CVE-2024-52009

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in #4060 and fixed in #4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in #4060 and fixed in #4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Summary

Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.

Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub.

When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization.

This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0.

Details

Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.

While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered:

• Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications.
• Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application.
• Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using Terraform's GitHub integration.

Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as:

{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}}

This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters.

While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis.

This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists CVE-2022-24912, which is unrelated).

Could you please publish a security advisory?

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.

cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details.

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

• This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File).
• This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis.
• This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in #4060 and fixed in #4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub. When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization. This was reported in #4060 and fixed in #4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Summary

Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.

Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub.

When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization.

This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0.

Details

Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.

While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered:

• Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications.
• Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application.
• Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using Terraform's GitHub integration.

Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as:

{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}}

This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters.

While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis.

This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists CVE-2022-24912, which is unrelated).

Could you please publish a security advisory?

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.

cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details.

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

• This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File).
• This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis.
• This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.

Git credentials are exposed in Atlantis logs in github.com/runatlantis/atlantis

These are all security issues fixed in the govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241120T172248-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.