CVE-2023-50715
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue.
When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when the request is not authenticated and the request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet. The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Adjacent network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
4.3
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue.
When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when the request is not authenticated and the request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet. The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
- Record
CVE-2023-50715- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-200
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2023-3237
4.3
Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue.
When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when the request is not authenticated and the request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet. The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
- Record
EUVD-2023-3237- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83
4.3
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Summary
The login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network.
Details
Starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when:
- The request is not authenticated and
- The request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet (
10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fd00::/8, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, ::ffff:172.16.0.0/108, ::ffff:192.168.0.0/112)
The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly (see release blog post) and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
PoC
- Place a Home Assistant instance on a private subnet, i.e., 192.168.1.0/24.
- Create a few users, let's say, three.
- From any (or another) private subnet on the LAN, like 192.168.2.0/24, open an incognito browser window (to ensure that the browser has no cookies from Home Assistant and therefore is demonstrably unauthenticated) and navigate to the Home Assistant URL.
- The login page will display all three users, including their profile photo.
Impact
The following CVSS string could be shaped to describe the overall impact of this issue: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
As seen, the Exploitability metrics are high, and the Impact metrics are low. This is fitting because the problem does not constitute a critical one, but at the same time, it is trivial to exploit. Still, since the mitigation can be so easily implemented in code to eliminate a typical case of information disclosure, it would certainly be worth pursuing.
- Record
GHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-200
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
4.3
Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue.
When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when the request is not authenticated and the request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet. The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
- Record
CVE-2023-50715- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-200
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
4.3
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue.
When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when the request is not authenticated and the request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet. The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
- Record
CVE-2023-50715- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-200
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83
4.3
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Summary
The login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network.
Details
Starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when:
- The request is not authenticated and
- The request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet (
10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fd00::/8, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, ::ffff:172.16.0.0/108, ::ffff:192.168.0.0/112)
The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly (see release blog post) and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
PoC
- Place a Home Assistant instance on a private subnet, i.e., 192.168.1.0/24.
- Create a few users, let's say, three.
- From any (or another) private subnet on the LAN, like 192.168.2.0/24, open an incognito browser window (to ensure that the browser has no cookies from Home Assistant and therefore is demonstrably unauthenticated) and navigate to the Home Assistant URL.
- The login page will display all three users, including their profile photo.
Impact
The following CVSS string could be shaped to describe the overall impact of this issue: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
As seen, the Exploitability metrics are high, and the Impact metrics are low. This is fitting because the problem does not constitute a critical one, but at the same time, it is trivial to exploit. Still, since the mitigation can be so easily implemented in code to eliminate a typical case of information disclosure, it would certainly be worth pursuing.
- Record
GHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-200
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-1451
4.3
User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN
Summary
The login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network.
Details
Starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when:
- The request is not authenticated and
- The request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet (
10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fd00::/8, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, ::ffff:172.16.0.0/108, ::ffff:192.168.0.0/112)
The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly (see release blog post) and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.
However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.
PoC
- Place a Home Assistant instance on a private subnet, i.e., 192.168.1.0/24.
- Create a few users, let's say, three.
- From any (or another) private subnet on the LAN, like 192.168.2.0/24, open an incognito browser window (to ensure that the browser has no cookies from Home Assistant and therefore is demonstrably unauthenticated) and navigate to the Home Assistant URL.
- The login page will display all three users, including their profile photo.
Impact
The following CVSS string could be shaped to describe the overall impact of this issue: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
As seen, the Exploitability metrics are high, and the Impact metrics are low. This is fitting because the problem does not constitute a critical one, but at the same time, it is trivial to exploit. Still, since the mitigation can be so easily implemented in code to eliminate a typical case of information disclosure, it would certainly be worth pursuing.
- Record
PYSEC-2026-1451- CVSS 3.1
- 4.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
homeassistantPyPI |
before 2023.12.3 | 2023.12.3 |
homeassistantPyPI |
before 2023.12.3, plus listed versions 0.10.00.10.10.100.00.100.0b00.100.0b1 Show 45 moreShow less0.100.0b20.100.0b30.100.10.100.20.100.30.101.00.101.0b00.101.0b10.101.0b20.101.0b30.101.0b40.101.10.101.20.101.30.102.00.102.0b00.102.0b10.102.0b20.102.0b30.102.10.102.20.102.30.103.00.103.0b00.103.0b10.103.10.103.20.103.30.103.40.103.50.103.60.104.00.104.0b00.104.0b10.104.0b20.104.0b30.104.0b40.104.0b50.104.10.104.20.104.30.105.00.105.0b00.105.0b50.105.0b6 |
2023.12.3 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| aliases, products, published | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2023-50715 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 4.3) in Home-assistant Core, published December 15, 2023. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.91%, the 60th percentile. Fixed in homeassistant 2023.12.3.
References
github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83
github.com/home-assistant/core/commit/dbfc5ea8f96bde6cd165892f5a6a6f9a65731c76
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50715
github.com/advisories/GHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2023/50xxx/CVE-2023-50715.json
github.com/home-assistant/core
pypi.org/project/homeassistant
Left out here: 1,120 versions. The JSON record has them.