CVE-2023-40013

SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack. This issue has been addressed in commit d3562fc08 which is included in releases from 1.6.9. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack. This issue has been addressed in commit d3562fc08 which is included in releases from 1.6.9. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Summary

According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in XSS.

Details

When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Here's a list of events not removed by svg-loader. onafterscriptexecute, onbeforecopy, onbeforecut, onbeforescriptexecute, onbeforetoggle, onbegin, onbounce, onend, onfinish, onfocusin, onfocusout, onmousewheel, onpointerrawupdate, onrepeat, onsearch, onshow, onstart, ontoggle(popover), ontouchend, ontouchmove, ontouchstart As you can see in the POC we can use onbegin in animate tag to execute JS code without needing to add data-js="enabled".

PoC

<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <animate onbegin=alert(1) attributeName=x dur=1s>
</svg>

<html>
    <head>
        <script src="./dist/svg-loader.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
    </head>
    <body>
        <svg data-src=""></svg>
    </body>
</html>

Impact

Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack.

SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack. This issue has been addressed in commit d3562fc08 which is included in releases from 1.6.9. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack. This issue has been addressed in commit d3562fc08 which is included in releases from 1.6.9. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Summary

According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in XSS.

Details

When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as onmouseover, onclick but the list of events is not exhaustive. Here's a list of events not removed by svg-loader. onafterscriptexecute, onbeforecopy, onbeforecut, onbeforescriptexecute, onbeforetoggle, onbegin, onbounce, onend, onfinish, onfocusin, onfocusout, onmousewheel, onpointerrawupdate, onrepeat, onsearch, onshow, onstart, ontoggle(popover), ontouchend, ontouchmove, ontouchstart As you can see in the POC we can use onbegin in animate tag to execute JS code without needing to add data-js="enabled".

PoC

<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <animate onbegin=alert(1) attributeName=x dur=1s>
</svg>

<html>
    <head>
        <script src="./dist/svg-loader.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
    </head>
    <body>
        <svg data-src=""></svg>
    </body>
</html>

Impact

Any website which uses external-svg-loader and allows its users to provide svg src, upload svg files would be susceptible to stored XSS attack.