CVE-2024-52003

Traefik (pronounced traffic) is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.11.14 and 3.2.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Traefik (pronounced traffic) is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.11.14 and 3.2.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Impact

There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source.

Patches

• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.14
• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.2.1

Workarounds

No workaround.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary The previously reported open redirect ([GHSA-6qq8-5wq3-86rp](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-6qq8-5wq3-86rp)) is not fixed correctly. The safePrefix function can be tricked to return an absolute URL.

Details

The Traefik API dashboard component tries to validate that the value of the header X-Forwarded-Prefix is a site relative path:

http.Redirect(resp, req, safePrefix(req)+"/dashboard/", http.StatusFound)

func safePrefix(req *http.Request) string {
	prefix := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Prefix")
	if prefix == "" {
		return ""
	}

	parse, err := url.Parse(prefix)
	if err != nil {
		return ""
	}

	return parse.Path
}

PoC

An attacker can bypass this by sending the following payload:

curl -v 'http://traefik.localhost' -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: %0d//a.com'
[...]
> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
> Location: //a.com/dashboard/

or similar:

curl -v 'http://traefik.localhost' -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: %2f%2fa.com'
[...]
> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
> Location: //a.com/dashboard/

Impact

Similar to the previously reported bug. In cache poisoning scenarios this may be exploitable.

</details>

Traefik (pronounced traffic) is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.11.14 and 3.2.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Traefik (pronounced traffic) is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.11.14 and 3.2.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Impact

There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to provide the X-Forwarded-Prefix header from an untrusted source.

Patches

• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.14
• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.2.1

Workarounds

No workaround.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary The previously reported open redirect ([GHSA-6qq8-5wq3-86rp](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-6qq8-5wq3-86rp)) is not fixed correctly. The safePrefix function can be tricked to return an absolute URL.

Details

The Traefik API dashboard component tries to validate that the value of the header X-Forwarded-Prefix is a site relative path:

http.Redirect(resp, req, safePrefix(req)+"/dashboard/", http.StatusFound)

func safePrefix(req *http.Request) string {
	prefix := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Prefix")
	if prefix == "" {
		return ""
	}

	parse, err := url.Parse(prefix)
	if err != nil {
		return ""
	}

	return parse.Path
}

PoC

An attacker can bypass this by sending the following payload:

curl -v 'http://traefik.localhost' -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: %0d//a.com'
[...]
> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
> Location: //a.com/dashboard/

or similar:

curl -v 'http://traefik.localhost' -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: %2f%2fa.com'
[...]
> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
> Location: //a.com/dashboard/

Impact

Similar to the previously reported bug. In cache poisoning scenarios this may be exploitable.

</details>

Traefik's X-Forwarded-Prefix Header still allows for Open Redirect in github.com/traefik/traefik

These are all security issues fixed in the govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241209T183251-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.