9.9
check-spelling is a github action which provides CI spell checking. In affected versions and for a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed. With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository. As a workaround users may can either: Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches or Set repository to Allow specific actions. check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses. Set repository Workflow permissions to Read repository contents permission. Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main will get the fix automatically. Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version. Users can verify who and which Pull Requests have been running the action by looking up the spelling.yml action in the Actions tab of their repositories, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml - you can filter PRs by adding ?query=event%3Apull_request_target, e.g., https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/actions/workflows/spelling.yml?query=event%3Apull_request_target.
- Record
CVE-2021-32724- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p 9.6
check-spelling workflow vulnerable to token leakage via symlink attack
Impact
For a repository with the check-spelling action enabled that triggers on pull_request_target (or schedule), an attacker can send a crafted Pull Request that causes a GITHUB_TOKEN to be exposed.
With the GITHUB_TOKEN, it's possible to push commits to the repository bypassing standard approval processes. Commits to the repository could then steal any/all secrets available to the repository.
Workarounds
You can either:
- Disable the workflow until you've fixed all branches.
or
- Set repository to Allow specific actions. You can check:
- [x]
Allow actions created by GitHub - [x]
Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators
- [x]
check-spelling isn't a verified creator and it certainly won't be anytime soon. You could then explicitly add other actions that your repository uses.
or
- Set repository Workflow permissions to
Read repository contents permission.
Solution
Workflows using check-spelling/check-spelling@main were fixed automatically with the release of v0.0.19.
Workflows using a pinned sha or tagged version will need to change the affected workflows for all repository branches to the latest version.
The simple case
In the simple case, you have few enough open branches that you can do the following on all branches.
- Edit the workflow to use
check-spelling/check-spelling@main, or - Edit the workflow to use
check-spelling/check-spelling@v0.0.19, or - Delete the workflow file, or
- Change the workflow to only use
on: push- this will result in PRs losing status checks (commits will still have statuses)
The complex case
If you have too many open branches to feasibly fix all of them as per the above, you can instead do the following:
- Perform the above solution on all open branches for which you need
check-spellingto be active. - On all open branches on which you need
check-spellingto be active, rename the workflow file (e.g. tospelling2.yml) - On the default branch, create a dummy workflow file with the old name (this is usually
spelling.yml). - Use the GitHub Actions UI to disable the workflow with the old name (this is usually
spelling.yml).
This should prevent the vulnerable workflow from executing on any branches that you have not applied the proper solution to.
The reason for creating the dummy file (Step 3) before disabling the workflow (Step 4) is that, in our testing, GitHub may un-disable a workflow if it does not exist on your default branch.
Example dummy workflow file (For step 3):
# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
name: Workflow should not run!
on:
push:
branches: ''
jobs:
placeholder:
name: Should be disabled
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: false
steps:
- name: Task
run: |
echo 'Running this task would be bad'
exit 1
You should also include a comment in the new workflow to remind people not to resurrect the old name, for example:
# spelling.yml is disabled per https://github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
Finally, you should consider sending a Pull Request to an open branch in which you have not performed the proper solution to verify that the old version of…
- Record
GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
check-spelling/check-spellingGitHub Actions | before 0.0.19 | 0.0.19 |
Public exploits
Links only. Every CVE stores no exploit code.
| Source | Link | Date |
|---|---|---|
| PoC in GitHub | MaximeSchlegel/CVE-2021-32724-Target | 2021-12-03 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV, PoC in GitHub |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2021-32724 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.9) in Check-spelling, published September 9, 2021. Public exploit code exists. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 2.33%, the 83rd percentile. Fixed in check-spelling/check-spelling 0.0.19.
References
github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/security/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/commit/436362fc6b588d9d561cbdb575260ca593c8dc56
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32724
github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling/releases/tag/v0.0.19
github.com/advisories/GHSA-g86g-chm8-7r2p
github.com/check-spelling/check-spelling
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.