CVE-2023-28443

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to version 9.23.3, the directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission. This issue is patched in version 9.23.3.

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to version 9.23.3, the directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission. This issue is patched in version 9.23.3.

Summary

CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File discovered in v9.23.1. The directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission.

Details

Using v9.23.1, I am seeing that the directus_refresh_token is not properly redacted as indicated by https://github.com/directus/directus/blob/7c479c5161639aac466c763b6b958a9524201d74/api/src/logger.ts#L13

I'm classifying this as a security vulnerability because if someone has access to the log outputs, for example with a shared Cloud account or Splunk implementation, they could exchange the refresh token using /auth/refresh for an access token and use the token to perform actions on behalf of an unsuspecting user. This situation creates issues with accountability and non-repudiation because we can no longer have confidence that actions taken in the application were authorized or even performed by the logged-in user.

A couple of examples of this are:

• A disgruntled employee deletes all of the data to get even with a target team member before logging off on their last day
• Under the guise of their unsuspecting boss, a mischievous engineer uploads questionable images that get displayed on internal or external facing content sites

The list could go on but I think these communicate the risk of an internal threat that has access to this information 😆

PoC

1. Set LOG_STYLE="raw" and run Directus v9.23.1

2. Log in to the application

3. Look at the shell output and see that directus_refresh_token is logged

   Note: This is different from the standard raw output format. I intentionally ran this with npx directus start | pino-pretty so logs would be easier to read. It can also be reproduced by running npx directus start alone.

4. Exchange the directus_refresh_token for an access_token

    curl -X POST \
      'http://0.0.0.0:8055/auth/refresh' \
      --header 'Accept: */*' \
      --header 'Cookie: directus_refresh_token=$shh'
   

Impact

Because this can be used to exploit other threats related to CWE-284: Improper Access Control I rank it with a Moderate severity. An insider with knowledge of this could do many mischievous things and get away with them for a long time without victims knowing about it.

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to version 9.23.3, the directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission. This issue is patched in version 9.23.3.

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to version 9.23.3, the directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission. This issue is patched in version 9.23.3.

Summary

CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File discovered in v9.23.1. The directus_refresh_token is not redacted properly from the log outputs and can be used to impersonate users without their permission.

Details

Using v9.23.1, I am seeing that the directus_refresh_token is not properly redacted as indicated by https://github.com/directus/directus/blob/7c479c5161639aac466c763b6b958a9524201d74/api/src/logger.ts#L13

I'm classifying this as a security vulnerability because if someone has access to the log outputs, for example with a shared Cloud account or Splunk implementation, they could exchange the refresh token using /auth/refresh for an access token and use the token to perform actions on behalf of an unsuspecting user. This situation creates issues with accountability and non-repudiation because we can no longer have confidence that actions taken in the application were authorized or even performed by the logged-in user.

A couple of examples of this are:

• A disgruntled employee deletes all of the data to get even with a target team member before logging off on their last day
• Under the guise of their unsuspecting boss, a mischievous engineer uploads questionable images that get displayed on internal or external facing content sites

The list could go on but I think these communicate the risk of an internal threat that has access to this information 😆

PoC

1. Set LOG_STYLE="raw" and run Directus v9.23.1

2. Log in to the application

3. Look at the shell output and see that directus_refresh_token is logged

   Note: This is different from the standard raw output format. I intentionally ran this with npx directus start | pino-pretty so logs would be easier to read. It can also be reproduced by running npx directus start alone.

4. Exchange the directus_refresh_token for an access_token

    curl -X POST \
      'http://0.0.0.0:8055/auth/refresh' \
      --header 'Accept: */*' \
      --header 'Cookie: directus_refresh_token=$shh'
   

Impact

Because this can be used to exploit other threats related to CWE-284: Improper Access Control I rank it with a Moderate severity. An insider with knowledge of this could do many mischievous things and get away with them for a long time without victims knowing about it.