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CVE-2021-41173

DoS via maliciously crafted p2p message

5.7 MediumFix available

Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
Required

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

1.24%Up 0.2 points since Oct 27, 2021
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 5.7

DoS via maliciously crafted p2p message

Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.

Record
CVE-2021-41173
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2021-2158 5.7

Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.

Record
EUVD-2021-2158
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v 5.7

Geth Node Vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted p2p message

Impact

A vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer, via the snap/1 protocol. The crash can be triggered by sending a malicious snap/1 GetTrieNodes package.

Details

On September 21, 2021, geth-team member Gary Rong (@rjl493456442) found a way to crash the snap request handler . By using this vulnerability, a peer connected on the snap/1 protocol could cause a vulnerable node to crash with a panic.

In the trie.TryGetNode implementation, if the requested path is reached, the associated node will be returned. However the nilness is not checked there.

func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
	if pos >= len(path) {
		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
		// that into consensus form can be nasty (needs to cascade down) and
		// time consuming. Instead, just pull the hash up from disk directly.
		var hash hashNode
		if node, ok := origNode.(hashNode); ok {
			hash = node
		} else {
			hash, _ = origNode.cache()
		}

More specifically the origNode can be nil(e.g. the child of fullnode) and system can panic at line hash, _ = origNode.cache().

When investigating this, @holiman tried to find it via fuzzing, which uncovered a second crasher, also related to the snap GetTrieNodes package. If the caller requests a storage trie:

				// Storage slots requested, open the storage trie and retrieve from there
				account, err := snap.Account(common.BytesToHash(pathset[0]))
				loads++ // always account database reads, even for failures
				if account == nil {
					break
				}
				stTrie, err := trie.NewSecure(common.BytesToHash(account.Root), triedb)

The code assumes that snap.Account returns either a non-nil response unless error is also provided. This is however not the case, since snap.Account can return nil, nil.

Patches

--- a/eth/protocols/snap/handler.go
+++ b/eth/protocols/snap/handler.go
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ func handleMessage(backend Backend, peer *Peer) error {
 				// Storage slots requested, open the storage trie and retrieve from there
 				account, err := snap.Account(common.BytesToHash(pathset[0]))
 				loads++ // always account database reads, even for failures
-				if err != nil {
+				if err != nil || account == nil {
 					break
 				}
 				stTrie, err := trie.NewSecure(common.BytesToHash(account.Root), triedb)
diff --git a/trie/trie.go b/trie/trie.go
index 7ea7efa835..d0f0d4e2bc 100644
--- a/trie/trie.go
+++ b/trie/trie.go
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ func (t *Trie) TryGetNode(path []byte) ([]byte, int, error) {
 }
 
 func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
+	// If non-existent path requested, abort
+	if origNode == nil {
+		return nil, nil, 0, nil
+	}
 	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
 	if pos >= len(path) {
 		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
@@ -193,10 +197,6 @@ func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, new
 	}
 	// Path still needs to be traversed, descend into children
 	switch n := (origNode).(type) {
-	case nil:
-		// Non-existent path requested, abort
-		return nil, nil, 0, nil
-
 	case valueNode:
 		// Path prematurely ended, abort
 		return nil, nil, 0, nil

The fixes were merged into #23657, with commit f1fd963, and released as part of Geth v1.10.9 on Sept 29, 2021.

Workarounds

Apply the patch above or upgrade to a version which is not vulnerable.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about…

Record
GHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 5.7

Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.

Record
CVE-2021-41173
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVSS 2.0
3.5 LowAV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 5.7

Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.

Record
CVE-2021-41173
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v 5.7

Geth Node Vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted p2p message

Impact

A vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer, via the snap/1 protocol. The crash can be triggered by sending a malicious snap/1 GetTrieNodes package.

Details

On September 21, 2021, geth-team member Gary Rong (@rjl493456442) found a way to crash the snap request handler . By using this vulnerability, a peer connected on the snap/1 protocol could cause a vulnerable node to crash with a panic.

In the trie.TryGetNode implementation, if the requested path is reached, the associated node will be returned. However the nilness is not checked there.

func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
	if pos >= len(path) {
		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
		// that into consensus form can be nasty (needs to cascade down) and
		// time consuming. Instead, just pull the hash up from disk directly.
		var hash hashNode
		if node, ok := origNode.(hashNode); ok {
			hash = node
		} else {
			hash, _ = origNode.cache()
		}

More specifically the origNode can be nil(e.g. the child of fullnode) and system can panic at line hash, _ = origNode.cache().

When investigating this, @holiman tried to find it via fuzzing, which uncovered a second crasher, also related to the snap GetTrieNodes package. If the caller requests a storage trie:

				// Storage slots requested, open the storage trie and retrieve from there
				account, err := snap.Account(common.BytesToHash(pathset[0]))
				loads++ // always account database reads, even for failures
				if account == nil {
					break
				}
				stTrie, err := trie.NewSecure(common.BytesToHash(account.Root), triedb)

The code assumes that snap.Account returns either a non-nil response unless error is also provided. This is however not the case, since snap.Account can return nil, nil.

Patches

--- a/eth/protocols/snap/handler.go
+++ b/eth/protocols/snap/handler.go
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ func handleMessage(backend Backend, peer *Peer) error {
 				// Storage slots requested, open the storage trie and retrieve from there
 				account, err := snap.Account(common.BytesToHash(pathset[0]))
 				loads++ // always account database reads, even for failures
-				if err != nil {
+				if err != nil || account == nil {
 					break
 				}
 				stTrie, err := trie.NewSecure(common.BytesToHash(account.Root), triedb)
diff --git a/trie/trie.go b/trie/trie.go
index 7ea7efa835..d0f0d4e2bc 100644
--- a/trie/trie.go
+++ b/trie/trie.go
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ func (t *Trie) TryGetNode(path []byte) ([]byte, int, error) {
 }
 
 func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
+	// If non-existent path requested, abort
+	if origNode == nil {
+		return nil, nil, 0, nil
+	}
 	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
 	if pos >= len(path) {
 		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
@@ -193,10 +197,6 @@ func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, new
 	}
 	// Path still needs to be traversed, descend into children
 	switch n := (origNode).(type) {
-	case nil:
-		// Non-existent path requested, abort
-		return nil, nil, 0, nil
-
 	case valueNode:
 		// Path prematurely ended, abort
 		return nil, nil, 0, nil

The fixes were merged into #23657, with commit f1fd963, and released as part of Geth v1.10.9 on Sept 29, 2021.

Workarounds

Apply the patch above or upgrade to a version which is not vulnerable.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about…

Record
GHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v
CVSS 3.1
5.7 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2022-0256 No score

Panic via maliciously crafted message in github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum

A maliciously crafted snap/1 protocol message can cause a panic.

Record
GO-2022-0256
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum
Go
before 1.10.9
1.10.9

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
aliasesEUVD
first indexedCVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2021-41173 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.7) in Ethereum Go Ethereum, published October 25, 2021. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1.24%, the 69th percentile. Fixed in github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum 1.10.9.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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