CVE-2024-34359
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
llama-cpp-python is the Python bindings for llama.cpp. llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to remote code execution by a carefully constructed payload.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.7
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
llama-cpp-python is the Python bindings for llama.cpp. llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to remote code execution by a carefully constructed payload.
- Record
CVE-2024-34359- CVSS 3.1
- 9.7 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-76
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2024-1433
9.7
llama-cpp-python is the Python bindings for llama.cpp. llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to remote code execution by a carefully constructed payload.
- Record
EUVD-2024-1433- CVSS 3.1
- 9.7 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829
9.6
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
Description
llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to RCE by a carefully constructed payload.
Source-to-Sink
llama.py -> class Llama -> __init__:
class Llama:
"""High-level Python wrapper for a llama.cpp model."""
__backend_initialized = False
def __init__(
self,
model_path: str,
# lots of params; Ignoring
):
self.verbose = verbose
set_verbose(verbose)
if not Llama.__backend_initialized:
with suppress_stdout_stderr(disable=verbose):
llama_cpp.llama_backend_init()
Llama.__backend_initialized = True
# Ignoring lines of unrelated codes.....
try:
self.metadata = self._model.metadata()
except Exception as e:
self.metadata = {}
if self.verbose:
print(f"Failed to load metadata: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Model metadata: {self.metadata}", file=sys.stderr)
if (
self.chat_format is None
and self.chat_handler is None
and "tokenizer.chat_template" in self.metadata
):
chat_format = llama_chat_format.guess_chat_format_from_gguf_metadata(
self.metadata
)
if chat_format is not None:
self.chat_format = chat_format
if self.verbose:
print(f"Guessed chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
else:
template = self.metadata["tokenizer.chat_template"]
try:
eos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.eos_token_id"])
except:
eos_token_id = self.token_eos()
try:
bos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.bos_token_id"])
except:
bos_token_id = self.token_bos()
eos_token = self._model.token_get_text(eos_token_id)
bos_token = self._model.token_get_text(bos_token_id)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using gguf chat template: {template}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat eos_token: {eos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat bos_token: {bos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
self.chat_handler = llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter(
template=template,
eos_token=eos_token,
bos_token=bos_token,
stop_token_ids=[eos_token_id],
).to_chat_handler()
if self.chat_format is None and self.chat_handler is None:
self.chat_format = "llama-2"
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using fallback chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
In llama.py, llama-cpp-python defined the fundamental class for model initialization parsing (Including NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and stuff ). In our case, we will be focusing on the parts where it processes metadata; it first checks if chat_format and chat_handler are None and checks if the key…
- Record
GHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-76
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
9.6
llama-cpp-python is the Python bindings for llama.cpp. llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to remote code execution by a carefully constructed payload.
- Record
CVE-2024-34359- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-76
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
9.6
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
llama-cpp-python is the Python bindings for llama.cpp. llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to remote code execution by a carefully constructed payload.
- Record
CVE-2024-34359- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-76
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829
9.6
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
Description
llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to RCE by a carefully constructed payload.
Source-to-Sink
llama.py -> class Llama -> __init__:
class Llama:
"""High-level Python wrapper for a llama.cpp model."""
__backend_initialized = False
def __init__(
self,
model_path: str,
# lots of params; Ignoring
):
self.verbose = verbose
set_verbose(verbose)
if not Llama.__backend_initialized:
with suppress_stdout_stderr(disable=verbose):
llama_cpp.llama_backend_init()
Llama.__backend_initialized = True
# Ignoring lines of unrelated codes.....
try:
self.metadata = self._model.metadata()
except Exception as e:
self.metadata = {}
if self.verbose:
print(f"Failed to load metadata: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Model metadata: {self.metadata}", file=sys.stderr)
if (
self.chat_format is None
and self.chat_handler is None
and "tokenizer.chat_template" in self.metadata
):
chat_format = llama_chat_format.guess_chat_format_from_gguf_metadata(
self.metadata
)
if chat_format is not None:
self.chat_format = chat_format
if self.verbose:
print(f"Guessed chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
else:
template = self.metadata["tokenizer.chat_template"]
try:
eos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.eos_token_id"])
except:
eos_token_id = self.token_eos()
try:
bos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.bos_token_id"])
except:
bos_token_id = self.token_bos()
eos_token = self._model.token_get_text(eos_token_id)
bos_token = self._model.token_get_text(bos_token_id)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using gguf chat template: {template}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat eos_token: {eos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat bos_token: {bos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
self.chat_handler = llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter(
template=template,
eos_token=eos_token,
bos_token=bos_token,
stop_token_ids=[eos_token_id],
).to_chat_handler()
if self.chat_format is None and self.chat_handler is None:
self.chat_format = "llama-2"
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using fallback chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
In llama.py, llama-cpp-python defined the fundamental class for model initialization parsing (Including NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and stuff ). In our case, we will be focusing on the parts where it processes metadata; it first checks if chat_format and chat_handler are None and checks if the key…
- Record
GHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-76
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-392
9.6
llama-cpp-python vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Server-Side Template Injection in Model Metadata
Description
llama-cpp-python depends on class Llama in llama.py to load .gguf llama.cpp or Latency Machine Learning Models. The __init__ constructor built in the Llama takes several parameters to configure the loading and running of the model. Other than NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and hardware settings, __init__ also loads the chat template from targeted .gguf 's Metadata and furtherly parses it to llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter.to_chat_handler() to construct the self.chat_handler for this model. Nevertheless, Jinja2ChatFormatter parse the chat template within the Metadate with sandbox-less jinja2.Environment, which is furthermore rendered in __call__ to construct the prompt of interaction. This allows jinja2 Server Side Template Injection which leads to RCE by a carefully constructed payload.
Source-to-Sink
llama.py -> class Llama -> __init__:
class Llama:
"""High-level Python wrapper for a llama.cpp model."""
__backend_initialized = False
def __init__(
self,
model_path: str,
# lots of params; Ignoring
):
self.verbose = verbose
set_verbose(verbose)
if not Llama.__backend_initialized:
with suppress_stdout_stderr(disable=verbose):
llama_cpp.llama_backend_init()
Llama.__backend_initialized = True
# Ignoring lines of unrelated codes.....
try:
self.metadata = self._model.metadata()
except Exception as e:
self.metadata = {}
if self.verbose:
print(f"Failed to load metadata: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Model metadata: {self.metadata}", file=sys.stderr)
if (
self.chat_format is None
and self.chat_handler is None
and "tokenizer.chat_template" in self.metadata
):
chat_format = llama_chat_format.guess_chat_format_from_gguf_metadata(
self.metadata
)
if chat_format is not None:
self.chat_format = chat_format
if self.verbose:
print(f"Guessed chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
else:
template = self.metadata["tokenizer.chat_template"]
try:
eos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.eos_token_id"])
except:
eos_token_id = self.token_eos()
try:
bos_token_id = int(self.metadata["tokenizer.ggml.bos_token_id"])
except:
bos_token_id = self.token_bos()
eos_token = self._model.token_get_text(eos_token_id)
bos_token = self._model.token_get_text(bos_token_id)
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using gguf chat template: {template}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat eos_token: {eos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"Using chat bos_token: {bos_token}", file=sys.stderr)
self.chat_handler = llama_chat_format.Jinja2ChatFormatter(
template=template,
eos_token=eos_token,
bos_token=bos_token,
stop_token_ids=[eos_token_id],
).to_chat_handler()
if self.chat_format is None and self.chat_handler is None:
self.chat_format = "llama-2"
if self.verbose:
print(f"Using fallback chat format: {chat_format}", file=sys.stderr)
In llama.py, llama-cpp-python defined the fundamental class for model initialization parsing (Including NUMA, LoRa settings, loading tokenizers, and stuff ). In our case, we will be focusing on the parts where it processes metadata; it first checks if chat_format and chat_handler are None and checks if the key…
- Record
PYSEC-2026-392- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
llama-cpp-pythonPyPI |
0.2.30 to 0.2.71 | 0.2.72 |
llama-cpp-pythonPyPI |
0.2.30 up to 0.2.72, plus listed versions 0.2.310.2.320.2.330.2.340.2.35 Show 36 moreShow less0.2.360.2.370.2.380.2.390.2.400.2.410.2.420.2.430.2.440.2.450.2.460.2.470.2.480.2.490.2.500.2.510.2.520.2.530.2.540.2.550.2.560.2.570.2.580.2.590.2.600.2.610.2.620.2.630.2.640.2.650.2.660.2.670.2.680.2.690.2.700.2.71 |
0.2.72 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| aliases, published | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2024-34359 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.7) in Abetlen Llama-cpp-python, published May 10, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 26.0%, the 97th percentile. Fixed in llama-cpp-python 0.2.72.
References
github.com/abetlen/llama-cpp-python/security/advisories/GHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829
github.com/abetlen/llama-cpp-python/commit/b454f40a9a1787b2b5659cd2cb00819d983185df
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34359
github.com/advisories/GHSA-56xg-wfcc-g829
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/34xxx/CVE-2024-34359.json
github.com/abetlen/llama-cpp-python
pypi.org/project/llama-cpp-python
Left out here: the rest of 3 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.