CVE-2024-52308
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.0
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
CVE-2024-52308- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-77
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2024-3287
8.0
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
EUVD-2024-3287- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
8.0
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer
Summary
A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
Details
The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the default devcontainer image. GitHub CLI retrieves SSH connection details, such as remote username, which is used in executing ssh commands for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
Impact
Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.
Remediation and Mitigation
- Upgrade
ghto2.62.0 - Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.
- Record
GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-77
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.0
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
CVE-2024-52308- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-77
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.0
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
CVE-2024-52308- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-77
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2024-52308
9.6
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored. In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2024-52308- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Show 10 moreShow less
OSVGHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
8.0
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer
Summary
A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
Details
The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the default devcontainer image. GitHub CLI retrieves SSH connection details, such as remote username, which is used in executing ssh commands for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
Impact
Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.
Remediation and Mitigation
- Upgrade
ghto2.62.0 - Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.
- Record
GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-77
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2024-52308
8.0
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored. In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2024-52308- CVSS 3.1
- 8.0 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVAZL-53217 No score
CVE-2024-52308 affecting package gh for versions less than 2.62.0-1
The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.
Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.
This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.
In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
- Record
AZL-53217- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGO-2024-3269 No score
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer in github.com/cli/cli
Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer in github.com/cli/cli
- Record
GO-2024-3269- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2024:14509-1 No score
gh-2.62.0-1.1 on GA media
These are all security issues fixed in the gh-2.62.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2024:14509-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2024:14513-1 No score
govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 on GA media
These are all security issues fixed in the govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2024:14513-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2025:0021-1 No score
Security update for gh
This update for gh fixes the following issues:
-
Update to version 2.65.0:
- Bump cli/go-gh for indirect security vulnerability
- Panic mustParseTrackingRef if format is incorrect
- Move trackingRef into pr create package
- Make tryDetermineTrackingRef tests more respective of reality
- Rework tryDetermineTrackingRef tests
- Avoid pointer return from determineTrackingBranch
- Doc determineTrackingBranch
- Don't use pointer for determineTrackingBranch branchConfig
- Panic if tracking ref can't be reconstructed
- Document and rework pr create tracking branch lookup
- Upgrade generated workflows
- Fixed test for stdout in non-tty use case of repo fork
- Fix test
- Alternative: remove LocalBranch from BranchConfig
- Set LocalBranch even if the git config fails
- Add test for permissions check for security and analysis edits (#1)
- print repo url to stdout
- Update pkg/cmd/auth/login/login.go
- Move mention of classic token to correct line
- Separate type decrarations
- Add mention of classic token in gh auth login docs
- Update pkg/cmd/repo/create/create.go
- docs(repo): make explicit which branch is used when creating a repo
- fix(repo fork): add non-TTY output when fork is newly created
- Move api call to editRun
- Complete get -> list renaming
- Better error testing for autolink TestListRun
- Decode instead of unmarshal
- Use 'list' instead of 'get' for autolink list type and method
- Remove NewAutolinkClient
- Break out autolink list json fields test
- PR nits
- Refactor autolink subcommands into their own packages
- Whitespace
- Refactor out early return in test code
- Add testing for AutoLinkGetter
- Refactor autolink list and test to use http interface for simpler testing
- Apply PR comment changes
- Introduce repo autolinks list commands
- Remove release discussion posts and clean up related block in deployment yml
- Extract logic into helper function
- add pending status for workflow runs
- Feat: Allow setting security_and_analysis settings in gh repo edit
- Upgrade golang.org/x/net to v0.33.0
- Document SmartBaseRepoFunc
- Document BaseRepoFunc
- Update releasing.md
- Document how to set gh-merge-base
-
Update to version 2.64.0:
- add test for different SAN and SourceRepositoryURI values
- add test for signerRepo and tenant
- add some more fields to test that san, sanregex are set properly
- Bump github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 from 2.0.5 to 2.0.6
- update san and sanregex configuration for readability
- reduce duplication when creating policy content
- tweak output of build policy info
- Name conditionals in PR finder
- Support pr view for intra-org forks
- Return err instead of silentError in merge queue check
- linting pointed out this var is no longer used
- Removed fun, but inaccessible ASCII header
- further tweaks to the long description
- Exit on pr merge with
-dand merge queue - Addressed PR review feedback; expanded Long command help string, used ghrepo, clarified some abbreviations
- Update pkg/cmd/attestation/inspect/inspect.go
- Update gh auth commands to point to GitHub Docs
- Reformat ext install long
- Mention Windows quirk in ext install help text
- Fix error mishandling in local ext install
- Assert on err msg directly in ext install tests
- Clarify hosts in ext install help text
- Bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.29.0 to 0.31.0
- Removed now redundant file
- minor tweak to language
- go mod tidy
- Deleted no-longer-used code.
- deleted now-invalid tests, added a tiny patina of new testing.
- Tightened up docs, deleted dead code, improved printing
- fix file name creation on windows
- wording
- hard code expected digest
- fix download test
- use bash shell with integration tests
- simplify var creation
- update integration test scripts
- fix: list branches in square brackets in gh codespace
- try nesting scripts
- run all…
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2025:0021-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21310-1 No score
Security update for gh
This update for gh fixes the following issues:
Changes in gh:
-
Update to version 2.96.0:
- Critical security fix: patched vulnerability in gh codespace jupyter that could allow command execution when connecting to malicious Codespaces
- Merge commit from fork
- Fix concurrent map writes in codespace port forwarding (#13313)
- docs: fix broken install command and link/grammar errors (#13690)
- Clarify
--cloneboolean flag behaviour ingh repo forkhelp (#13786) - docs: fix duplicated word in primer README (#13677)
- fix(skills): honor --dir without agent prompt (#13766)
- Support antigravity-cli and antigravity2.0 in gh skill (#13784)
- chore(deps): bump golangci/golangci-lint-action from 9.2.1 to 9.3.0
- docs(search): reword raw qualifier examples
- chore(deps): bump goreleaser/goreleaser-action from 7.2.2 to 7.2.3
- docs(search): simplify raw qualifier examples
- docs(search): add examples for multiple qualifiers
- chore(deps): bump actions/attest from 4.1.0 to 4.1.1
- chore(deps): bump actions/setup-go from 6.4.0 to 6.5.0
- fix(cmdutil): honor DisableAuthCheck under repo-override parents
- feat(release): allow download without authentication
- fix(release): don't let a failed draft lookup mask a found release
- Fix flaky TestHuhPrompterMultiSelectWithSearchPersistence on slow architectures (#13675)
- Detect additional third-party coding agents (#13722)
- Add security disclosure guidance to AGENTS.md (#13720)
- chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6.0.3 to 7.0.0
- chore(deps): bump github.com/microsoft/dev-tunnels from 0.1.19 to 0.1.27
- ci: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs
- chore(deps): bump github.com/google/go-containerregistry
- Use int64 for GitHub database IDs (#13403)
- docs: fix broken anchor link in release-process-deep-dive (#13688)
- Cover all printSummary branches in a table test
- fix(skills): install universal agent to ~/.agents/skills
- fix: show checks summary when all checks were cancelled
-
The following bugs are no longer present in this release (may have been fixed in previous releases): bsc#1234566, bsc#1235345, bsc#1237669, bsc#1239496, bsc#1241837, bsc#1243930, bsc#1251464, bsc#1251666, bsc#1253929, bsc#1258617, bsc#1260271, bsc#1262339, bsc#1262943, bsc#1265405, bsc#1265777, bsc#1266173, bsc#1266618, bsc#1266975, bsc#1267158, bsc#1269427
-
Update to version 2.95.0:
- feat(skills): list available skills when install runs non-interactively (#13548)
- fix(skills): stage updates in a temp dir and swap in-place (#13449)
- feat: add
repo read-fileandrepo read-dir(#13580) - Bump Go in devcontainer
- Make filtering by bot authors more discoverable (#13642)
- chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.52.0 to 0.53.0
- chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/term from 0.43.0 to 0.44.0
- chore(deps): bump charm.land/lipgloss/v2 from 2.0.3 to 2.0.4
- chore(deps): bump github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go from 1.1.4 to 1.2.1
- chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/text from 0.37.0 to 0.38.0
- test(skill): fix test case name
- test(skill): merge isolated test into table
- Potential fix for pull request finding
- docs(discussion): polish help docs
- chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.36.1 to 4.36.2
- fix test
- support custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in install
-
Update to version 2.94.0:
- Add gh discussion and Issues 2.0 reference to the
ghskill, plus a README note (#13631) - fix(discussion comment): fix bug in requiring body/body-file in add/edit mode
- chore(discussion/client): rename client files
- test(acceptance): fix discussion comment acceptance tests
- fix(discussion/shared): error on out-of-range discussion number in URL
- fix(discussion view): print only requested items in non-tty output
- docs(discussion list): clarify answered examples refer to Q&A discussions
- fix(discussion view): show comments and replies in chronological order
- refactor(discussion list):…
- Add gh discussion and Issues 2.0 reference to the
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21310-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2024-52308 No score
CVE-2024-52308 in gh - Patched by Root
Root has patched CVE-2024-52308 in the gh package for Root:Debian:12. Multiple fixed versions available.
- Record
ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2024-52308- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUSN-7130-1 No score
gh vulnerability
It was discovered that GitHub CLI incorrectly handled username validation. An attacker could possibly use this issue to perform remote code execution if the user connected to a malicious server. (CVE-2024-52308)
- Record
USN-7130-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/cli/cli/v2Go |
through 2.61.0 | 2.62.0 |
github.com/cli/cliGo |
before 2.62.0 | 2.62.0 |
ghAzure Linux:3 |
before 2.62.0-1 | 2.62.0-1 |
ghDebian:12 |
All versions, plus listed versions 2.23.0+dfsg1-12.24.3+dfsg1-12.27.0+dfsg1-12.30.0-12.30.0-2 Show 11 moreShow less2.35.0-12.40.1+dfsg1-12.42.1-12.43.1-12.44.1-12.44.1-22.45.0-12.46.0-12.46.0-22.46.0-32.46.0-4 |
None known |
ghDebian:13 |
before 2.46.0-2 | 2.46.0-2 |
github.com/cli/cli/v2Go |
before 2.62.0 | 2.62.0 |
github.com/cli/cliGo |
All versions | None known |
ghRoot:Debian:12 |
before 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.1 | 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.12.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.22.23.0+dfsg1-1.aikido.3 |
rootio-ghRoot:Debian:12 |
before 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.1 | 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.12.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.22.23.0+dfsg1-1.aikido.3 |
ghUbuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS |
before 2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm1, plus listed versions 2.27.0+dfsg1-1build12.30.0-22.35.0-12.40.1+dfsg1-12.42.1-1 Show 7 moreShow less2.43.1-12.44.1-12.44.1-22.45.0-12.45.0-1build12.45.0-1ubuntu0.12.45.0-1ubuntu0.2 |
2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm1 |
Show 5 moreShow less
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
ghopenSUSE:Tumbleweed |
before 2.62.0-1.1 | 2.62.0-1.1 |
govulncheck-vulndbopenSUSE:Tumbleweed From an advisory covering 10 CVEs |
before 0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 | 0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 |
ghSUSE:Package Hub 15 SP6 |
before 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1 | 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1 |
ghopenSUSE:Leap 15.6 |
before 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1 | 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1 |
ghopenSUSE:Leap 16.0 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 2.96.0-bp160.1.1 | 2.96.0-bp160.1.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | ||
| aliases | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2024-52308 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.0) in Cli, published November 14, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.91%, the 60th percentile. Fixed in github.com/cli/cli/v2 2.62.0.
References
github.com/cli/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52308
pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3269
github.com/advisories/GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/52xxx/CVE-2024-52308.json
security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-52308
Show 39 moreShow less
github.com/cli/cli
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-52308
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-52308
ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7130-1
lists.opensuse.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/YTCSKJMBC73WSFKWY7SLMRJFMRX4UHQF
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-52308
lists.opensuse.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/CJ6SUNDNOZSHM4PZYYGMBH7233D63JOI
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2020-8911
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-0109
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-0793
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-24425
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-24426
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-44625
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-52010
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-52522
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-9526
lists.opensuse.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/HUMKXZZVR2XTEF5OINR7OTNWNR5IVCYQ
bugzilla.suse.com/1233387
bugzilla.suse.com/1234566
bugzilla.suse.com/1235345
bugzilla.suse.com/1237669
bugzilla.suse.com/1239496
bugzilla.suse.com/1241837
bugzilla.suse.com/1243930
bugzilla.suse.com/1251464
bugzilla.suse.com/1251666
bugzilla.suse.com/1253929
bugzilla.suse.com/1258617
bugzilla.suse.com/1260271
bugzilla.suse.com/1262339
bugzilla.suse.com/1262943
bugzilla.suse.com/1265405
bugzilla.suse.com/1265777
bugzilla.suse.com/1266173
bugzilla.suse.com/1266618
bugzilla.suse.com/1266975
bugzilla.suse.com/1267158
bugzilla.suse.com/1269427
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-27144
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.