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CVE-2024-4447

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via...

9.9 Critical

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.

While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.

Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS

This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.

  1. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure":
  • UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails

  • RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information

  • RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details

  • RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions

  • RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance

  • RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs

  • ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,

  • CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions

Overall CVSS for the above findings:

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Exploit likelihood

0.47%Up 0.4 points since Jul 26, 2024
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.9

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.

While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.

Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS

This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.

  1. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure":
  • UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails

  • RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information

  • RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details

  • RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions

  • RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance

  • RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs

  • ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,

  • CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions

Overall CVSS for the above findings:

Record
CVE-2024-4447
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2024-44066 9.9

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.

While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.

Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS

This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.

  1. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure":
  • UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails

  • RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information

  • RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details

  • RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions

  • RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance

  • RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs

  • ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,

  • CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions

Overall CVSS for the above findings:

Record
EUVD-2024-44066
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-whhx-238v-wr87 4.9

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via...

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.

While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.

Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS

Record
GHSA-whhx-238v-wr87
CVSS 3.1
4.9 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 9.9

In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.

While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.

Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS

This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.

  1. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure":
  • UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails

  • RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information

  • RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details

  • RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions

  • RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance

  • RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs

  • ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,

  • CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions

Overall CVSS for the above findings:

Record
CVE-2024-4447
CVSS 3.1
9.9 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Weakness
CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2024-4447 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.9) in Dotcms Core, published July 26, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.47%, the 41st percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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