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CVE-2024-52308

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer

8.0 HighFix available

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
Required

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.91%Up 0.9 points since Nov 15, 2024
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.0

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
CVE-2024-52308
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2024-3287 8.0

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
EUVD-2024-3287
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87 8.0

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer

Summary

A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

Details

The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the default devcontainer image. GitHub CLI retrieves SSH connection details, such as remote username, which is used in executing ssh commands for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Impact

Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.

Remediation and Mitigation

  1. Upgrade gh to 2.62.0
  2. Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.
Record
GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.0

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
CVE-2024-52308
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 3.1
9.6 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.0

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
CVE-2024-52308
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2024-52308 9.6

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored. In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2024-52308
CVSS 3.1
9.6 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
Show 10 moreShow less
OSVGHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87 8.0

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer

Summary

A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

Details

The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the default devcontainer image. GitHub CLI retrieves SSH connection details, such as remote username, which is used in executing ssh commands for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Impact

Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.

Remediation and Mitigation

  1. Upgrade gh to 2.62.0
  2. Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.
Record
GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2024-52308 8.0

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored. In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2024-52308
CVSS 3.1
8.0 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS 3.1
9.6 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVAZL-53217 No score

CVE-2024-52308 affecting package gh for versions less than 2.62.0-1

The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0.

Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing ssh commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for gh codespace ssh or gh codespace logs commands.

This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects ssh arguments within the SSH connection details. gh codespace ssh and gh codespace logs commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like -oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #. The -oProxyCommand flag causes ssh to execute the provided command while # shell comment causes any other ssh arguments to be ignored.

In 2.62.0, the remote username information is being validated before being used.

Record
AZL-53217
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2024-3269 No score

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer in github.com/cli/cli

Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer in github.com/cli/cli

Record
GO-2024-3269
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2024:14509-1 No score

gh-2.62.0-1.1 on GA media

These are all security issues fixed in the gh-2.62.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

Record
openSUSE-SU-2024:14509-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2024:14513-1 No score

govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 on GA media

These are all security issues fixed in the govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20241119T173509-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

Record
openSUSE-SU-2024:14513-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2025:0021-1 No score

Security update for gh

This update for gh fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 2.65.0:

    • Bump cli/go-gh for indirect security vulnerability
    • Panic mustParseTrackingRef if format is incorrect
    • Move trackingRef into pr create package
    • Make tryDetermineTrackingRef tests more respective of reality
    • Rework tryDetermineTrackingRef tests
    • Avoid pointer return from determineTrackingBranch
    • Doc determineTrackingBranch
    • Don't use pointer for determineTrackingBranch branchConfig
    • Panic if tracking ref can't be reconstructed
    • Document and rework pr create tracking branch lookup
    • Upgrade generated workflows
    • Fixed test for stdout in non-tty use case of repo fork
    • Fix test
    • Alternative: remove LocalBranch from BranchConfig
    • Set LocalBranch even if the git config fails
    • Add test for permissions check for security and analysis edits (#1)
    • print repo url to stdout
    • Update pkg/cmd/auth/login/login.go
    • Move mention of classic token to correct line
    • Separate type decrarations
    • Add mention of classic token in gh auth login docs
    • Update pkg/cmd/repo/create/create.go
    • docs(repo): make explicit which branch is used when creating a repo
    • fix(repo fork): add non-TTY output when fork is newly created
    • Move api call to editRun
    • Complete get -> list renaming
    • Better error testing for autolink TestListRun
    • Decode instead of unmarshal
    • Use 'list' instead of 'get' for autolink list type and method
    • Remove NewAutolinkClient
    • Break out autolink list json fields test
    • PR nits
    • Refactor autolink subcommands into their own packages
    • Whitespace
    • Refactor out early return in test code
    • Add testing for AutoLinkGetter
    • Refactor autolink list and test to use http interface for simpler testing
    • Apply PR comment changes
    • Introduce repo autolinks list commands
    • Remove release discussion posts and clean up related block in deployment yml
    • Extract logic into helper function
    • add pending status for workflow runs
    • Feat: Allow setting security_and_analysis settings in gh repo edit
    • Upgrade golang.org/x/net to v0.33.0
    • Document SmartBaseRepoFunc
    • Document BaseRepoFunc
    • Update releasing.md
    • Document how to set gh-merge-base
  • Update to version 2.64.0:

    • add test for different SAN and SourceRepositoryURI values
    • add test for signerRepo and tenant
    • add some more fields to test that san, sanregex are set properly
    • Bump github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 from 2.0.5 to 2.0.6
    • update san and sanregex configuration for readability
    • reduce duplication when creating policy content
    • tweak output of build policy info
    • Name conditionals in PR finder
    • Support pr view for intra-org forks
    • Return err instead of silentError in merge queue check
    • linting pointed out this var is no longer used
    • Removed fun, but inaccessible ASCII header
    • further tweaks to the long description
    • Exit on pr merge with -d and merge queue
    • Addressed PR review feedback; expanded Long command help string, used ghrepo, clarified some abbreviations
    • Update pkg/cmd/attestation/inspect/inspect.go
    • Update gh auth commands to point to GitHub Docs
    • Reformat ext install long
    • Mention Windows quirk in ext install help text
    • Fix error mishandling in local ext install
    • Assert on err msg directly in ext install tests
    • Clarify hosts in ext install help text
    • Bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.29.0 to 0.31.0
    • Removed now redundant file
    • minor tweak to language
    • go mod tidy
    • Deleted no-longer-used code.
    • deleted now-invalid tests, added a tiny patina of new testing.
    • Tightened up docs, deleted dead code, improved printing
    • fix file name creation on windows
    • wording
    • hard code expected digest
    • fix download test
    • use bash shell with integration tests
    • simplify var creation
    • update integration test scripts
    • fix: list branches in square brackets in gh codespace
    • try nesting scripts
    • run all…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2025:0021-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21310-1 No score

Security update for gh

This update for gh fixes the following issues:

Changes in gh:

  • Update to version 2.96.0:

    • Critical security fix: patched vulnerability in gh codespace jupyter that could allow command execution when connecting to malicious Codespaces
    • Merge commit from fork
    • Fix concurrent map writes in codespace port forwarding (#13313)
    • docs: fix broken install command and link/grammar errors (#13690)
    • Clarify --clone boolean flag behaviour in gh repo fork help (#13786)
    • docs: fix duplicated word in primer README (#13677)
    • fix(skills): honor --dir without agent prompt (#13766)
    • Support antigravity-cli and antigravity2.0 in gh skill (#13784)
    • chore(deps): bump golangci/golangci-lint-action from 9.2.1 to 9.3.0
    • docs(search): reword raw qualifier examples
    • chore(deps): bump goreleaser/goreleaser-action from 7.2.2 to 7.2.3
    • docs(search): simplify raw qualifier examples
    • docs(search): add examples for multiple qualifiers
    • chore(deps): bump actions/attest from 4.1.0 to 4.1.1
    • chore(deps): bump actions/setup-go from 6.4.0 to 6.5.0
    • fix(cmdutil): honor DisableAuthCheck under repo-override parents
    • feat(release): allow download without authentication
    • fix(release): don't let a failed draft lookup mask a found release
    • Fix flaky TestHuhPrompterMultiSelectWithSearchPersistence on slow architectures (#13675)
    • Detect additional third-party coding agents (#13722)
    • Add security disclosure guidance to AGENTS.md (#13720)
    • chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6.0.3 to 7.0.0
    • chore(deps): bump github.com/microsoft/dev-tunnels from 0.1.19 to 0.1.27
    • ci: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs
    • chore(deps): bump github.com/google/go-containerregistry
    • Use int64 for GitHub database IDs (#13403)
    • docs: fix broken anchor link in release-process-deep-dive (#13688)
    • Cover all printSummary branches in a table test
    • fix(skills): install universal agent to ~/.agents/skills
    • fix: show checks summary when all checks were cancelled
  • The following bugs are no longer present in this release (may have been fixed in previous releases): bsc#1234566, bsc#1235345, bsc#1237669, bsc#1239496, bsc#1241837, bsc#1243930, bsc#1251464, bsc#1251666, bsc#1253929, bsc#1258617, bsc#1260271, bsc#1262339, bsc#1262943, bsc#1265405, bsc#1265777, bsc#1266173, bsc#1266618, bsc#1266975, bsc#1267158, bsc#1269427

  • Update to version 2.95.0:

    • feat(skills): list available skills when install runs non-interactively (#13548)
    • fix(skills): stage updates in a temp dir and swap in-place (#13449)
    • feat: add repo read-file and repo read-dir (#13580)
    • Bump Go in devcontainer
    • Make filtering by bot authors more discoverable (#13642)
    • chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.52.0 to 0.53.0
    • chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/term from 0.43.0 to 0.44.0
    • chore(deps): bump charm.land/lipgloss/v2 from 2.0.3 to 2.0.4
    • chore(deps): bump github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go from 1.1.4 to 1.2.1
    • chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/text from 0.37.0 to 0.38.0
    • test(skill): fix test case name
    • test(skill): merge isolated test into table
    • Potential fix for pull request finding
    • docs(discussion): polish help docs
    • chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.36.1 to 4.36.2
    • fix test
    • support custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in install
  • Update to version 2.94.0:

    • Add gh discussion and Issues 2.0 reference to the gh skill, plus a README note (#13631)
    • fix(discussion comment): fix bug in requiring body/body-file in add/edit mode
    • chore(discussion/client): rename client files
    • test(acceptance): fix discussion comment acceptance tests
    • fix(discussion/shared): error on out-of-range discussion number in URL
    • fix(discussion view): print only requested items in non-tty output
    • docs(discussion list): clarify answered examples refer to Q&A discussions
    • fix(discussion view): show comments and replies in chronological order
    • refactor(discussion list):…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21310-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2024-52308 No score

CVE-2024-52308 in gh - Patched by Root

Root has patched CVE-2024-52308 in the gh package for Root:Debian:12. Multiple fixed versions available.

Record
ROOT-OS-DEBIAN-12-CVE-2024-52308
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVUSN-7130-1 No score

gh vulnerability

It was discovered that GitHub CLI incorrectly handled username validation. An attacker could possibly use this issue to perform remote code execution if the user connected to a malicious server. (CVE-2024-52308)

Record
USN-7130-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/cli/cli/v2
Go
through 2.61.0
2.62.0
github.com/cli/cli
Go
before 2.62.0
2.62.0
gh
Azure Linux:3
before 2.62.0-1
2.62.0-1
gh
Debian:12
All versions, plus listed versions
2.23.0+dfsg1-12.24.3+dfsg1-12.27.0+dfsg1-12.30.0-12.30.0-2
Show 11 moreShow less
2.35.0-12.40.1+dfsg1-12.42.1-12.43.1-12.44.1-12.44.1-22.45.0-12.46.0-12.46.0-22.46.0-32.46.0-4
None known
gh
Debian:13
before 2.46.0-2
2.46.0-2
github.com/cli/cli/v2
Go
before 2.62.0
2.62.0
github.com/cli/cli
Go
All versions None known
gh
Root:Debian:12
before 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.1
2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.12.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.22.23.0+dfsg1-1.aikido.3
rootio-gh
Root:Debian:12
before 2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.1
2.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.12.23.0+dfsg1-1.root.io.22.23.0+dfsg1-1.aikido.3
gh
Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS
before 2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm1, plus listed versions
2.27.0+dfsg1-1build12.30.0-22.35.0-12.40.1+dfsg1-12.42.1-1
Show 7 moreShow less
2.43.1-12.44.1-12.44.1-22.45.0-12.45.0-1build12.45.0-1ubuntu0.12.45.0-1ubuntu0.2
2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm1
Show 5 moreShow less
Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
gh
openSUSE:Tumbleweed
before 2.62.0-1.1
2.62.0-1.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Tumbleweed
From an advisory covering 10 CVEs
before 0.0.20241119T173509-1.1
0.0.20241119T173509-1.1
gh
SUSE:Package Hub 15 SP6
before 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1
2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1
gh
openSUSE:Leap 15.6
before 2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1
2.65.0-bp156.2.17.1
gh
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 2 CVEs
before 2.96.0-bp160.1.1
2.96.0-bp160.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
aliasesEUVD
first indexedCVE List, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2024-52308 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.0) in Cli, published November 14, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.91%, the 60th percentile. Fixed in github.com/cli/cli/v2 2.62.0.

References

Show 39 moreShow less
This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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