CVE-2023-54250

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt()

Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient.

Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt()

Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient.

Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt()

Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient.

Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt()

Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient.

Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt()

Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient.

Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt() Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient. Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: avoid out of bounds access in decode_preauth_ctxt() Confirm that the accessed pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms address sits within the SMB request boundary; deassemble_neg_contexts() only checks that the eight byte smb2_neg_context header + (client controlled) DataLength are within the packet boundary, which is insufficient. Checking for sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) is overkill given that the type currently assumes SMB311_SALT_SIZE bytes of trailing Salt.