CVE-2023-29198
Context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value in Electron
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions 25.0.0-alpha.2, 24.0.1, 23.2.3, and 22.3.6.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
6.0
Context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value in Electron
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions 25.0.0-alpha.2, 24.0.1, 23.2.3, and 22.3.6.
- Record
CVE-2023-29198- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-754
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2023-2557
6.0
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions 25.0.0-alpha.2, 24.0.1, 23.2.3, and 22.3.6.
- Record
EUVD-2023-2557- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7
6.0
Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value
Impact
Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:
- If an API exposed to the main world via
contextBridgecan return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrownError: object could not be cloned. - If an API exposed to the main world via
contextBridgehas a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.
The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.
Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.
Fixed Versions
25.0.0-alpha.224.0.123.2.322.3.6
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]
- Record
GHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-754
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
6.0
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions 25.0.0-alpha.2, 24.0.1, 23.2.3, and 22.3.6.
- Record
CVE-2023-29198- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-754
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
6.0
Context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value in Electron
Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions 25.0.0-alpha.2, 24.0.1, 23.2.3, and 22.3.6.
- Record
CVE-2023-29198- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-754
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7
6.0
Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value
Impact
Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:
- If an API exposed to the main world via
contextBridgecan return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrownError: object could not be cloned. - If an API exposed to the main world via
contextBridgehas a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.
The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.
Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.
Fixed Versions
25.0.0-alpha.224.0.123.2.322.3.6
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]
- Record
GHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7- CVSS 3.1
- 6.0 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-754
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2023-29198 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.0) in Electron, published September 6, 2023. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.59%, the 48th percentile. Fixed in electron 22.3.6.