CVE-2025-14081

The Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Profile Privacy Setting Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.11.0. This is due to a flaw in the secure fields mechanism where field keys are stored in the allowed fields list before the required_perm check is applied during rendering. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access to modify their profile privacy settings (e.g., setting profile to "Only me") via direct parameter manipulation, even when the administrator has explicitly disabled the option for their role.

The Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Profile Privacy Setting Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.11.0. This is due to a flaw in the secure fields mechanism where field keys are stored in the allowed fields list before the required_perm check is applied during rendering. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access to modify their profile privacy settings (e.g., setting profile to "Only me") via direct parameter manipulation, even when the administrator has explicitly disabled the option for their role.

The Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Profile Privacy Setting Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.11.0. This is due to a flaw in the secure fields mechanism where field keys are stored in the allowed fields list before the required_perm check is applied during rendering. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access to modify their profile privacy settings (e.g., setting profile to "Only me") via direct parameter manipulation, even when the administrator has explicitly disabled the option for their role.

The Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Profile Privacy Setting Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.11.0. This is due to a flaw in the secure fields mechanism where field keys are stored in the allowed fields list before the required_perm check is applied during rendering. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access to modify their profile privacy settings (e.g., setting profile to "Only me") via direct parameter manipulation, even when the administrator has explicitly disabled the option for their role.