CVE-2025-15284

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=value consumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here
    obj = [];
    obj[index] = leaf;
}

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

The Intel SGX SDK is a collection of APIs, libraries, documentations and tools that allow software developers to create and debug Intel SGX enabled applications in C/C++.

Security Fix(es):

• qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper input validation in array parsing (CVE-2025-15284)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite and symlink poisoning via unsanitized linkpaths in archives (CVE-2026-23745)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite via Unicode path collision race condition (CVE-2026-23950)

• lodash: prototype pollution in _.unset and _.omit functions (CVE-2025-13465)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal bypass in hardlink security check (CVE-2026-24842)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Rocky Linux 10 Release Notes linked from the References section.

The Intel SGX SDK is a collection of APIs, libraries, documentations and tools that allow software developers to create and debug Intel SGX enabled applications in C/C++.

Security Fix(es):

• qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper input validation in array parsing (CVE-2025-15284)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite and symlink poisoning via unsanitized linkpaths in archives (CVE-2026-23745)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite via Unicode path collision race condition (CVE-2026-23950)

• lodash: prototype pollution in _.unset and _.omit functions (CVE-2025-13465)

• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal bypass in hardlink security check (CVE-2026-24842)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Rocky Linux 9 Release Notes linked from the References section.

Root has patched CVE-2025-15284 in the qs package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

The Intel SGX SDK is a collection of APIs, libraries, documentations and tools that allow software developers to create and debug Intel SGX enabled applications in C/C++.

Security Fix(es):

• qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper input validation in array parsing (CVE-2025-15284)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite and symlink poisoning via unsanitized linkpaths in archives (CVE-2026-23745)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite via Unicode path collision race condition (CVE-2026-23950)
• lodash: prototype pollution in _.unset and _.omit functions (CVE-2025-13465)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal bypass in hardlink security check (CVE-2026-24842)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the AlmaLinux Release Notes linked from the References section.

The Intel SGX SDK is a collection of APIs, libraries, documentations and tools that allow software developers to create and debug Intel SGX enabled applications in C/C++.

Security Fix(es):

• qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper input validation in array parsing (CVE-2025-15284)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite and symlink poisoning via unsanitized linkpaths in archives (CVE-2026-23745)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file overwrite via Unicode path collision race condition (CVE-2026-23950)
• lodash: prototype pollution in _.unset and _.omit functions (CVE-2025-13465)
• node-tar: tar: node-tar: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal bypass in hardlink security check (CVE-2026-24842)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the AlmaLinuxRelease Notes linked from the References section.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check }

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; }

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check }

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; }

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check }

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; }

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check }

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; }

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 5.2.0-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 5.1.0-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 6.5.3-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 2.3.3-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 6.5.5-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 5.2.1-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 6.10.7-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 6.10.3-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 6.7.0-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 6.13.0-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 5 CVEs. Fixed in 0.6.5-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 6.4.3-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 6.2.6-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.0.2-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 6.11.2-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 6.10.4-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 6.5.1-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 4 CVEs. Fixed in 6.2.1-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 6.5.3-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 5 CVEs. Fixed in 0.4.2-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt qs to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 6.14.0-tuxcare.6.