CVE-2024-28253

OpenMetadata is a unified platform for discovery, observability, and governance powered by a central metadata repository, in-depth lineage, and seamless team collaboration. CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare. prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from EntityResource.createOrUpdate(). Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated. In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate(). This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-252. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution and has been addressed in version 1.3.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

OpenMetadata is a unified platform for discovery, observability, and governance powered by a central metadata repository, in-depth lineage, and seamless team collaboration. CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare. prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from EntityResource.createOrUpdate(). Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated. In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate(). This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-252. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution and has been addressed in version 1.3.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

SpEL Injection in PUT /api/v1/policies (GHSL-2023-252)

Please note, only authenticated users have access to PUT / POST APIS for /api/v1/policies. Non authenticated users will not be able to access these APIs to exploit the vulnerability

CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare

  @Override
  public void prepare(Policy policy, boolean update) {
    validateRules(policy);
  }
  ...
  public void validateRules(Policy policy) {
    List<Rule> rules = policy.getRules();
    if (nullOrEmpty(rules)) {
      throw new IllegalArgumentException(CatalogExceptionMessage.EMPTY_RULES_IN_POLICY);
    }

    // Validate all the expressions in the rule
    for (Rule rule : rules) {
      CompiledRule.validateExpression(rule.getCondition(), Boolean.class);
      rule.getResources().sort(String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
      rule.getOperations().sort(Comparator.comparing(MetadataOperation::value));

      // Remove redundant resources
      rule.setResources(filterRedundantResources(rule.getResources()));

      // Remove redundant operations
      rule.setOperations(filterRedundantOperations(rule.getOperations()));
    }
    rules.sort(Comparator.comparing(Rule::getName));
  }

prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from the EntityResource.createOrUpdate():

public Response createOrUpdate(UriInfo uriInfo, SecurityContext securityContext, T entity) {
  repository.prepareInternal(entity, true);

  // If entity does not exist, this is a create operation, else update operation
  ResourceContext<T> resourceContext = getResourceContextByName(entity.getFullyQualifiedName());
  MetadataOperation operation = createOrUpdateOperation(resourceContext);
  OperationContext operationContext = new OperationContext(entityType, operation);
  if (operation == CREATE) {
    CreateResourceContext<T> createResourceContext = new CreateResourceContext<>(entityType, entity);
    authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, createResourceContext);
    entity = addHref(uriInfo, repository.create(uriInfo, entity));
    return new PutResponse<>(Response.Status.CREATED, entity, RestUtil.ENTITY_CREATED).toResponse();
  }
  authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, resourceContext);
  PutResponse<T> response = repository.createOrUpdate(uriInfo, entity);
  addHref(uriInfo, response.getEntity());
  return response.toResponse();
}

Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated.

In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate():

@PUT
@Operation(
    operationId = "createOrUpdatePolicy",
    summary = "Create or update a policy",
    description = "Create a new policy, if it does not exist or update an existing policy.",
    responses = {
      @ApiResponse(
          responseCode = "200",
          description = "The policy",
          content = @Content(mediaType = "application/json", schema = @Schema(implementation = Policy.class))),
     …

OpenMetadata is a unified platform for discovery, observability, and governance powered by a central metadata repository, in-depth lineage, and seamless team collaboration. CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare. prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from EntityResource.createOrUpdate(). Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated. In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate(). This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-252. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution and has been addressed in version 1.3.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

OpenMetadata is a unified platform for discovery, observability, and governance powered by a central metadata repository, in-depth lineage, and seamless team collaboration. CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare. prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from EntityResource.createOrUpdate(). Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated. In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate(). This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-252. This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution and has been addressed in version 1.3.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

SpEL Injection in PUT /api/v1/policies (GHSL-2023-252)

Please note, only authenticated users have access to PUT / POST APIS for /api/v1/policies. Non authenticated users will not be able to access these APIs to exploit the vulnerability

CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare

  @Override
  public void prepare(Policy policy, boolean update) {
    validateRules(policy);
  }
  ...
  public void validateRules(Policy policy) {
    List<Rule> rules = policy.getRules();
    if (nullOrEmpty(rules)) {
      throw new IllegalArgumentException(CatalogExceptionMessage.EMPTY_RULES_IN_POLICY);
    }

    // Validate all the expressions in the rule
    for (Rule rule : rules) {
      CompiledRule.validateExpression(rule.getCondition(), Boolean.class);
      rule.getResources().sort(String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
      rule.getOperations().sort(Comparator.comparing(MetadataOperation::value));

      // Remove redundant resources
      rule.setResources(filterRedundantResources(rule.getResources()));

      // Remove redundant operations
      rule.setOperations(filterRedundantOperations(rule.getOperations()));
    }
    rules.sort(Comparator.comparing(Rule::getName));
  }

prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from the EntityResource.createOrUpdate():

public Response createOrUpdate(UriInfo uriInfo, SecurityContext securityContext, T entity) {
  repository.prepareInternal(entity, true);

  // If entity does not exist, this is a create operation, else update operation
  ResourceContext<T> resourceContext = getResourceContextByName(entity.getFullyQualifiedName());
  MetadataOperation operation = createOrUpdateOperation(resourceContext);
  OperationContext operationContext = new OperationContext(entityType, operation);
  if (operation == CREATE) {
    CreateResourceContext<T> createResourceContext = new CreateResourceContext<>(entityType, entity);
    authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, createResourceContext);
    entity = addHref(uriInfo, repository.create(uriInfo, entity));
    return new PutResponse<>(Response.Status.CREATED, entity, RestUtil.ENTITY_CREATED).toResponse();
  }
  authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, resourceContext);
  PutResponse<T> response = repository.createOrUpdate(uriInfo, entity);
  addHref(uriInfo, response.getEntity());
  return response.toResponse();
}

Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated.

In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate():

@PUT
@Operation(
    operationId = "createOrUpdatePolicy",
    summary = "Create or update a policy",
    description = "Create a new policy, if it does not exist or update an existing policy.",
    responses = {
      @ApiResponse(
          responseCode = "200",
          description = "The policy",
          content = @Content(mediaType = "application/json", schema = @Schema(implementation = Policy.class))),
     …