CVE-2023-28841

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.

Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.

It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed.

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:

• moved to the kernel-modules-extra package and no longer installed by default in RHEL 8.3
• officially deprecated in RHEL 8.6
• removed completely in RHEL 9

This rule is not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.

It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a…

Docker is an open source project to build, ship and run any application as a lightweight container.

Security Fix(es):

Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The overlay driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in host mode instead of ingress mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the ingress network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.(CVE-2023-28842)

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is…

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Docker Swarm encrypted overlay network traffic may be unencrypted in github.com/docker/docker

This update fixes several security issues and also solves some other issues

• manage change of launch option earlier in post process
• Automatically convert -g option to --data-root in installed /etc/sysconfig/docker-storage
• Fix CVE-2023-26054 and CVE-2023-2884[0-2]

These are all security issues fixed in the docker-24.0.5_ce-2.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

These are all security issues fixed in the docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-15.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for docker fixes the following issues:

• Update to v20.10.25-ce
• CVE-2023-28840: Fixed a bug where an attacker could inject arbitrary Ethernet frames to execute a Denial of Service attack. (bsc#1214107)
• CVE-2023-28841: Fixed a bug which allows an attacker to sit in a trusted position on the network and read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure (bsc#1214108)
• CVE-2023-28842: Fixed a bug which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. (bsc#1214109)

This update for docker fixes the following issues:

• Update to Docker 24.0.5-ce.

  See upstream changelong online at https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2405 bsc#1213229

• Update to Docker 24.0.4-ce.

  See upstream changelog online at https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2404. bsc#1213500

• Update to Docker 24.0.3-ce.

  See upstream changelog online at https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2403. bsc#1213120

• Recommend docker-rootless-extras instead of Require(ing) it, given it's an additional functionality and not inherently required for docker to function.

• Add docker-rootless-extras subpackage (https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless)

• Update to Docker 24.0.2-ce. See upstream changelog online at https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2402. bsc#1212368

  • Includes the upstreamed fix for the mount table pollution issue. bsc#1210797

• Add Recommends for docker-buildx, and add /usr/lib/docker/cli-plugins as being provided by this package.

• was rebuilt against current GO compiler.

This update for docker-stable fixes the following issues:

• Include historical changelog data from before the docker-stable fork. The initial changelog entry did technically provide all the necessary information, but our CVE tracking tools do not understand how the package is forked and so it seems that this package does not include fixes for ~12 years of updates. So, include a copy of the original package's changelog up until the fork point. (bsc#1250596)

• Remove git-core recommends on SLE. Most SLE systems have installRecommends=yes by default and thus end up installing git with Docker. bsc#1250508

  This feature is mostly intended for developers ('docker build git://') so most users already have the dependency installed, and the error when git is missing is fairly straightforward (so they can easily figure out what they need to install).

• Backport https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/48517. bsc#1247362

• Update to docker-buildx v0.25.0. Upstream changelog: https://github.com/docker/buildx/releases/tag/v0.25.0

• Do not try to inject SUSEConnect secrets when in Rootless Docker mode, as Docker does not have permission to access the host zypper credentials in this mode (and unprivileged users cannot disable the feature using /etc/docker/suse-secrets-enable.) bsc#1240150

• Initial docker-stable fork, forked from Docker 24.0.7-ce release (packaged on 2024-02-14). The original changelog is included below for historical reference.

This update for docker-stable fixes the following issues:

Note this update contains a already fixed references mostly.

• Remove git-core recommends on SLE to avoid pulling it in unnecessary. (bsc#1250508)

  This feature is mostly intended for developers ('docker build git://') so most users already have the dependency installed, and the error when git is missing is fairly straightforward (so they can easily figure out what they need to install).

• Include historical changelog data from before the docker-stable fork. The initial changelog entry did technically provide all the necessary information, but our CVE tracking tools do not understand how the package is forked and so it seems that this package does not include fixes for ~12 years of updates. So, include a copy of the original package's changelog up until the fork point. bsc#1250596

• Update to docker-buildx v0.25.0. Upstream changelog: https://github.com/docker/buildx/releases/tag/v0.25.0

• Update to Go 1.23 for building now that upstream has switched their 23.0.x LTSS to use Go 1.23.

• Do not try to inject SUSEConnect secrets when in Rootless Docker mode, as Docker does not have permission to access the host zypper credentials in this mode (and unprivileged users cannot disable the feature using /etc/docker/suse-secrets-enable.) bsc#1240150

• Initial docker-stable fork, forked from Docker 24.0.7-ce release (packaged on 2024-02-14). The original changelog is included below for historical reference.

Cory Snider discovered that Docker incorrectly handled networking packet encapsulation. An attacker could use this issue to inject internet packets in established connection, possibly causing a denial of service or bypassing firewall protections. This issue only affected Ubuntu 22.04 LTS, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. (CVE-2023-28840, CVE-2023-28841, CVE-2023-28842)

Rory McNamara discovered that Docker incorrectly handled cache in the BuildKit toolkit. An attacker could possibly use this issue to expose sensitive information. (CVE-2024-23651)

It was discovered that Docker incorrectly handled parallel operations in some circumstances, which could possibly lead to undefined behavior. (CVE-2024-36621, CVE-2024-36623)

Rory McNamara discovered that Docker incorrectly verified file paths during a certain command in the BuildKit toolkit. An attacker could possibly use this issue to delete arbitrary files from the system. (CVE-2024-23652)