CVE-2023-54195

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel

afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b
 rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d
 rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35
 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519
 kthread+0xe7/0xef
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted.

It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel

afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b
 rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d
 rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35
 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519
 kthread+0xe7/0xef
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted.

It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel

afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b
 rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d
 rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35
 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519
 kthread+0xe7/0xef
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted.

It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel

afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b
 rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d
 rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35
 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519
 kthread+0xe7/0xef
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted.

It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.

• fix: fbdev: fix potential buffer overflow in do_register_framebuffer()
• qed: Don't collect too many protection override GRC elements {CVE-2025-39949}
• drm/amd/display: Avoid a NULL pointer dereference {CVE-2025-39693}
• pNFS: Fix uninited ptr deref in block/scsi layout {CVE-2025-38691}
• netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets {CVE-2025-38732}
• ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr() {CVE-2025-71085}
• fs: dlm: fix use after free in midcomms commit {CVE-2023-53629}
• svcrdma: use rc_pageoff for memcpy byte offset {CVE-2025-68811}
• bpf: Disable preemption in bpf_perf_event_output {CVE-2023-54303}
• scsi: target: iscsit: Free cmds before session free {CVE-2023-54184}
• fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs* {CVE-2025-40322}
• scsi: libsas: Fix use-after-free bug in smp_execute_task_sg() {CVE-2022-50422}
• RDMA/core: Fix "KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in ib_register_device" problem {CVE-2025-38022}
• memcg: protect concurrent access to mem_cgroup_idr {CVE-2024-43892}
• ACPI: EC: Fix oops when removing custom query handlers {CVE-2023-54244}
• KVM: SVM: Get source vCPUs from source VM for SEV-ES intrahost migration {CVE-2023-54296}
• net: nsh: Use correct mac_offset to unwind gso skb in nsh_gso_segment() {CVE-2023-54114}
• net: tls: avoid hanging tasks on the tx_lock {CVE-2023-54306}
• usb: typec: bus: verify partner exists in typec_altmode_attention {CVE-2023-54299}
• scsi: mpi3mr: Fix missing mrioc->evtack_cmds initialization {CVE-2023-54234}
• rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel {CVE-2023-54195}
• block, bfq: Fix division by zero error on zero wsum {CVE-2023-54242}
• wifi: cfg80211: reject auth/assoc to AP with our address {CVE-2023-53540}
• wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't trust firmware n_channels {CVE-2023-53589}
• wifi: mac80211: check for station first in client probe {CVE-2023-53588}
• bonding: do not assume skb mac_header is set {CVE-2023-53601}
• drm/i915: Make intel_get_crtc_new_encoder() less oopsy {CVE-2023-53571}
• wifi: rtw88: delete timer and free skb queue when unloading {CVE-2023-53574}
• net: bcmgenet: Add a check for oversized packets {CVE-2023-53535}
• media: uvcvideo: Fix memory leak in uvc_gpio_parse {CVE-2022-50882}
• md/raid10: fix memleak of md thread {CVE-2023-54294}
• usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: fix pin_assignment_show {CVE-2023-54186}
• scsi: qedf: Fix NULL dereference in error handling {CVE-2023-54289}
• HID: multitouch: Add NULL check in mt_input_configured {CVE-2024-58020}
• driver core: fix potential null-ptr-deref in device_add() {CVE-2023-54321}
• net: usb: smsc75xx: Move packet length check to prevent kernel panic in skb_pull {CVE-2023-53125}
• rcuscale: Move rcu_scale_writer() schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() to _idle() {CVE-2023-54246}
• bpf: Address KCSAN report on bpf_lru_list {CVE-2023-54283}
• usb: core: config: Prevent OOB read in SS endpoint companion parsing {CVE-2025-39760}
• nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec {CVE-2026-22998}
• drm/i915: fix race condition UAF in i915_perf_add_config_ioctl {CVE-2023-54202}
• mmc: via-sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host() {CVE-2022-50846}
• bpf: Disable preemption in bpf_event_output {CVE-2023-54173}
• net/mlx5e: Move representor neigh cleanup to profile cleanup_tx {CVE-2023-54148}
• net/mlx5: Handle pairing of E-switch via uplink un/load APIs {CVE-2023-53347}
• net/mlx5e: Fix cleanup null-ptr deref on encap lock {CVE-2023-53105}
• smb3: fix for slab out of bounds on mount to ksmbd {CVE-2025-38728}
• perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail {CVE-2025-38565}
• HID: core: do not bypass hid_hw_raw_request {CVE-2025-38494}
• HID: core: ensure __hid_request reserves the report ID as the first byte
• HID: core: ensure the allocated report buffer can contain the reserved report ID {CVE-2025-38495}
• HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix kernel panic during warm reset {CVE-2023-53392}
• xfs: do not propagate ENODATA…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel

afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b
 rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d
 rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35
 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519
 kthread+0xe7/0xef
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted.

It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix timeout of a call that hasn't yet been granted a channel afs_make_call() calls rxrpc_kernel_begin_call() to begin a call (which may get stalled in the background waiting for a connection to become available); it then calls rxrpc_kernel_set_max_life() to set the timeouts - but that starts the call timer so the call timer might then expire before we get a connection assigned - leading to the following oops if the call stalled: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... CPU: 1 PID: 5111 Comm: krxrpcio/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-build3+ #701 RIP: 0010:rxrpc_alloc_txbuf+0xc0/0x157 ... Call Trace: <TASK> rxrpc_send_ACK+0x50/0x13b rxrpc_input_call_event+0x16a/0x67d rxrpc_io_thread+0x1b6/0x45f ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x35 ? rxrpc_input_packet+0x519/0x519 kthread+0xe7/0xef ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x1b/0x1b ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Fix this by noting the timeouts in struct rxrpc_call when the call is created. The timer will be started when the first packet is transmitted. It shouldn't be possible to trigger this directly from userspace through AF_RXRPC as sendmsg() will return EBUSY if the call is in the waiting-for-conn state if it dropped out of the wait due to a signal.